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What was the traditional approach to the gold standard? In this paper,
I try to provide an answer to the question by examining the works of
major writers on the subject since the eighteenth century.
1The choice of
writers and works surveyed is based on my judgment that the works
encompasseda significantshareofthecontentofthe traditional approach
and that the writers played a significant role in the history of economic
thought.
Six major themes formed the traditional approach, and five major
schools of thought may be identified.
1.2 Major Themes in the Literature
The first theme, which runs from Cantillon to present-daywriters, was
that gold (the precious metals) was an ideal monetarystandard, domesti-
cally and internationally, because of its unique qualities both as a stan-
dard ofvalue and a medium ofexchange. A stable price level in the long
run that an automatically operated gold standard produced, in line with
the commodity theoryofmoney, was invariably contrasted to the evils of
inconvertiblefiduciary money. Atthe handsofeven well-meaningpolicy-
makers the latter would inevitably lead to depreciation of the value of
money. However, most writers, following Adam Smith, emphasized the
social saving from using fiduciary money instead ofa commodity money
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and hence wereconcernedwith thepropertiesofaconvertible (ormixed)
standard to ensure price stability.
The second theme was the price-specie-flow mechanism. The essence
ofthe gold standardwas the maintenanceofa fixed mint price ofnational
money in terms of gold (achieved by specifying the weight of a nation's
coinage in terms of gold). That rule ensured uniformity of the price of
gold across nations (and regions) through the process of arbitrage in
gold.
2Moreover, eachcountry'sprice levelwas determinedby its stockof
monetary gold, which in turn was determined (naturally distributed) by
the nation's real income and money-holding habits. Consequently, the
price levels ofall countries were linked together under the gold standard
by the fixed definition of the monetary unit in terms of gold. Any
disturbance away from the natural distribution ofprecious metals affect-
ing onenation's (region's) pricelevel, andhence the marketpriceofgold,
would inevitably lead to an equilibrating process through arbitrage in the
gold market. Gold flows, by changing the nation's (region's) money
supply, would then also change its level of prices.
Forexample, a gold discovery in onecountrywould leadto an increase
in its moneysupply, an increasein its pricelevel, a~d afall in the domestic
market price of gold. The divergence between the domestic and world
gold prices would quickly lead to a gold outflow, a contraction in the
domesticmoneysupply, and afall ofthe domesticpricelevel. Analterna-
tive way ofviewing the same mechanism was to focus on the balance of
trade-the rise in the domestic price level would raise prices ofdomestic
goods and exports relative to prices ofimports, leading to a balance-of-
trade deficit, a gold outflow, and a contraction of the money supply.
Thus the price-specie-flow mechanism was the means by which arbi-
trage in one commodity-gold-between nations and regions, served to
keep overall national (regional) price levels in line and to maintain
balance-of-payments equilibrium. Within this context, different authors
stressed the pattern of adjustment of particular classes of commodities.
Thus Mill focused onthe behaviorofthe prices oftradable goods relative
to those ofdomestic (nontradable) goods. Othersfocused onthe second-
ary role of changes in the exchange rate. To the extent that gold prices
between nations could differ, reflecting transportation and othercosts of
transferring gold (the difference between the upper and lower bounds
referred to as the gold points), changes in exchange rates (the domestic
relative to the foreign price of gold) would also serve to equilibrate the
balance ofpaymentswithout requiring a gold flow. In addition, a number
of writers focused on the role of real income in the adjustment mecha-
nism-ehanges in the quantity of money consequent upon gold flows
would affect totalexpenditure andincome in addition to, orin somecases
instead of, affecting prices.25 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
The third theme, which is intimately connected to the second, was the
"law of one price"-the notion that arbitrage in individual traded com-
modities would ensure similar prices in a common currency for similar
goods, taking account of transportation costs and trade impediments.
Along these lines, a distinction was made between domestic (nontraded)
goods whose prices are determined primarily by domestic forces and
traded goods whose prices are determined by the world mark.et.
One question is how to reconcile the law of one price with the price-
specie-flow mechanism, since the latter stressed primarily consequences
of arbitrage in gold, while the former stressed arbitrage in all traded
commodities. For the classical economists, it was assumed that arbitrage
in gold was more effective than in other commodities because of gold's
special properties; moreover, since gold served as the money supply (or
as the monetary base), alterations in its quantity would impinge on all
prices. Ultimately, which goods serve as vehicles for arbitrage is an
empirical question. The answer depends on the total costs of arbitrage,
including information costs. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, gold was the commodity with the lowest arbitrage costs, hence
gold flows rapidly kept gold prices in line and other goods prices fol-
lowed. Later in the nineteenth century, with improvements in com-
munications technology and the development ofinternational securities
and commodity markets, arbitrage in securities and traded commodities
reduced the role for gold flows in the adjustment mechanism.
The fourth theme was the role of capital flows in the gold standard
balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism. The original conception of
theprice-specie-flow adjustmentmechanismwas thatitoperatedthrough
flows of goods and money, but by the middle of the nineteenth century,
emphasis was also placed on the role ofshort-termcapital flows as partof
the equilibrating mechanism. According to the traditional approach, a
decline (rise) in the domesticmoneystockledto a rise (fall) in short-term
interest rates and consequently attracted funds from abroad. Thus in the
example of a gold discovery, the increased money supply would reduce
domestic interest rates relative to interest rates in other countries, pro-
ducing both a short-term capital and gold outflow, thereby reducing the
amount of adjustment required through changes in the domestic price
level. As the nineteenth century wore on and world capital markets
became more integrated, emphasis on the role of capital mobility in-
creased to the point where it was regarded as the dominant adjustment
mechanism.
In addition to short-term capital flows, the role of long-term capital
flows was noted as a source of disturbance to the balance of payments.
Thus one element of the traditional approach was the role of long-term
lending by mature countries, such as England and France, to developing26 Michael D. Bordo
nations, such as the UnitedStates, Canada, and Argentina. Capital flows
from the Old to the New World were also accompanied by gold flows,
raising the price level in the capital-importing country and lowering it in
the exporting country. The resultant change in relative price levels pro-
duced a current-account surplus in the capital-exporting country and a
deficit in the importing country. Thus the transfer ofcapital resulted in a
transfer of real resources.
3 The process could continue for many years,
with developing (developed) countries running a persistent balance-of-
payments deficit (surplus) on current account financed by long-term
capital inflows (outflows).
The fifth theme, which focuses primarily on the performance of the
BankofEngland, was the role ofcentralbanksin helpingorhinderingthe
adjustment mechanism. This theme was a reflection ofthe British flavor
of the gold standard literature and the key role played by the Bank of
England in the analysis of the gold standard.
Several aspects ofthe central-bank theme may be noted. One was the
debate over rules versus discretion. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, emphasis was placed on the advantage of combining the auto-
matic-monetary-rule aspect of the gold standard with the benefits of
low-resource-cost fiduciary money. That approach culminated in the
BankCharterAct of1844 andthe separationofthe BankofEnglandinto
the Issue Department, based on a gold standard rule, and the Banking
Department, based on commercial-banking principles.
Second, several money-market crises and threats to convertibility in
the succeeding quar.ter century led to attention in the literature to the
Bank's disregard of domestic-money-market conditions in its operation
as a private profit-maximizing institution following a gold standard rule.
Thus the Bank, in keeping with its private role, would maintain as Iowa
gold reserve as possible while using its Bank-rate weapon to protect its
reserve from gold outflows. Bagehot's statement of the "responsibility
doctrine" and a prescription for effective central-bank management,
referred to as Bagehot's rule, emerged from the scrutiny of the Bank's
behavior. A laterdevelopmentwas the discussion ofthe inherent conflict
between internal and external price stability under a fixed exchange rate
such as the gold standard.
In addition, the gold standard came to be regarded as primarily man-
aged by central banks' use of changes in the discotmt rate to facilitate
adjustment to both internal and external gold drains. Among the issues
stressed were: how Bank rate was made "effective," in the sense of
inducing correspondingchanges in market interest rates; the use ofother
policy tools to protectthe gold reserves; thechannelsbywhich changesin
Bank rate would affect the required adjustment in the balance of pay-
ments-by inducing short-term capital flows or by changing domestic
price levels, economic activity, and the terms of trade.27 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
Finally, discussion turned on the extent to which central banks fol-
lowed the "rules ofthe game," that is, used theirpolicy tools to speed up
the adjustment mechanism to an external shock. According to the rules,
the central bankofa country experiencing a gold outflow (inflow) should
engage in policies to contract (expand) the domestic money supply.
The sixth and final theme in the traditional approach was the advocacy
ofa numberofproposalsfor reform. Manywriters suggested schemes for
reform ofthe gold standard both at the national and international levels.
At the national level, a persistent theme ranging from Thornton
([1802] 1978) to Keynes ([1923] 1971) was the importance of managing
the gold standard so as to reduce the conflict between external and
internal stability, i.e., for the central bank to intervene and shield the
domestic moneysupplyfrom externalshocks. Relatedto this themewere
schemes to protect the monetary gold stock from internal currency
drains, e.g., Ricardo's gold-bullion standard. Finally, schemes were de-
signed to separate the medium-of-exchange function of gold from the
store-of-value function. All these proposals attempted to rectify an im-
portant defect of the gold standard-basing a nation's money supply on
one commodity subject to changing demand and supply conditions.
Schemes along these lines included creation ofa tabularstandard, bimet-
allism, symmetallism, and Fisher's (1920) compensated dollar.
At the international level, proposals designed to provide world price
stability included schemes such as bimetallism, symmetallism, and the
basing ofinternational money on a wide commodity basket; and also, to
ensure internationalharmonyofprice-levelmovements, theyfavored the
creation of some form of supernational central bank.
1.3 Schools of Thought
On the basis bothofcommon views and chronology, the five schools of
thought on the gold standard are the classical school, the neoclassical
school, the Harvardschool, the interwarcritics, and the post-WorldWar
II reinterpreters. A briefsummary ofthe views ofthe leading exponents
of each school follows. Detailed documentation of these views is pro-
vided in five appendixes, one for each school.
1.3.1 Classical School
Eight economists-Cantillon, Hume, Ricardo, Thornton, Mill,
Cairnes, Goschen, and Bagehot-eonstituted the classical school. From
the writings of these men we can distill the essence of the traditional
approach. Cantillon developed the law of one price and aspects of the
international adjustment mechanism. Hume is famous for the price-
specie-flow mechanism. Ricardo developed the natural distribution of
precious metals and made contributions to issues related to the monetary28 Michael D. Bordo
standard and monetary reform. Mill, perhaps the key writer of the
school, coveredvirtually all themajorthemes ofthe traditionalview, and
Cairnes tested some of the theoretical implications. Finally, Goschen
focused on the role of short-term capital flows, while Bagehot outlined
the principles of central-bank management under the gold standard.
1.3.2 Neoclassical School
Marshall, Fisher, and Wicksell ofthe neoclassical school extended and
perfected the mechanisms analyzed by the classical school. They, how-
ever, explored some of the detrimental effects, both for individual na-
tions and for the world, of adhering to the gold standard, and conse-
quently the need for reform.
1.3.3 Harvard School
F. W. Taussig and his students (Viner, Graham, White, Williams, and
Beach) attemptedto formulate andtest a more comprehensive version of
the traditional balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism to the exter-
nal disturbance of long-term capital movements by incorporating gold
flows, changes in relative price levels, short-term capital flows, and
changes in discount rates.
The evidence for the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada,
and Argentina produced by this massive research project was largely
inconclusive, andin many respects cast doubtonthe traditional emphasis
onrelative price-levelchanges as the heartofthe adjustmentmechanism.
J. W. Angell, a critic ofTaussig, integrated the law ofone price in the
relative price-specie-flow adjustment mechanism. Despite its critical
approach, his work is classified as part of the Harvard-school studies.
1.3.4 Interwar Critics
After World War I, a number of writers considered the case for and
against a return to the gold standard as it existed pre-World War I.
Brown and Smit, accepting in the main the stylized facts of the gold
standard as succinctly portrayed by the Cunliffe report (United King-
dom, Parliament [1918] 1979), assessed the gold standard as having been
successful before World War I because it was a managed standard-
managed by London-and then documented the special institutional
characteristics of the sterling standard. Keynes and Viner discussed the
inherent policy conflict between adherence to the gold standard and
domestic economic activity, and addressed a plea for more international
cooperation. Whale cast doubt on the stylized facts of how the gold
standard worked, suggesting that perhaps the traditional approach was
incorrect.29 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
1.3.5 Post-World War II Reinterpreters
Inthe post-WorldWarII period, scholars reexaminedtheoperationof
the classical gold standard on the basis ofnew evidence and new theoret-
ical and statisticaltools. Theissues theystressed included the balance-of-
payments adjustment mechanism, capital flows, and rules of the game.
The balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism under the gold stan-
dard was reexamined from a Keynesian perspective by Ford, from a
modern quantity-theory perspective by Friedman and Schwartz, and
from the perspective of the monetary approach to the balance of pay-
ments by Williamson, Triffin, and McCloskey and Zecher. The role of
capitalflows was reexaminedby Morgenstern andBloomfield. Finally the
operation ofcentral banks under the gold standard with respect to rules
of the game was reconsidered by Sayers, Bloomfield, and Lindert.
1.4 A Retrospective
The development of the literature on the traditional approach can be
viewed from a number ofperspectives. I briefly sketch out the elements
of two of them: the first, that the interpretation of the gold standard by
each school reflected the policy concerns ofthe time; the second, thatthe
evolution of the interpretation of the gold standard has many of the
characteristics of a Kuhnian scientific revolution.
According to the first perspective, the development of the traditional
approach by the classical economists was strongly influenced by the
concern over finding the ideal monetary standard consistent with the
classical principles of free enterprise and free trade. This concern thus
explains the emphasis on the automatic qualities of the gold standard
both as a national and an international standard, the operation of the
commodity theory of money that would ensure long-run world price
stability (in astationaryworld), andtheprice-specie-flowmechanism that
would ensure the natural distribution of precious metals and uniformity
of price structures across the world. Behind this smoothly functioning
monetary veil, real resources would be efficiently allocated to their best
uses by the forces of competition between individuals and enterprises
across the world. The introduction ofthe real-world problems offriction
in the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism and the possible con-
flict, at least in the short run, between the constraint ofthe gold standard
and internal economic stability led to the development ofrules ofproper
central-bank management of the gold standard.
The neoclassical economists, writing at a time when the gold standard
was the prevailing standard, accepted its rationale, but concerned them-
selves with removing one of its major shortcomings-specifically, the
tendency for the world price level to exhibit alternating swings of defla-30 Michael D. Bordo
tion and inflation, reflecting major shocks to the demand for and supply
of gold.
The Harvard economists, like the neoclassicists, writing about the
heyday of the gold standard, sought a better understanding of the
mechanism by which one of the most important structural changes in
modern economic history took place-the transfer of real resources
associated with massive lending by the mature countries of Western
Europe to the developing countries of the New World.
Theinterwarcritics, writing after the collapse ofthe gold standard, yet
strongly influenced by its heritage, were concerned with thepossibility of
restoring the old system. Much oftheir work reflected skepticism on this
score because for them "special circumstances" in the prewar period
made the system work: the unique interrelationship between the London
gold, securities, and commodities markets that created a "sterling stan-
dard"; the commitment by major participants to maintain convertibility
as their key policy goal; and relatively free trade and factor mobility.
These special circumstances no longer existed.
Other interwar critics focused on the negative aspects of the gold
standard: the tendency for short-run price instability, the asymmetry
between the adjustment mechanism ofcentral and peripheral countries,
the conflict between external and internal stability, and the tendency for
economic fluctuations to be transmitted internationally by the gold stan-
dard. Hencetheseinterwarcritics doubtedthewisdom ofreturningtothe
standard'siron discipline. However, in elaborating proposalsfor a better
system, the consensus favored maintaining a fixed-exchange-rate system
based on gold, with expanded national discretionary management and
the establishment of a supernational central bank.
Finally, in the postwar period, operating in an institutional environ-
ment far enough removed from the events before 1914, scholars of the
gold standard could objectively ask how the gold standard in its many
aspects worked. Armedwith new theoretical andstatisticaltools and new
compilations of data, the consensus of this work has been that the
internationalgold standarddid function smoothlyin thesenseofensuring
international price harmony, in allowing the international transfer of
resources, and in maintaining balance-of-payments equilibria for most
countries over long periods of time, but that many elements of the
story-particularlythe operationofthe price-specie-flowmechanism and
the importance of the rules of the game-were subject to doubt.
According to the second perspective, the development of the gold
standardliteraturereflected a Kuhnianscientific revolution (Kuhn 1970).
Along this line, we start with the development of the classical-gold
standard paradigm by the classical economists, culminating in the mag-
numopus ofJ. S. Mill. Theparadigmwas furtherextendedandperfected
by the neoclassical economists, especiallyIrvingFisher. However, anom-31 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
alies begin to appear by the end of the nineteenth century: the price-
specie-flow mechanism emphasizing the adjustment of relative price
levels could not explain the actual adjustment process to international
lending in a number ofcountries; in some cases the mechanism could be
detected, in others the adjustment of price levels between countries
seemed to be too rapid for the theory; and it appeared that many
countries did not follow the rules of the game but engaged in extensive
sterilizationactivities. However, the reactiontotheseanomalies byTaus-
sig and others was to incorporate them into the theory as special cases.
The assault on the classical paradigm began in the interwar period with
the grave doubts raised by Keynes, Williams, Cassel, and others, but it
was probably the 1937 article by Whale, challenging the whole classical
interpretation ofhow the gold standard worked, that started the revolu-
tion. The further revelation of evidence inconsistent with the classical
story in the postwar period added ammunition to the case presented by
Williamson, Triffin, and finally McCloskey and Zecher. The last authors
completely upended the classical paradigm and argued passionately that
all aspects of the gold standard could be explained by the newly de-
veloped monetary approach. The scientific revolution was complete.
In conclusion, we can ask: Is this the end of the gold standard story?
McCloskey and Zecher, in tying together much of the unfavorable evi-
dence againstthetraditionalapproachandthenreinterpretingthefacts to
be consistent with the implications of the monetary approach to the
balance of payments, make a strong case for a successful conclusion,
except that the evidence they marshal in favor of their approach, based
largely on correlation tests of commodity arbitrage, is neither extensive
nor conclusive enough to end the story.
Appendix A The Classical Economists
In this appendix the writings ofeight key economistswho first formulated
the tenets of the traditional approach to the gold standard are
summarized:
4 Cantillon, Hume, Ricardo, Thornton, Mill, Cairnes, Go-
schen, and Bagehot.
Richard Cantillon
Richard Cantillon ([1931] 1964), writing in 1755, was one of the first
writers to analyze the working ofa money economy. Operating within a
crude quantity-theory-of-money framework ,5 Cantillon regarded the
quantity ofmoney as consisting entirely ofspecie-gold and silver coins.
Gold and silver emerged as money commodities as a result ofthe evolu-
tion of natural market forces-they best satisfied the properties of32 Michael D. Bordo
money, viz., they are "of small volume, equal goodness, easily trans-
ported, divisible without loss, convenient to keep, beautiful and brilliant
in the articles made of them and durable almost to eternity" (Cantillon
[1931] 1964, p. 111). Moreover, the choice between gold and silver (as
well as the desired ratio in a bimetallic system) is determined by market
forces-on the demand side by tastes and income, on the supply side by
relative scarcity (pp. 97 and 277). In the long run, the world's monetary
specie stock as well as its exchange value is determined by the foregone
cost in terms ofthe land and laborrequiredto extractpreciousmetals.6In
the short run, the two key sources of a nation's money supply are its
balance-of-paymentssurplus andthepresenceofdomesticgold andsilver
mines (bk. 2, chaps. 6, 7).
Perhaps Cantillon's most important contribution was setting out a
dynamic version ofthe quantity theory ofmoney orwhat has often been
referred to as monetary-disequilibrium theory. Cantillon carefully ana-
lyzed the dynamic process by which the quantity of money affected eco-
nomic activity and the price level. An important element ofhis analysis
was the international repercussions in the specie-standard world offixed
exchange rates of domestically induced monetary change:
If more money continues to be drawn from the Mines all prices will
owing to this abundance rise to such a point that . . . there will be a
considerable profit in buying them [goods] from the foreigner who
makes them much more cheaply. This will naturally induce several
people to import many manufactured articles made in foreign coun-
tries, where they will be found very cheap: this will gradually ruin the
Mechanics and Manufacturers of the State. (P. 165).
Thatis, domesticinflation, by raising the prices ofdomestically-produced
goods relative to foreign-produced goods (changing the terms oftrade),
will generate a balance-of-trade deficit. This deficit will induce a specie
outflow, a reduction in the domestic money stock, and a reduction in
domestic output and prices-the price-specie-flow mechanism.
In addition to the terms-of-trade effect, the balance of payments will
adjust by a direct-expenditure effect. According to this mechanism, an
excess supply of money will cause domestic expenditures to exceed
income; some of this expenditure will be made directly on foreign-
produced goods (whose prices are determined abroad), leading to a
specie outflow:
It is usual in States which have acquired a considerable abundance of
money to draw manythings from neighbouring countrieswhere money
is rare and consequently everything is cheap: but as money must be
sent for this the balance of trade will become smaller. (P. 169)
Cantillon's final main contribution to the traditional view
7 was a clear
statement ofthe law ofone price-eommodity arbitrage will ensure that33 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
the prices of similar traded goods will be the same across countries and
across regions within countries, allowing for the influence of tariffs and
transportation costs.
ThedifferenceofpricesintheCapitalandintheProvincesmustpayfor
the costs and risks of transport, otherwise cash will be sent to the
Capital to pay the balance and this will go on till the prices in the
Capital and the Provinces come to the level of these costs and risks.
(P. 151)
Moreover, he clearly distinguished between traded and nontraded
goods on the basis of trade impediments and transportation costs. Thus
the prices of traded goods that are determined abroad will be largely
unaffected by domestic monetary conditions, whereas the prices ofnon-
traded goods will respond fully, viz.
In England it is always permitted to bring in corn from foreign coun-
tries, but not cattle. Forthis reason however greatthe increase ofhard
moneymaybein Englandthepriceofcorncanonlyberaisedabovethe
price in othercountries where money is scarce by the costs and risks of
importing corn from these foreign countries.
It is not the same with the price of Cattle, which will necessarily be
proportioned to the quantity ofmoney offered for Meat in proportion
to the quantity ofMeat and the number of Cattle bred there. (P. 179)
This suggests that the distinction between the terms of trade and the
direct-expenditure mechanisms rests on the distinction between traded-
and nontraded-goods prices. The excess-money-induced expenditure
falls on both traded and nontraded goods. To the extent the expenditure
affects nontraded goods, their prices rise, inducing the substitution of
traded goods. To the extent it affects traded goods whose prices are
determined abroad, it leads to a direct specie outflow. Presumably, the
effect on nontraded-goods prices will be short-lived-until substitution
andthe decline in the domesticmoneysupplyconsequentuponthespecie
outflow have caused the relative prices oftraded and nontraded goods to
return to their initial equilibrium.
David Hume
In his essay, "Ofthe Balance ofTrade" ([1752] 1955), Hume is gener-
ally believed to have originated the theory ofthe traditional balance-of-
paymentsadjustmentmechanismofaninternationalspecie standard (see
Viner 1937, pp. 291-92). According to Hume, a domestic monetary
disturbance such as a sudden decrease in the specie stock will lead to a
proportional decline in all prices and wages, a consequent decline in the
prices ofexports relative to the prices ofimports, a balance-of-payments
surplus, a specie inflow, and an increase in the domestic stock ofspecie.34 Michael D. Bordo
Suppose four-fifths ofall the money in Great Britain to be annihilated
in one night, ... what would be the consequence? Must not the price
of all labour and commodities sink in proportion . . . ? What nation
could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navi-
gate orto sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford
sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the
moneywhich we hadlost, andraise us tothelevelofall theneighboring
nations? Where, afterwe have arrived, we immediatelylose the advan-
tage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther
flowing in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion. (Hume
[1752] 1955, pp. 62-63)
Thus, the domestic specie stock in a country (or province within a
country) under a specie standard will be automatically regulated by its
balance of payments. Moreover, this mechanism will ensure that each
nation's (province's) price level will be consistent with adherence to the
specie standard.
In addition, variations in the exchange rate within the gold points will
act as an additional factor to correct balance-of-payments disequilibria.
There is another cause, though more limited in its operation, which
checks the wrong balance oftrade, to every particular nation to which
the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the
exchange turns against us, and this becomes a new encouragement to
export; as much as the charge of carriage and insurance of the money
which becomes due would amount to. Forthe exchange can never rise
but a little higher than that sum. (P. 64n)
Hume also discussed the law of one price, viz.
any man who travels over Europe at this day, may see, by the prices of
commodities, that money... has brought itself nearly to a level; and
that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in
this respect, than it is often between different provinces of the same
kingdom....Theonly circumstanceswhich canobstructtheexactness
ofthese proportions [between money and real economic activity] is the
expense of transporting the commodities from one place to another.
(P. 66)
Some writers have argued that there appeared to be an inconsistency
between the law of one price, which suggests rapid adjustment of com-
modity prices through arbitrage, and the price-specie-flow mechanism
which suggests noticeable time lags.
8 However, as is made most clear by
Ricardo, the price-specie-flow mechanism is a reflection of arbitrage in
the gold market, which, because of its special properties, is more rapid
than arbitrage in othermarkets. Otherprices are kept in line through the
influence ofchanges in the quantity ofgold as money. In accordance with
this interpretation, Hume may have regarded the law of one price as a35 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
long-run equilibrium condition in all markets with the price-specie-flow
mechanism as the means to achieve that result.
David Ricardo
Gold as the Standard
Ricardo ([1811] 1951, [1816] 1951), in the classical tradition, viewed
the world quantity of specie as determined in the long run by cost of
production (Ricardo [1811] 1951, p. 52). The quantity ofprecious metals
used as money in each country depended "first, on its value;-secondly,
onthe amountorvalue ofthe payments to bemade;-and,thirdly, onthe
degree of economy practiced in effecting those payments" (Ricardo
[1816] 1951,po 55).
Each country's share of the world specie stock and hence the natural
distribution of precious metals is determined by its share of world real
income and factors determining velocity (or the demand for money).
The precious metals employed for circulating the commodities of the
world, ... have been divided into certain proportions among the
different civilized nations of the earth, according to the state of their
commerce and wealth, and therefore according to the number and
frequency of the payments which they had to perform. While so
divided they preserved everywhere the same value, and as each coun-
try had an equal necessity for the quantity actually in use, there could
be no temptationoffered to eitherfor theirimportationorexportation.
([1811] 1951, p. 52)
The choice ofgold and silver as monetary standard was "thecompara-
tive steadiness in the value of the precious metals, for periods of some
duration" ([1816] 1951, p. 55). Inthechoice betweengold andsilver, gold
has in its favor "itsgreatervalue under a smallerbulk" which "qualifiesit
for the standard in an opulent country," but coupled with the disadvan-
tage thatit is subjectto "greatervariations ofvalue during periods ofwar
or extensive commercial discredit." Silver he viewed as "much more
steady in its value, in consequence ofits demand and supply being more
regular." The only objection to its use as a standard "is its bulk, which
renders it unfit for the large payments required in a wealthy country" (p.
63).
However, using bothprecious metals as the standardhas the disadvan-
tage that prices expressed in terms of gold and silver will vary with
changing demand and supply conditions for each commodity. To avoid
this instability, Ricardo suggested the substitution of paper money and
"by the judicious management of the quantity, a degree of uniformity
... is secured" (pp. 57-58).9 In addition, the substitution ofbank notes
for specie "enables us to turn the precious metals (which, though a very36 Michael D. Bordo
necessary part of our capital, yield no revenue) into a capital which will
yield one" ([1811] 1951, p. 55). However, "the issuers of paper money
should regulate their issues solely by the price of bullion" ([1816] 1951,
p. 64). Indeed, for Ricardo, the key advantage ofthe gold standard was
that adherence to the standard acted as a check against the overissue of
paper money-it provided discipline (p. 78).
Balance-oJ-Payments Adjustment Mechanism
Beginning with the natural distribution of precious metals, Ricardo
demonstrated how this distribution would be neutral with respect to
monetary changes. Any movement away from the natural distribution
would be corrected by the price-specie-flow mechanism. Thus if a gold
mine were discovered in one country
the currency ofthat countrywould be lowered in value in consequence
of the increased quantity of the precious metals brought into circula-
tion, and would therefore no longer be of the same value as that of
othercountries. Gold andsilver, whetherin coin orin bullion, obeying
the law which regulates all other commodities, would immediately
become articles of exportation; they would leave the country where
they were cheap, for those countries where they were dear, and would
continue to do so, as long as the mine should prove productive, and till
the proportion existing between capital and money in each country
before the discovery ofthe mine, were again established, and gold and
silver restored every where to one value. In return for the gold ex-
ported, commodities would be imported; and though what is usually
termed the Balance of Trade would be against the country exporting
money orbullion, it would be evidence that she was carrying on a most
advantageous trade, exportingthatwhich was no way useful to her, for
commodities which might be employed in the extension ofher manu-
factures, and the increase ofherwealth. (Ricardo [1811] 1951, p. 54)10
Thus gold as a commodity flows to the market with the highest price
and thereby maintains price uniformity between nations.
Aslongas differentcountries(regionswithincountries) fixed the prices
oftheircurrenciesin terms ofgold (specified a gold weight oftheircoins),
then arbitrage allowing for transportation costs would always keep gold
prices in line. 11 This principle, referred to as the law ofone price, would
hold for all traded commodities, and hence in logic there was no reason
why commodityarbitragewould notoccurfor all commodities. However,
for Ricardo andotherclassicaleconomists, arbitragetookplaceprimarily
in gold because ofits special properties as money and because it involved
thelowest arbitragecosts. Consequentlysince all othercommodityprices
weresetin termsofgold-thenumeraireofthesystem-goldflows would
then keep all prices in line for countries (regions) on a gold standard.
However, some prices would react more quickly to the mechanism than37 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
others, specifically prices of tradable goods, and this quick reaction
probably explains the later emphasis in the literature on the role of
changes in sectional prices and the terms of trade (see appendix B on
Marshall).
Ricardo clearly distinguished between the adjustment mechanism
under the gold standard and under irredeemable paper money. An issue
ofconvertible papercurrency, e.g., BankofEnglandnotes, will displace,
through the balance of payments, a corresponding amount of specie
(p. 67). However, as long as convertibility in terms ofgold is maintained,
the domestic price level will not be affected. 12 Once all specie is displaced
and convertibility suspended, however, domestic prices will rise, and a
depreciated exchange rate will be the indicator of overissue (pp. 58-59,
63-64, 72-78). In the Bullion report ([1810] 1978, pp. ccxvii-ccxxi), a
distinction is made between the real exchange rate-determined by the
ratioofthe mintpricesofgold betweentwo gold standardcountries-and
the marketexchange rateorthe computedpar. Themarketexchange rate
includes both the influence of real factors causing a divergence from par
within the gold points and the depreciation of the exchange rate (pre-
mium on the price of gold) due to a rise in the price level.
Thus for Ricardo, the increase in irredeemable paper following the
suspension of payments in 1797 was responsible for both a rise in all
commodityprices in Englandwith no corresponding rise in prices abroad
and the depreciation of the pound (pp. ccxiv-ccxv).
Proposals for Monetary Reform
As mentioned above, Ricardo viewed a properly regulated convertible
paper currency as superior to a precious-metals standard. However, he
believed that convertibility into gold was necessary to avoid the tempta-
tion of overissue (Ricardo [1816] 1951, p. 69).
And in the Bullion report ([1810] 1978, p. ccxlvi) a strong case is made
in favor of a gold standard rule and against discretionary monetary
policy:
The most detailed knowledge of the actual trade of the country,
combined with the profound science in all the principles ofmoney and
circulation, would not enable any man orsetofmento adjust, andkeep
always adjusted, the right proportion ofcirculating medium in a coun-
try to the wants of trade. When the currency consists entirely of the
precious metals, or of paper convertible at will into the precious
metals, the natural process of commerce, by establishing exchanges
amongall the differentcountriesoftheworld, adjusts, in everyparticu-
lar country, the proportion of circulating medium to its actual occa-
sions, according to that supply ofthe precious metals which the mines
furnish to the general market of the world. The proportion, which is
thus adjusted and maintained by the natural operation of commerce,38 Michael D. Bordo
cannotbe adjusted by any humanwisdom orskill. Ifthe naturalsystem
ofcurrency and circulation be abandoned, and a discretionary issue of
paper money substituted in its stead, it is vain to think that any rules
can be devised for the exact exercise of such a discretion.
As a remedyfor defects ofapurelymetallicstandardwith no discretion
for central bankers, he proposed a convertible banknote issue backed by
bullion (Ricardo [1816] 1951, p. 66).
Free export and import of bullion would be permissible. Under this
scheme the costs of frequent conversions of coin into bullion would be
eliminated, but the risks of attempted conver~ion of banknotes into




Like Ricardo, Thornton([1802] 1978, p. 21a) viewed convertibilityas a
key feature of the gold standard.
14 Also, like Ricardo, he viewed the
substitution ofpapermoney for specie up to the point ofconvertibility as
a social saving. However, he extended the analysis to consider the effects
of a domestic issue of bank notes on the world price level.
First, since the issue of paper money would displace specie in the
domestic circulation, specie would be exported abroad, leading to an
increase in the world money stock and a rise in world prices. The country
displacing specie would thereby raise its capital stock (Thornton [1802]
1978, pp. 269-70).
Second, to the extent the use ofpaper money reduced the demand for
gold as money, and hence the price of bullion, this development would
cause "those mines which have not yielded any rent, to be no longer
worked; and the supply of gold ... to be in consequence, somewhat
reduced." The process would continue until
all mines will be unable to defray the charge of extracting the ore,
exceptthosewhich now yield theveryhighest rent. Atthis pointthefall
will necessarily stop . . . gold and silver must continue to bear that
price, or nearly that price,... atwhich they are now exchangeable for
commodities. (P. 266)
Balance-oj-Payments Adjustment Mechanism
Thornton clearly elucidated the price-specie-flow mechanism. The
primary mechanism ofadjustment following an increase in the domestic
money supply (an increase in BankofEngland note issue) is the effect on
prices at home relative to those abroad.
It is obvious, that in proportion as goods are rendered dear in Great
Britain, theforeigner becomes unwilling to buythem, thecommodities
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preference in the foreign market; and, therefore, that in consequence
ofa diminution ofordersfrom abroad, ourexports will be diminished.
. . . But not only will our exports lessen ... ; our imports also will
increase; for the high British price of goods will tempt foreign com-
modities to come in nearly in the same degree in which it will discour-
age British articles from going out. (Thornton [1802] 1978, p. 198)
The resultant deficit in the balance ofpayments will however be offset
to a certain extent by changes in the exchange rate within the gold points.
However, to the extent an unfavorable balance persists andthe exchange
rate falls to the specie-export point, this will lead to a specie outflow until
trade balance is restored (pp. 145-47).
Finally, Thornton discussed an alternative adjustment mechanism-
the direct-expenditure-income mechanism:
There is in the mass of the people . . . a disposition to adapt their
individual expenditure to theirincome. Importations conductedwith a
view to the consumption of the country into which the articles are
imported . . . are limited by the ability of the individuals of that
country to pay for them out oftheir income.... If, therefore,... the
value of the annual income of the inhabitants of a country is dimin-
ished, either new economy on the one hand, or new exertions of
individual industry on the other, fail not, after a certain time, in some
measure, to restore the balance. And this equality between private
expenditures and private incomes tends ultimately to produce equality
between the commercial exports and imports. (Pp. 142-43)
Law of One Price
According to Thornton, different prices within Great Britain for iden-
tical goods cannot exist as long as country banknotes are convertible into
Bank of England notes.
A very considerable advance in the price of commodities bought and
sold in one quarterofthis kingdom, while there was no such rise in any
other, was not supposable; because the holders of the circulating
medium current in the spot in which goods were . . . rendered dear,
would exchange it for the circulating medium ofthe part in which they
were assumed to be cheap, and would then buy the commodities ofthe
latterplace, and transport them to theformer, for the sake ofthe profit
on the transaction.
Moreover, the law ofone price can be extended from one kingdom to
the whole world as long as currencies are convertible.
We may ... extend our views, and conceive of Europe, and even of
the world, as forming one great kingdom, over the whole of which
goods pass and repass . . . nearly in the same manner in which they
spread themselves through this single country.40 Michael D. Bordo
However, prices can differ betweencountrieswithin thelimits ofthe gold
points:
ButBritishpaperis not exchangeablefor thecirculatingmediumofthe
continent, unless a discount ... be allowed. Of this fluctuating dis-
count ... the variations in the course of exchange are the measure.
(Thornton [1802] 1978, pp. 260-61)
Finally, he argued that under a specie standard, one country alone can
affect world (traded) goods prices only to the extentthatit has monopoly
powerin theirproduction. GreatBritainmay have this powerin theshort
run, but in the long run the existence of substitutes will diminish the
power.
Policy Considerations
Thornton was one of the first to recognize the possibility of a conflict
between external and internal policy goals. In the case ofan unfavorable
balance oftrade caused by an exogenous event such as a harvest failure,
the central bank could respond to the resulting gold outflow by reducing
the money supply, but taking such a course of action might depress
domestic activity. Hence, it would be prudent to maintain an adequate
gold reserve to permit the bank to increase its loans while losing gold.
IS
John Stuart Mill
Perhaps the clearest statement of the traditional approach to the gold
standard is in J. S. Mill's Principles ofPolitical Economy ([1865] 1961).
Much of the subsequent literature is either a refinement of Mill or
attempts to verify his theory. In discussing Mill, I focus on three topics:
(a) gold as a commodity money; (b) the natural distribution of precious
metals and the adjustment mechanism; (c) the distinction between real
and nominal disturbances.
Gold as a Commodity Money
Mill carefully analyzed the economics ofcommoditymoney, according
to which marketforces ensureadeterminatemoneystockandpricelevel.
In the longrun, according to Mill, the exchange value ofgold-whatit
will purchase in terms of other goods and services or the inverse of the
price level-willbe equalto its cost ofproduction-"thecost in laborand
expense, at the least productive sources ofsupply which the then existing
demand makes it necessary to work" (Mill [1865] 1961, p. 502). The
conformitywill be maintained by deviations in gold outputin response to
variations in the exchange value ofgold relative to its cost ofproduction.
However, because the existing stock of gold is large relative to addi-
tions to the stock, it takes a long time for full adjustment to take place.41 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
And hence the effect ofall changes in the conditions ofproduction of
the precious metals are at first, and continue to be for many years,
questions of quantity only, with little reference to cost ofproduction.
(P. 503)
Thus, in the short run, the price level is determined by the relationship
between the demand for and supply ofmoney, and only in the long run is
it determined by cost of production.
Mill then compared a bimetallic standard to a single metallic stan-
dard-"Thereis anobviousconvenience in making use ofthemorecostly
metal for larger payments and the cheaper one for smaller" (p. 507), but
the arrangement only works if the ratio of the two metals is consistent
with their relative costs ofproduction. Ifrelative values change, e.g., the
value ofgold rises relative to silver, this change will cause replacement of
gold by silver coins and the melting of gold coins.
Mill therefore preferred a limping standard.
The advantage without the disadvantages ofa double standard, seems
to be best obtained by those nations with whom one only of the two
metals is a legal tender, but the other is also coined (the more costly
metal), and allowed to pass for whatevervalue the market assigns to it.
(P. 509)
Finally, Mill, like his predecessors, viewed the substitution of paper
moneyfor specie up tothepointofconvertibilityas "anationalgain," but
beyond that "a form of robbery" (p. 551). Moreover, the social saving
from the issue ofpapermoney is transmitted to the rest ofthe world. The
specie displaced through the balance of payments will initially lead to a
rise in the world price level, but ultimately to a reduction in gold output.
The world price level will then return to normal.
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Natural Distribution ofPrecious Metals and Balance-oJ-Payments
Adjustment Mechanism
In the long run, each country in the world will have that quantity of
money to effect exchange consistent with keeping its value in terms ofits
cost of production, hence the natural distribution of precious metals
across countries is determined by real forces.
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Mill then compared the international adjustment mechanism under a
barter system with that under a money system. Starting from a state of
stable equilibrium where the value ofexports equals the value ofimports
"the process by which things are brought back to this state when they
happen to deviate from it, is, at least outwardly, not the same in a barter
system and in a money system." Under barter,
a country which wants more imports than its exports will pay for, must
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demand for them sufficient to reestablish the equilibrium. When
money is used, the country ... takes the additional imports at the
same price as before, and as she exports no equivalent, the balance of
payments turn against her; the exchange becomes unfavourable, and
the difference has to be paid in money. This is in appearance a very
distinct operation from the former. (Mill [1865] 1961, pp. 619-20)
However, this difference is only apparent; in both cases prices must
adjust to restore equilibrium. In the case of a money economy:
When. . . the state ofprices is such that the equation ofinternational
demand cannot establish itself, the country requiring more imports
than can bepaidfor byexports; it is a sign that the countryhas more of
the precious metals ... than can permanently circulate, and must
necessarily partwith some ofthem before the balance can be restored.
Thecurrencyis accordinglycontracted: pricesfall, and amongthe rest,
theprices ofexportable articles; for which, accordingly, there arises, in
foreign countries, a greaterdemand: while importedcommoditieshave
possibly risen in price, from the influx ofmoneyinto foreign countries,
and at all events have not participated in the general fall. (Pp. 620-21)
Thus, through the price-specie-flow mechanism the same results will be
achieved as under barter, with the only difference that relative prices
adjust as a consequence ofchanges in the quantity ofmoney induced by
specie flows rather than adjust directly. "In international, as in ordinary
domestic interchanges, moneyis to commerce only what oil is to machin-
ery, or railways to locomotion-a contrivance to diminish friction" (p.
622).
Mill made a clear distinction between temporary and permanent dis-
turbances to the balance ofpayments. When a disturbance is temporary,
most of the adjustment takes place through variations in the exchange
rate, within the gold points. Thus the deficit will be "soon liquidated in
commodities, and the account adjusted by means of bills, without the
transmission of any bullion" (pp. 617-18). In the case of a permanent
disturbance to the balance ofpayments, the adjustment must be made by
"the subtraction of actual money from the circulation of one of the
countries" (p. 618).
Distinction Between Real and Nominal Disturbances
Since the natural distribution ofprecious metals is determined by real
forces, changes in that distribution will only follow from a change in real
forces. Thus Mill made a clear distinction between the effects of a real
disturbance, such as a remittance from one country to another, and a
purely nominal disturbance, such as the discovery ofa hoardoftreasure.
In the first case, he starts from a state of equilibrium, after the first
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made in money. This lowers prices in the remitting country, and raises
them in the receiving. The natural effect is that more commodities are
exported than before, and fewer imported, and that... a balance of
moneywill be constantly due from the receiving to the paying country.
When the debt thus annually due to the tributary country becomes
equalto the annual tribute. . . no further transmission ofmoney takes
place; the equilibrium ofexports and imports will no longer exist, but
that ofpayments will; the exchange will be at par, the two debts will be
set off against one another, and the tribute or remittance will be
virtually paid in goods.
In addition, the terms oftrade will turn against the paying country and
in favor ofthe receiving country. "The paying country will give a higher
price for all that it buys from the receiving country, while the latter. . .
obtains the exportable produce ofthe tributary country at a lower price"
(Mill [1865] 1961, pp. 627-28)
Incontrast, a disturbance in the money marketchangestheworld price
level with no real effects. Thus the discovery of a hoard of treasure in a
country with a purely metallic currency will raise prices there, check
exports and encourage imports, leading to a balance-of-payments deficit
and diffusion of the new stock of money over the commercial world;
consequently the country's price level will revert to its previous level.
John E. Cairnes
Cairnes in his essays on gold (first published in 1858-60, reprinted in
1873) used the monetary history ofthe Australian colonies following the
gold discoveries of 1851 to test some of the principal conclusions of
classical monetary and trade theory. 18 In particular, he tested the ability
ofthe quantity theory ofmoney to predict the comparative static effects
of the gold discoveries on the money supplies and price levels of the
major countries of the world, and the ability of the Hume-Ricardo-
Thornton-Mill adjustment mechanism to predict the distribution ofpre-
cious metals. 19
Startingwith thelong-runcost-of-productiontheoryofmoney, Cairnes
argued that "the rate ofgold earnings [is] ... the circumstance which, in
the final resort, regulates the value ofthe metal and sets the limit beyond
which depreciation cannot permanently pass" (Cairnes [1873] 1965,
p. 41); and since gold earnings in Australia increased by 50 percent, i.e.,
the costofgold fell by one-half, he expectedthe price level in Australiato
double. The inflation process would spread across the world until either
prices doubled orthe cost ofproducing gold rose. Finally, as prices in the
rest ofthe world rose, gold would become a less profitable commodity to
produce and export until, in the limit, when the price of Australian
imports increased by the amount ofthe fall in the cost ofgold, Australia44 Michael D. Bordo
would cease to have a comparative advantage in gold and would divert
resources back to agriculture (p. 48).
In 1872, twelve years afterwriting his essays ongold, Cairnesfound, as
he hadpredicted, that (a) exhaustionofthe mines and the resulting rising
costs ofproduction and (b) rises in the price ofimports led to a consider-
able shift of resources out of gold production and back into agriculture.
Next Cairnes examined the factors that determine the pace of price
adjustment across countries. He argued that the rise in prices would be
most rapid in countries with the most advanced banking systems-the
more developed thesystem ofbankingandcredit, thesmallerthe amount
of new gold required to effect a given rise in prices. Furthermore, since
Australia and California conducted most of their trade with the United
States and England, most ofthe new gold would tend to go first to these
countries, and from there it would spreadto the continent ofEurope and
to Asia (pp. 67-68).20
In general, Cairnes found the evidence agreeable to his predictions-
prices increased most in Australia, followed by price increases in de-
scending order ofmagnitude in Great Britain and the United States, the
Continent, and finally Asia. Moreover, in a postscript, Cairnes reported
that (a) world gold production doubled by 1868 and (b) most ofthe gold
ended up in France and India, although much of it passed through
England (pp. 160-65).
George J. Goschen
The clearest statement of the classical position on short-term capital
flows in the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism is in Goschen
([1892] 1978).
Changes in interest rates and short-term capital flows facilitate the
balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism since
money will be dear and scarce in the country which owes much to
foreign creditors, and plentiful in that which has exported much; and,
high interest will be attracting money to that quarter whence specie is
flowing out in payment of foreign debts.
[an] adverse balance oftrade will. . . render the bills on the country
which is most in debt difficult of sale, and tend to compel it to export
specie; whereas the high rate ofinterest, which is generally contempo-
raneous with a drain...ofspecie, will revive a demandfor bills onthis
same country, and enhance their value in other quarters, for there will
be a general desire to procure the means of remitting capital to that
marketwhere it commandsthe highest value. (Goschen [1892] 1978, p.
127)
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where a considerable efflux ofspecie is takingplace, therateofinterest
will rise in the natural course of things. The abstraction caused by the
bullion shipments will of itself tend to raise that rate. (P. 132)
Moreover, a country can finance a temporary balance-of-payments
deficit by borrowing abroad. Finally, arbitrage in the securities market
will ensure that interest rates for a similar class of bills will be equal
between financial centers, account being taken of transportation costs
and exchange risks.
Ifat anytimetherateofinterestherefalls belowthatwhich rulesonthe
continent, it is inevitable that the whole mass ofthese bills will at once
besent to London, and be discounted there atthe cheaperrate, so that
the proceeds may be remitted in gold to the continent to be invested
there in local securities at the supposed higher rate. (P. 138)
Walter Bagehot and the Responsibility of the Bank of England
The puregold standardin England-whenthemoneysupplyconsisted
in large part of specie, and variations in its amount were determined
mainly by the balance ofpayments-became a managed gold standardin
the course ofthe nineteenth century-whenthe money supply consisted
primarily ofconvertible notes and deposits, and variations in its amount
were determinedbyoperationsoftheBankofEnglandconformingtothe
externalconstraintofthegoldstandard. Theevolutiontoa managedgold
standard evoked considerable debate in the ecopomic literature.
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In the decades after the restoration of convertibility in 1821, British
monetary history was punctuated by a series of monetary crises in 1825,
1836, 1838, 1847, 1859, and 1866 (see Viner [1937] 1975, pp. 218-20).
Thesecrises occurredwhen the necessarycontractionofthemoneystock
consequent upon a specie outflow (an external drain) coincided with a
demand by deposit and note holders for specie currency (an internal
drain). In such a situation it was difficult for the Bank to maintain
convertibility of its notes without resort to special measures. The Bank
CharterActof1844 was an attemptto rectify thesituationbydividing the
Bank ofEngland into an Issue Department and a Banking Department.
The former was charged with the responsibility of maintaining the gold
standard link by following the "currencyprinciple": The note circulation
should fluctuate one-for-one with changes in the Bank's holdings of
gold.22 The latter was to follow the principles of a profit-maximizing
banking enterprise, accepting deposits and making discounts.
The arrangement was criticized on two grounds: (1) the currency
principleignoredtheroleofdepositsas anincreasinglyimportantcompo-
nent ofthe money stock;23 and (2) the Banking Department in operating
on a sound commercial-banking basis could not act responsibly as a
central bank. In that role, it had to maintain a gold reserve large enough46 Michael D. Bordo
to protect the rest ofthe banking system from the effects ofboth internal
and external specie drains.
24 This criticism culminated in the 1860s with
the formulation by Walter Bagehot, the influential editor of the Econo-
mist, ofthe "responsibility doctrine" and the establishment ofguidelines
for a central bank under a gold standard.
In Lombard Street ([1873] 1969), Bagehot clearly set out the conflict
between the private concern of the Banking Department to reduce the
holding of specie reserves to minimize foregone interest costs and its
public concern to hold larger reserves (p. 38).
Bagehot argued for the "responsibility doctrine"-that the Bank of
England must fulfill its special obligations as a bankers' bank and as
holder of the nation's specie reserves. In consequence, he established
clear guidelines for central-bank behavior in times of crisis.
First, in the case of a purely external drain,
theBankofEnglandrequiresthe steadyuse ofan effectualinstrument.
Thatinstrumentis the elevation ofthe rate ofinterest. Ifthe interestof
money is raised, it is proved by experience that money does come to
Lombard Street, and theory shows it ought to come. (P. 46)
The rise in Bankrate will initially lead to a short-term capitalinflow and a
gold inflow.
And there is also a slower mercantile operation. The rise in the rate of
discount acts immediately on the trade ofthis country. Prices fall here;
in consequence imports are diminished, exports are increased, and,
therefore, there is more likelihood of a balance in bullion coming to
this country after the rise in the rate than there was before. (P. 47)
Second,
the best way for the Bank. . . to deal with a drain arising from internal
discredit is to lendfreely. . . .A panic. . . is a species ofneuralgia, and
according to the rules ofscience you must not starve it. The holders of
the cash reserve must be ready not only to keep it for their own
liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities of others.
(Pp. 48, 51)
In brief, the central bank has a responsibility to act as lender-of-Iast-
resort.
Finally, in thecase ofbothan internaland an externaldrain, the central
bank should follow what has come to be known as Bagehot's rule.
We must look first to the foreign drain, and raise the rate ofinterest as
high as may be necessary. Unless you can stop the foreign export, you
cannot allay the domestic alarm. TheBankwill get poorer and poorer,
and its povertywill protectorrenew the apprehension. And at the rate
of interest so raised, the holders ... of the final Bank reserve must47 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
lend freely. Very large loans at very high rates are the best remedy for
theworstmaladyofthe moneymarketwhen a foreign drainis addedto
a domestic drain. (P. 56)
Bagehotwas awareofthelimitationstotheBank'scontrolmechanism.
The Bank could only temporarily affect marketinterest rates. The initial
effect ofan increase in central-banklending is to lowerinterest rates, but
it also leads to an "increase oftrade and increase ofprices." The rise of
pricesandtradeleadsto anincreaseinthedemandforloanablefunds and
also to an increase of imports and a decrease in exports. The resultant
balance-of-trade deficit leads to a specie outflow and a reduction in
reserves, and hence the rate of interest must be raised (pp. 12-14).
In conclusion, Bagehot proposed several remedies for reform. Ofkey
importance, "there should be a clear understanding between the Bank
and the public that, since the Bank holds our ultimate banking reserve,
they will recognize and act on the obligations which this implies" (p. 70);
and the Bank should hold an adequate reserve to be determined by
"experience" (p. 304).25
Following the publication of Lombard Street, the Bank of England's
special position as both lender-of-Iast-resort and holder of the nation's
reserve was recognized, but increasing stress was laid on the Bank's
vulnerability in view of London's growing international liabilities (see
Sayers 1957). Though Bagehot andotherwriters urged the Bankto meet
theproblembymaintaininga largerspecie reserve (anapproachtakenby
other countries), the Bank's solution was to alter its discount rate
whenever its international reserves were affected, thereby primarily in-
fluencing short-term capital movements. The Bank also supplemented
the use of Bank rate with other tools of monetary policy, especially
open-marketoperations, andin additionlearnedtoprotectits reserves by
using special techniques referred to as "gold devices" (see Viner [1937]
1975, p. 277; Sayers 1936, chap. 3). Thus the ultimate answer to Bage-
hot's concern was the use "of a powerful bank rate weapon with a 'thin
film of gold' " (Sayers 1951, p. 116).
Appendix B The Neoclassical Economists: Extension ofthe
Traditional Approach
In this appendix, attention will center on the works ofthree neoclassical
economists-Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher, and Knut Wicksell-who
wrote extensively on the gold standard and whose contribution can be
viewed as a refinement or extension of the traditional approach.48 Michael D. Bordo
Alfred Marshall
Marshall's contribution (1923, 1926) to the traditional approachcanbe
classified under two headings: the monetary standard and proposals for
reform and the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism.
The Monetary Standard and Proposals for Reform
ForMarshall, the primarypurposeofa monetarystandardis to ensure
price stability:
Violent fluctuations of prices are less distasteful to the heads of busi-
ness enterprises than a gradual fall ofprices. But I believe they are far
more injurious both physically and morally to the community at large.
(Marshall 1926, p. 20)
Nevertheless, a goldorsilverstandardmaynot bethe best mechanism to
ensure price stability, at least in the long run.
Gold and silver, separately or conjointly, can set good standards of
general purchasing power, in regard to obligations and business trans-
actions, which donotrangeovermorethana few years; butobligations
which range over long periods, call for standards that are not depen-
dent on the hazards of mining. (Marshall 1923, p. 52)
Marshall admitted that in past years, technical advances in mining
precious metals had kept pace with technical advances elsewhere, so the
real cost of producing the precious metals had remained constant over
long periods of time, which was no accident; but he still believed that
as the arts oflife progress. . . man must demand a constantly increas-
ing precision from the instruments which he uses, and from money
among others: and he is beginning to doubt whether either gold or
silver, or even gold and silver combined, give him a sufficiently stable
standard of value for the ever widening range of space and time over
which his undertakings and contracts extend . . . [indeed] gold and
silver have had a less stablevalue, duringthe historyofthe world, than
has accruedto thosestaplegrains, which havesuppliedthechiefmeans
of supporting life to the great mass of the people in every age.
(Pp. 53-54)
Over shorter periods oftime, however, gold and silver represent good
monetarystandards becausechanges in the stock are small relative to the
existing stock (1926, p. 177).
In addition, following the classical tradition, Marshall regardedgold as
an inefficient form of money tying up scarce resources. Civilization had
advancedsufficientlyfor anexpandedrole for convertiblepaper(p. 137).
Finally, following Mill, heopposedbimetallicschemesbasedon a fixed
ratio of gold to silver on the ground that changes in relative costs of
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thus producing more instability than reliance on one metal alone (1923,
p.63).
Tosolve the shortcomingsofreliance onpreciousmetals as a monetary
standard, Marshall proposed two alternative schemes-symmetallism
and a tabular standard.
Under the symmetallic scheme, currency would be exchangeable for a
combination of gold and silver bullion bars in fixed proportions.
A gold barof100 grammes, together with a silver bar, say, 20 times as
heavy, would be exchangeable . . . for an amount of the currency
which would be calculated and fixed once for all when the scheme was
introduced.... Anyone who wanted to buy orsell gold orsilver alone
in exchange for currencycould get what he wanted by exchanging gold
for silver, or silver for gold, at the market rate. Government fixing its
own rates from day to day, so as to keep its reserve ofthe two metals in
about the right proportion, might safely undertake this exchangeitself,
and then anyone could buy or sell either gold or silver for currency in
one operation. (1926, p. 29)
The scheme would provide a better monetary standard than Ricardo's
gold-bullion-reserve scheme,
because it causes the value oflegal tendermoneytovarywith themean
of the values of both of these metals ... and because it would be
convenient both to those countries which now chiefly use gold and to
those which now chiefly use silver. (P. 28).
In contrast, the tabular scheme, similar to that of Fisher (see p. 53
below) would separate the standard of value from the medium of ex-
change. Under this scheme, long-term contracts would be tied to "an
official index number, representing average movements of the prices of
important commodities" (1923, p. 36). In addition, he proposed regula-
tion of an inconvertible currency so that "the value of a unit of it is
maintained at a fixed level," based on an index number (p. 50).
Finally, Marshall stressedthe needfor aninternationalcurrencyorelse
for the international harmonization of monetary policies:
There is a real, though very slow moving, tendency for national in-
terests to overrule provincial interests, and international interests to
overrule national, and I think the time will come at which it will be
thought as unreasonable for any country to regulate its currency with-
out reference to other countries as it will be to have signalling codes at
seawhich took no account ofsignalling codes at sea ofothercountries.
(1926, p. 135)
Balance-oJ-Payments Adjustment Mechanism
Following Ricardo, Marshall argued thatgold flows reflect arbitrage in
a widely traded commodity (gold)50 Michael D. Bordo
[so] as to bring gold prices at the seaboards of the two countries to
equality, allowance being made for carriage. If they are higher in A
than in B, there will be a small temporary bounty on exportation from
B to A corresponding to this difference, which must always be small.
Bills drawn in B on A will multiply, and, specie point being reached,
gold will go from A to B till prices in B are as high as in A. (Marshall,
1926, p. 170)
However, he questioned why gold has to be the commodity used to
settle payments imbalances. Thus in the case of a balance-of-payments
deficit
the value of gold, as a means of purchasing foreign commodities by
being exported in exchange for them, will rise so much that it will be
profitably exported for the purpose: ... But under these conditions
merchants are likely to look around them, and see whetherthere is not
some other thing which the country does not produce herself, and
therefore does not habitually export; but which could under the cir-
cumstances be marketed profitably abroad. (1923, p. 153)
Forexample, the balanceofpaymentscould besettledby the exportation
of lead once "lead point" has been reached. The choice of which com-
modity is used
depends partlyon its portability and partly on the extent ofthe market
which it finds in either country. The power of gold for this purpose is
therefore of primary importance between two countries which have a
gold currency, for gold has in each a practically unlimited market.
(1926, p. 172).26
Marshall then discussed the internal adjustment mechanism to an
external disturbance such as a gold outflow. The gold outflow would
lower theBankofEngland'sreserves, theBankwould respond by raising
its discount rate, and "the result would be a check to speculative invest-
ments, a diminished demand for commodities, and a fall of prices" (p.
158).27 Atthesametime, therise in the discountrate, ifnotmatchedby an
equal rise in the discount rate abroad, would attract gold from abroad (p.
160).
Finally, he discussed the role of a force that would weaken the tradi-
tional adjustment mechanism-the international integration of markets
for securities and commodities:
The growing tendency of intercommunication has shown itself in the
discount market more than in any other; fluctuations in the price of
wheat are being held in check by the growing internationality of the
wheat market; butthe discount marketis becominginternationalmore
rapidly even than the wheat market. (Pp. 127-28)51 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
Thus in Marshall's view, more ofthe adjustment to balance-of-payments
disequilibrium takes place through capital flows than through the arbi-
trage of traded goods, with less of the burden placed on gold flows.
Irving Fisher
I focus on three important aspects of Fisher's (1920, [1922] 1965)
treatment of the gold standard: his exposition of the operation of a
commodity money standard, his discussion of the international adjust-
mentmechanism, andhis criticism ofthe gold standardand advocacyofa
"compensated dollar. "28
The Commodity Theory ofMoney
Fisher's exposition of the working of a commodity money standard is
perhap the most lucid extension of Mill's theory. First Fisher demon-
stratedhow, undera goldstandardwith unrestrictedcoining andmelting,
the price ofgold bullion would conform to the price ofcoin, allowing for
seigniorage. Thus, in the case ofunrestricted coinage, ifthe price ofgold
bullion exceeds that of coin, gold users such as jewellers will melt coin
into bullion; in the opposite situation, bullion owners will take bullion to
the mint and have it coined. The effect ofmelting the coin will decrease
the stock of gold coins relative to bullion, reducing the value of gold as
bullion relative to gold as money, thus lowering the price level and
restoring equality between bullion and money. In the opposite case, the
effect ofminting bullion into coin will restore equilibrium (Fisher [1922]
1965, p. 97).
Next Fisher demonstrated how the world gold stock and the world
monetary gold stock are influenced by the production and consumption
of gold:
As the stock ofbullion and the stock ofmoney influence eachother, so
the total stock of both is influenced by production and consumption.
The production of gold consists of the output of the mines which
constantly tends to add to the existing stocks both ofbullion and coin.
Theconsumptionofgoldconsistsoftheuse ofbullionin thearts.(P.99)
He then made the analogy to a reservoir, "production would be the
inflow from the mines, and consumption the outflow to the arts, by
destruction and loss" (p. 99). Gold production is regulated by the rela-
tionship between "the estimated marginal cost of production" and the
purchasing power or exchange value of gold. He assumed that gold
mining is an increasing-cost industry. Thus,
gold production will always tend toward an equilibrium in which the
marginal cost of production will . . . be equal to the value of the
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production in any particular mine, it will pay to work that mine....
Thus the production ofgold increases or decreases with an increase or
decrease in the purchasing power of gold. (Pp. 101-3).
And the purchasing power of gold in turn would vary inversely with the
prices of other goods.
The consumption ofgold "inthe arts"-nonmonetary uses ofgold-is
related to "consumption for monetary purposes"-monetary uses of
gold-by a comparison of the purchasing power of gold with the "mar-
ginal utility ofwhat is consumed." Thus consumptionofgold-the diver-
sion ofgoldfrom monetaryto nonmonetaryuses-willbe "stimulatedby
a fall in the value (purchasing power) of gold, while the production of
gold is decreased" (p. 104).
The two forces ofproduction and consumption, operating in opposing
directions, regulate the monetarygold stock andhence the price level. In
the case ofincreased gold production due to the discovery ofnew mines,
the increase in production will lead to a filling up of "the currency
reservoir," and "a decrease in the purchasing power of money. This
processwill becheckedfinally by theincreasein consumption. Andwhen
production andconsumption becomeequal, anequilibriumwill beestab-
lished" (pp. 108-9).
International Adjustment Mechanism
Fisher effectively argued that for a small open economy that is part of
an international gold standard, as is the case for one state within the
United States, the money supply is not an independent variable, but is
determinedby the needfor the domesticprice level to conformtoforeign
price levels. However, he preserved the classical quantity-theory notion
ofcausalitybetweenthequantityofmoneyandthepricelevel (see Girton
and Roper 1978).
The price level in an outside community is an influence outside the
equation ofexchange ofthat community, and operates by affecting its
money in circulation and not by directly affecting its price level. The
price level outside of New York City, for instance, affects the price
level in New York City only via changes in the money in New York
City. Within New York City it is the money which influences the price
level, and not the price level which influences the money. The price
level is effect and not cause. (Fisher [1922] 1965, p. 172)
FollowingthetraditionofRicardoandMarshall, Fisherarguedthat the
force of arbitrage would tend to produce equality in the prices oftraded
commodities, but to the extent that international (and interlocal) trade
does not bring about uniformity ofprice levels/
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adjustment of these levels toward uniformity by regulating ... the
distribution of money" (p. 93).
Thusgold flows because it is the most efficient internationalmediumof
exchange and because it affects the prices of all commodities.
In ordinary intercourse between nations . . . there will always be a
large number of commodities thus acting as outlets and inlets. And
since the quantityofmoneyitselfaffects pricesfor all sorts ofcommod-
ities, the regulative effect ofinternational trade applies, not simply to
the commodities which enter into that trade, but to all others as well.
(P. 93)
Criticisms ofthe Gold Standard and Proposals for Reform
Like Marshall, Fishercriticized the basing ofthe monetarystandardon
a single commodity-goldor, for that matter, silver-becauseofinstabil-
ity in supply and demand conditions of the money metal.
The commercial world has become more and more committed to the
gold standard through a series of historical events having little if any
connectionwith thefitness ofthatorany othermetaltoserve as astable
standard... so far as the question ofmonetary stability is concerned,
... we have hit upon the gold standard by accident. (Fisher [1922]
1965, p. 323)
Instead, in a comparison ofthe purchasing power ofgold with thatofa
number of other commodities he concluded that "in terms of general
purchasing power, gold is no more stable than eggs and considerably less
stable than carpets" (Fisher 1920, p. 41).30
In addition, Fisher, a number of years later, criticized the gold stan-
dard becauseit allows price-level movements and business fluctuations to
be transmitted from one country to another.31
As a remedy for the inherent instability in the purchasing power of
money under the gold standard, Fisheroffered his scheme for a compen-
sated dollar: Issue gold certificates backed by gold bullion, but vary the
weight of the gold backing per dollar so as to maintain a constant
purchasingpowerofmoney by tying the weight to an index number-"to
mark upordown the weight ofthe dollar (that is, to markdown orup the
priceofgold bullion) in exactproportionto thedeviationsaboveorbelow
parofthe index numberofprices" ([1922] 1965, p. 498). Thiswouldallow
us to "keep the metal gold for the good attributes it has-portability,
durability, divisibility, salability-but correct its instability, so that one
dollar of it will always buy approximately [a] composite basketful of
goods." It would "retain gold as a good medium [of exchange] and yet
... make it into a good standard" (1920, pp. 88-89).54 Michael D. Bordo
Knut Wicksell
Wicksell's views ([1898] 1965) on the gold standard will be discussed
under three headings: the commodity theory ofmoney, the international
adjustment mechanism, and proposals for reform.
Commodity Theory ofMoney
In contrast to Fisher, for Wicksell the stabilizing features of the com-
modity theory were too slow to be ofconsequence for price-level move-
ments except in the very long run. Either the underlying mechanism was
weakor, by theendofthe nineteenthcentury, institutionaldevelopments
had neutralized or obscured it. Thus
the newly extracted gold-passes, for the most part, not into circula-
tion, but into the stocks ofcash ofmonetary institutions; and gold for
industrial uses is mainly taken eitheroutofthese stocks or directly out
of imported stocks of uncoined metal. In neither case can it be sup-
posed that there is any direct effect on prices. (Wicksell [1898] 1965,
p.31)
The use of gold purely as a monetary base was utopian.
In such a system the value of money would be directly exposed to the
effects ofevery fortuitous incident on the side ofthe production ofthe
precious metal and every caprice on the side of its consumption. It
would undergo the same violent fluctuations as do the values of most
other commodities. (P. 35)
International Adjustment Mechanism
Wicksell was skeptical of the Hume price-specie-flow mechanism-
disturbances affecting one country's price level relative to another's
would affect the terms oftrade, and the balance ofpayments would then
be corrected by gold flows. Although the explanation was fundamentally
correct, he expressed reservations:
Itis...clearthatinternationalequilibriumofprices is usually reached
far more rapidly and far more directly. The increase in the supply of
foreign goods and the diminution in the demand for exports must
themselves exert, directly and indirectly, a pressure on domestic prices
which is quite independent ofany simultaneous movement ofprecious
metals. (Wicksell [1898] 1965, pp. 157-58)
For Wicksell, changes in real income must be brought into the adjust-
ment mechanism.
Proposals for Reform
Like Fisher, Wicksell was concerned with price stabilization, both
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backed by a reserve of gold bullion, with each central bank maintaining
convertibility and agreeing to accept other central banks' notes and
clearing them through an international clearing house (Wicksell [1898]
1965, pp. 186-87). In addition, the central bank of each nation would
stabilize its internal price level by keeping the market rate ofinterest in
line with the "natural rate of interest" following simple criteria:
32
So long as prices remain unaltered the bank's rate of interest is to
remainunaltered. Ifprices rise, the rateofinterestis to be raised; andif
pricesfall, the rateofinterestis to be lowered; andthe rateofinterestis
henceforth to be maintained at its new level until a further movement
of prices calls for a further change in one direction or the other.
To achieve international price stability, central banks would need to
manipulate their gold stocks cooperatively to keep interest rates in line
between nations (p. 192).
Appendix C The Harvard Neoclassical School
F. W. Taussig ofHarvardand his students-JacobViner, F. D. Graham,
J. H. Williams, and H. D. White-andW. A. Beach (a student ofAllyn
Young and J. H. Williams) formulated and tested some of the main
tenetsoftheclassical Ricardo-Mill theoryoftheinternationaladjustment
mechanism. Taussig's reformulation of the theory and the evidence for
Great Britain, the United States, France, Canada, and Argentina in the
pre-World War I era are summarized here. In addition the writings of
J. W. Angell, a contemporary critic ofthe Harvard School and a precur-
sor of the modern monetary approach to the balance of payments are
examined.
F. W. Taussig
In an article (1917) and a book ([1927] 1966), Taussig clearly reformu-
lated the traditional approach in a mannersuitable for empirical verifica-
tion and then summarized some of the evidence.
For Taussig, international borrowing was the most important disturb-
ance to the pre-World War I international economy. He analyzed the
effects of the transfer of capital on the balance of payments, money
supplies, and price levels of both lender and borrower. Several of his
studies ofBritish and U.S. experience, beginning with the earliest period
he covered, will be reviewed here.
In an examinationoftheBritishbalanceofpaymentsin theperiod1853
to 1879, Taussig found that the adjustmentofthe merchandise balanceof
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and to capital exports was much more rapid and smooth than classical
theory would lead one to expect:
No signs of disturbance are to be observed such as the theoretic
analysis previses; and some recurring phenomena are of a kind not
contemplated by theoryat all. Most noticeable...is the circumstance
that periods ofactive lending have been characterized by rising prices
rather than by falling prices, and that the export of goods apparently
has taken place, not in connection with a cheapening of goods in the
lendingcountry, butin spite ofthefact thatits goods have seemedto be
dearer at times of great capital export. (Taussig [1927] 1966, p. 239)
In addition, he found specie movements to be small relative to mer-
chandise movements, a fact to be explained by the sensitivity of the
British money supply. Moreover, he found it difficult to separate specie
flows consistent with the theory from the more steady series ofgold flows
into Britain following the gold discoveries in the 1840s and 1850s.
The general lack of conclusive evidence sympathetic to the classical
mechanism for the period 1853-79 is reversed for the period 1880-1914.
That period is conveniently divided into two parts: 1880-1900 and 1901-
1914. The first period was characterized by a deficit on merchandise
account financed by shipping earnings and income from abroad with no
unusual capital exports. The second was dominated by massive capital
exports, which were quickly reflected in a decline in the merchandise
deficit.
According to Taussig, the change in circumstances offered a good test
ofthe theory. Had the trends before 1900 continued, Britain would have
continuedtoenjoyan improvementin hertermsoftrade, butthetermsof
trade turned around after 1900. That phenomenon, he believed, was
consistent with classical theory:
That the gross barter terms of trade should vary as they do, becoming
more favorable until 1900, thereafter less favorable, is indeed easily in
accord with theory. They will naturally fluctuate in the same direction
as the balanceofpayments. . . .Moresignificant. . .is thefact thatthe
net barter terms of trade move in the same direction, ... [w]e have
argued that when a country has payments to receive for other items
than merchandise, the direct and simple exchange ofgoods for goods is
also affected, and is affected to the country's greater advantage. (P.
256)33
The improvement in the terms of trade raises domestic real income
because money incomes rise, while the price of imported commodities
falls. Taussig found the evidence that money wages rose until 1900, after
which they turned down, consistent with his theory.34
However, a continuing puzzle for Taussig was how to separate the
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of gold into Britain, the world's principal gold market. Moreover, the
puzzle was complicated by the fact that commodity exports and imports
[respond] with surprising promptness to the balance of international
payments as a whole. The promptness is surprising because each
constituent transaction . . . is purely in terms of money. . . . Yet the
recorded transactions between countries show surprisingly little trans-
fer ofthe only "money" that moves from one to the other-gold. It is
the goods that move, andthey seem to move at once; almost as ifthere
were an automatic connection between these financial operations and
thecommodityexportsorimports. Thattheflow ofgoodsshouldensue
in time, perhaps even at an early date, is ofcourse to be expected....
Whatis puzzling is the rapidity, almost simultaneity, ofthe commodity
movements. The presumable intermediate stage ofgold flow and price
changes is hard to discern, and certainly is extremely short. (P. 261)
He also examined a case under the gold standard of U.S. borrowing
long-term capital from Great Britain.35 To the extent that not all of the
proceeds of the loan are spent on British goods,
the increase in remittances from London to New York will cause a
demand for New York exchange in London. New York exchange will
rise in London, sterling exchange will fall in New York.... The
fluctuations in foreign exchange will necessarily be confined within the
gold points. (Taussig, 1917, p. 394)
The next step is a gold flow from London to New York once the
specie-exportpointis reached. Elsewhere,Taussigarguedthatin the case
of temporary disturbances, gold rarely flows. Much ofthe adjustment is
taken up by movements in the exchange rate within the gold points that
speculators promoted. In addition, in the prewar era, sterling bills acted
as a substitute for gold in important money-market centers and were
transferred in lieu of gold flows. Finally short-term capital movements
acted as a substitute for gold flows. 36 "In the last resort, when all expe-
dients for adjusting and equalizing the payments between nations have
been utilized and exhausted, specie will flow in payment of balances"
([1927] 1966, pp. 220-21).
Thegold inflow intothe UnitedStatesand the gold outflowfrom Great
Britain then raises and lowers the money supplies of the two countries
respectively (1917, p. 394). However, the effects ofgold flows on domes-
tic money supplies depend on institutional arrangements in each
country.37 In the pre-World War I era offractional reserve banking and
convertible fiduciary money
the inflow oroutflow ofspecie. . . primarily affects the discount policy
of the banks. Their discount policy in turn affects the volume of
accommodation which they offer to the borrowing public, and this in
turn affects the volume of notes and deposits. ([1927] 1966, p. 201)58 Michael D. Bordo
Thenextstepis a "trainofconsequencesfamiliartothereaderofRicardo
and Mill. Prices will fall in Great Britain and will rise in the United
States" (1917, p. 394). WithintheUnitedStates,pricesofdomesticgoods
and exports rise relative to prices ofimports, and opposite movementsof
sectional prices occur in Great Britain.38 Finally, because the terms of
tradehaveturnedinfavor oftheUnitedStates,hercitizens are betteroff:
"Their money incomes have risen, the prices of imported commodities
have fallen; as buyers of imported commodities they gain" (p. 395).
The opposite takes place in Great Britain. In the case of the United
States after 1879 when it was a net importer of British capital and from
1900 to 1914 when it financed a merchandise surplus with immigrant
remittances andotherinvisibles, Taussig expectedto observegold move-
mentsandterms-of-trade effects oppositeto those hehadobservedin the
British case.
As in the British case, Taussig ([1927] 1966, p. 299) found it difficult to
separate the effects of equilibrating gold flows from primarily domestic
gold production and consumption. However, unlike the British case, the
terms of trade did not behave according to theory. It was difficult to
discern a markedtrend, thoughthenetbartertermsoftradewereslightly
less favorable before 1900 than afterwards. This, he stated
is an unexpected result.... On general principles we should look for
terms oftrade more unfavorable in the second stage. The excess in the
moneyvolumeofexportsmeant...thatthe UnitedStates, in meeting
the divers additional charges for immigrants' remittances... sent out
goods having a greater money value than the goods she bought....
The case shows an outcome different from that in Great Britain and
Canada during the same period. Forthese countries, the actual course
of events proves to be in accord with theoretical prevision. For the
United States it does not. (P. 303)
Taussig attempted to account for the poorresults for the United States
comparedto those for Great Britain and Canada by reference to disturb-
ing causes notpresentinthe othercountries. Amongthese werethetariff
that made the terms of trade more favorable than otherwise and an
exogenous increase in demand by foreigners for U.S. manufactured
goods.
Taussig then analyzed effects of a capital transfer under flexible ex-
change rates, the example relevant for the period 1862-78 when the
United States had inconvertible paper money and Great Britain was on
the gold standard (1917, p. 386).
The initial effects ofU.S. borrowing in London is to reduce the specie
premium in New York (i.e., the U.S.-dollar price of gold falls). This
reduction leads to a fall in the paper prices of U.S. exports (as well as
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consequence, export industries in the United States are discouraged,
imports are encouraged. Theoppositeeffects takeplace in GreatBritain.
Thus the total volume of commodities bought and sold in the United
States increases, as exports are shifted to domestic consumption.
Moreover, real income rises in the United States because holding the
money supply constant, nominal income remains unchanged but prices
havefallen. U.S. residentsgain notonlyas purchasersofimports (theydo
under a gold standard as well), but also as purchasers of domestic com-
modities. In contrast to the gold standard case, the U.S. terms of trade
improve not because U.S. residents have larger money incomes and
lower prices, but because they have the same money incomes and lower
prices. The opposite results occur in Great Britain.
Taussig's analysis may be contrasted with that in Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, pp. 84-85), of the effect on the gold premium of U.S.
Treasury gold purchases abroad before resumption.
The Evidence
Taussig's students presented evidence for the classical adjustment
mechanism based on detailed examination of the monetary history of a
number of countries under the gold standard and under inconvertible
paper money. Initially the case studies for Great Britain, the United
States, Canada, and France under the gold standard and then for the
United States and Argentina underinconvertible paperwill be reported.
W. Beach
In contrast to Taussig, Beach (1935) presented evidence for Great
Britainfor theperiod 1881-1913 unfavorable tothe classical price-specie-
flow model. Beach argued that if differences in the levels of commodity
prices were to dominate the adjustment mechanism, then gold would be
expected to flow
because the price levels ofone country do not rise orfall in accordance
with the levels in other countries. The movement of gold forces all
countries to keep the same pace through the various phases of the
business cycle. (Beach 1935, p. 170)
Thusone would expect gold to flow out ofa countryin the upswing ofthe
business cycle. Also, according to the classical model, one would expect
capital exports to move procyclically so that other things equal, an
upswing in a creditor country would induce a capital flow to a debtor
country, accompanied by a gold outflow, unless offset by increased
purchases of the creditor's exports. Yet Beach found that there was a
tendency for gold imports to increase during the prosperity stages of
business cycles and for exports to grow during depression, both in Great
Britain and the United States.60 Michael D. Bordo
Beach's explanation of this anomaly relied on several pieces of evi-
dence. First, he observed a high correlation between business conditions
and (long-term) capital exports from Great Britain. The volume of new
loans, he suggested, was determined primarily by business conditions
(pp. 171-73). Second, in the upswing of the business cycle in Great
Britain (and the United States), there was an increased internal demand
for gold currency. Third, short-term balances (loans) were sensitive to
changes in discount rates, more so than domestic business and prices.
Hence in the business-cycle upswing, the internal currency drain put
pressure onthe reserves ofthe bankingsystem and the BankofEngland,
which led to a rise in the discount rate, a short-term capital inflow, and,
ceteris paribus, a gold inflow. 39
Thus
cyclical fluctuations in the movement of specie might easily be con-
trolled by the movements of these balances. This explanation for the
cyclical movements of gold found for England and the United States
seems more adequate than the explanation based upon price level
differences. (P. 180)
Jacob Viner
Viner (1924) tested the classical balance-of-payments adjustment
mechanism for Canada during the period 1900-1913.
40 During that
period, the great disturbing factor was the inflow offoreign capital into
Canada. The adjustment to be explained was the "process whereby the
Canadian borrowings, negotiated in terms ofmoney, entered Canada in
the form of goods and not in gold" (Viner 1924, p. 145).
The mechanism to be tested was that ofJ. S. Mill. The capital inflow
initially would raise the price of foreign exchange to the gold export
point. This would then be followed by a gold flow from the lendingto the
borrowingcountry. Prices would rise in the borrowing country andfall in
the lending country, leading to a change in imports and exports, with the
borrowing country experiencing an unfavorable balance oftrade and the
lending country, a favorable balance. Once the unfavorable balance of
the borrowing country equaled the rate of borrowing, the exchanges
would return to parity, gold movements would cease, and relative prices
in the two countries would stabilize at their new levels.
First, examining the effects ofchanges in the exchange rate within the
gold points, Viner argued that since transportation and insurance costs
were very low between Montreal and New York, the gold points were so
narrow that changes in the exchange rate were not likely to have much
effect on the balance of trade (p. 155).
Second, Vinerfound evidence thatgold flows were highestin the years
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(p. 160). Atthis point, Vinerdigressedonthe role ofgoldin theCanadian
financial system. Before World War I, gold did not circulate as hand-to-
hand currency but did act as a reserve asset for the chartered banks.
(Canada did not have a central bank in this period.)41 The Canadian
monetary base consisted ofa fixed issue ofgovernment fiduciary notes-
Dominion notes and gold reserves, largely maintained as "outside re-
serves" on call in New York or London, or as balances with commercial
banksin thosecenters. Accordingto Viner, changesin outsidereservesin
New Yorkacted in a mannersimilarto gold flows in the classical balance-
of-payments adjustment mechanism. Thus the transfer offoreign capital
from London to Canada usually passed through the New York money
market, raising outside reserves ofCanadian banks. Thenon the basis of
the increased outside reserves, Canadian banks would increase their
deposits (pp. 177-79).
Third, theincreasein theCanadianmoneysupplywould producea rise
in the Canadian price level (relative to the rest of the world) in accord-
ance with the classical theory42 and a rise in sectional price levels. The
initial effect would be on the prices of domestic goods and not on the
prices of imports, which for a small open economy such as Canada are
determined abroad. Some substitution away from domestic goods
towards imports would follow as would also a rise in the price ofexports
(to the extent Canadahad monopoly power in theirproduction), leading
to a reduction in exports.43
The evidence generally confirms these predictions: between 1900 and
1913 indexes of the prices of imports increased least, followed by the
prices ofexports, while domestic prices increased the most. Moreover, a
beginning-of-period weighted index of the price of exports declined
relative to an unweighted index, suggesting that commodities shifted
from the export to either the domestic or import category. In addition,
the ratio ofdomestic-goods prices to the wholesale price index increased
more in Canada than in the United States.44 Finally a decline in exports
and a rise in imports completed the case for Vinerin favor ofthe classical
adjustment mechanism.45
This theory has beenverified inductively for Canadaduring the period
1900 to 1913. [Moreover,] a corollaryofthis reasoning[is] thatduringa
periodofinternational borrowings the termsofinternationalexchange
shift infavor oftheborrowingcountryandagainst thelendingcountry.
. . . Adequate inductive verification of this proposition is supplied by
the demonstration already made that export prices rose relative to
import prices. (P. 295)
Harry D. White
White (1933) examined the French evidence for the classical price-
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France in the four decades before World War I lent large sums abroad,
and as in the British case, for contemporaryeconomists, the income from
foreign investment permitted a persistent merchandise-trade deficit. In a
careful reconstruction of the French balance-of-payments accounts,
White demonstrated that the income from foreign investment over the
1880-1913 period was no greater than the total export of capital for the
same period. Moreover he found, contrary to the official figures, that in
twelve out of the thirty-four years surveyed, France had a surplus on
merchandise account; and the years when the French accounts showed a
deficit on merchandise trade it was paid for not by revenue from French
foreign investment but by foreign-tourist expenditures in France (White
1933, p. 301).
White then attempted to determine, as Taussig did for Great Britain,
the adjustment mechanism by which the net capital export affected the
balance of trade:
Tho the totals of capital exports and net revenue from foreign invest-
ment over the period as a whole were not far apart, for anyone year
during most of the period they differed considerably, thereby raising
the question of the mechanism for adjustment of the disequilibrium
caused by changes in the volume of capital exports. (P. 302)
First, he found that in France's trade with gold standard countries,
exchange-rate movements had a negligible effect on merchandise move-
ments, but in the case ofa numberofcountries not on the gold standard,
from which France obtained one quarter of her imports, fluctuations in
the exchange rate made a significant difference to French importers.
Second, he concluded that in the French case, only a small portion of
the sums loaned abroad were spent on French exports.
Third, the movements ofsectional price changes and ofthe volume of
merchandisetraderevealeda relationshipin accordancewith the classical
sequence. Relative increases in import prices were accompanied by a
decline in physical quantities andvice versa. The changes continued until
there was a rough approximation between changes in the values of
merchandise balances and capital exports.
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Fourth, he could find no evidence of the linkage of gold flows to the
reserves ofthe BankofFrance andthence to the domestic moneysupply.
According to White, the Bank of France would raise the discount rate
only to offset a large gold outflow, but not to influence domestic eco-
nomic activity. Moreover France's large gold reserves relative to other
major gold standard countries enabled it to follow such a passive dis-
count-rate policy.
Fifth, White argued that it was possible that there existed a direct link
between gold flows and price-level movements because such a large
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no clear evidence on . . . the relationship of the quantity ofmoney in
circulation to pricesis revealed by the comparison betweenthefluctua-
tions in the quantityofspecie andnotes outsidetheBankofFranceand
the movement of prices. Moreover, even if such a relationship were
revealed, the absence ofcorrelationbetweenthe annual movementsof
capital and specie renders dubious the interpretation that changes in
sectional price levels were induced by capital movements. (P. 304)
Finally, the mixed evidence leads him to conclude that
the specie-flow-specie mechanism is doubtless one of the forces, but
thereseems to be no justificationfor assuming thatit is thesole oreven
the dominant means ofadjustment.... The neoclassical theory is not
the complete explanation. The theory fails in that it explains what
happens only under certain given conditions seldom found. It ex-
pounds a sequence of changes which undisturbed would in time bring
about adjustment, but which seldom, if ever, operates unchecked by
the frictions and rapid changes characteristic of modern economic
conditions. By ignoring some of these forces and minimizing others,
the neoclassical exposition exaggerates the effectiveness of gold flows
and sectional price changes as a means for establishing equilibrium in
international accounts. (P. 306)
Frank D. Graham
Graham tested Taussig's (1917) theory of the adjustment mechanism
under depreciated paper. In the period 1862 to 1878, when the United
States was on an inconvertible paper standard-the greenback stan-
dard-while her principal trading partner, Great Britain, was on a gold
standard, the premium on gold was a close proxy for the dollar-pound
exchange rate.47 Grahamanalyzed theeffectsofBritishcapitalflows-the
major source of disturbance during this period to the balance of pay-
ments, and hence the exchange rate.
The period can conveniently be divided into two episodes: 1863 to
1873, a period of heavy and continuous borrowing from London, and
1874 to 1878, a period when the borrowing dropped off.
According to Taussig's theory, one would expect the period of heavy
borrowing to be associated with a deficit in the balance of trade and the
period of cessation with a reversal in the balance of trade. Graham's
evidence showed a large annual excess of commodity imports over ex-
ports in the period of heavy borrowing, the opposite in the period of
cessation (Graham 1922, pp. 231-34).
Also, according to Taussig'stheory, onewould expect, ceteris paribus,
the period of heavy borrowing to be associated with a decline in the
exchange rate (the premium on gold), while the periodofcessation to be
associated with a rise in the exchange rate. Graham found the evidence
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number of general commodity prices, he found the quarterly average
price of gold to be lower than the general price level from April 1865
through June 1876, while from July 1876 to the end of the period it was
higher, with the price ofgold rising relative to the overallprice level after
1874.
Next, according to Taussig, onewould observe the following effects on
sectional prices: in the first period, low paperprices ofexports, gradually
declining paper prices of imports, and relatively high paper prices of
domestic commodities; in the second period, a gradual reversal towards
higher paper prices of exports, gradually rising paper prices of imports,
and relatively low prices of domestic goods. A comparison of the arith-
metic means of the three different groups of commodities between the
two periods provided evidence consistent with the theory.
Finally, one would observe different effects on money wages (as a
measure of relative prosperity) in the two periods: in the first period
declining wages in the export industries relative to the domestic-goods
industry, as resources are diverted from it in theface offalling prices; the
opposite movement in the second period. Again, using Mitchell's wage
data and classifying U.S. industries into domestic and export industries,
Graham found the evidence consistent with the theory (pp. 267-70).
At the same time as these effects occurred in the United States,
opposite ones would occur in Great Britain, although the fluctuations in
the U.S. dollar would have only limited effects on British prices since
GreatBritainwas ona gold basis andmovementsofthe dollarwouldonly
affect a portionofhertrade.48 Again Grahamfound the evidence consist-
ent with the theory.
John H. Williams
Williams (1920) tested for Argentina Taussig's theory of the adjust-
ment mechanism under depreciated paper but unlike Graham found the
evidence too inconclusive to be of more than limited support to the
theory. First, according to Taussig's theory, a rising premium on gold
would stimulate exports. "It does so by virtue of the fact that export
prices rise more rapidly than costs, creating an extra profit or bounty for
the producing and exporting classes" (Williams 1920, p. 233). Williams
presented evidence indicating a rise in the price of exports concomitant
with a rising premium on gold in the period 1885 to 1891. However,
according tothe theory, thevalue ofexportsoughttorise-butit did not.
This result Williams attributed to the presence of other forces such as
"the character of the Argentine exports . . . agricultural and grazing
products . . . [which are] extremely susceptible to vagaries of climate"
and the fact that "though [the] quantity ofexports increased, the greater
quantity was sold for a lower gold price per unit" (p. 234).65 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
Second, according to Taussig's theory, a rising gold premium should
reduce the value of imports, which the evidence confirmed.
We find first of all that the diminution ofvalue of imports asserted by
theory... did occur: that, in fact, the diminution was very marked.
. . . On comparing the course ofimports with the gold premium,...
there was in every year an inverse relation between imports and the
premium on gold. (P. 253)
In sum, the evidence marshalled by the Harvard school in favor ofthe
classical adjustment mechanism is mixed. Overall price levels adjust in
accordance with the theory, butsectionalprice adjustmentin accordance
with the theory is limited. Little support was found for the role of gold
flows, the money supply, and discount rates in the mechanism. A com-
monfinding was thatthecommoditytradebalance adjustedrapidlytothe
external disturbance of capital flows, more rapidly than would be ex-
pected by a theory postulating links from price-level differences to gold
flows, to changes in money supplies, to changes in sectional price levels,
andthen adjustmentofthecommoditytradebalance. Explanationsgiven
by the school for the rapidity of adjustment-with no supporting evi-
dence-included the growing integration of goods and securities mar-
kets, the role ofincome effects, and the sensitivity of the money-supply
process.
J. W. Angell
Angell ([1925] 1965), a student ofTaussig's, had a distinctly different
interpretationofthe international adjustment mechanism underthepre-
World War I gold standard. Angell focused on the relationship between
individual commodity prices and national price levels.
First, he argued that the classical division ofthe overall price level into
export, import, and domestic-goods prices was "extremely misleading
andmayleadto erroneousconclusions." Thedistinction hepreferredwas
between internationalortraded commodities and domestic ornontraded
commodities, with the dividing line between the two types of commod-
ities to be determined empirically:
Any movable article whatsoever may enter international trade....
The first requisite for movement is that the money prices receivable,
translated through a common measure, shall be higher in one country
than in the other; the second, that the difference shall at least cover
costs of transportation of all sorts, including tariff[s] (Angell [1925]
1965, pp. 375-76)
He cited evidence for equality in the world prices oftraded goods (staple
commodities) at one extreme, and at the otherextreme, no international
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goods, with an in-between third category-partially traded goods. Arbi-
tragewouldensureequalityfor traded-goodspricesbutarbitragemay not
take place for many commodities because of: (a) "lack of accurate
information, in each market," (b) "lack ofsufficient initiative and enter-
prise, on the part ofthe manufacturers and dealers, to take advantage of
the discrepancy," (c) "sellingin a new market requires the priorerection
of trade connections," (d) monopoly power (pp. 379-80).
Second, Angell discussed evidence showing long-run similarity of
national price-level movements between countries on the same metallic
standard. He defined national price structures as
a series ofsolar systems, which maintain a fairly constant relationship
in their movements through space. But the component parts of the
system-individualprices-arein a stateofceaselesschange relative to
the elements in both their own and other systems. (P. 390)
However, he argued that the similarity ofmovement ofnational price
levels coupled with the tendency to price equalization of internationally
traded goods suggests that domestic (nontraded-goods) prices conform
to the pattern set by traded-goods prices. Further, since the process of
substitution between domestic and tradedgoods is a relativelyweak one,
the key mechanism that keeps prices levels in line is the
classical price specie flow analysis.... No other type of explanation
can adequately account for the known facts. Prices in different coun-
tries do not move together, over long periods of time, by sheer acci-
dent. There must evidently be some connecting link between them.
But the influence exerted by international prices alone, on the various
national price structures, is not great enough to provide this link. It is
necessary to discover some condition or element that is capable of
affecting the totality ofprices indiscriminately, and fairly rapidly. This
element is found in the mechanism by which the balance of interna-
tional payments is kept in equilibrium. (P. 393)
Angellofferedhis ownversionoftheprice-specie-flow mechanism. He
downplayed the role ofactual gold flows in the mechanism, arguing that
neither the magnitudes nor the directions of the international flow of
gold are adequate to explain those close and comparatively rapid
adjustmentsofpaymentdisequilibria, andofpricerelationships, which
were witnessed before the war. (P. 400)
Moreover,
the character of modern banking [will not] permit the assumption of
any very high degreeofintimacyto theconnectionbetweena country's
metallic stock and its price level. Finally, gold is among the least
sensitive ofthe media ofinternational payments, one ofthe slowest to
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His own version of the mechanism relies on the importance of foreign
bills ofexchange which act as a substitutefor gold. Temporarydisequilib-
ria will be offset by movements in the exchange rate. If that proves
inadequate, gold will flow, prompting a change in discount rates. Finally,
if the disturbance is more than temporary, then
an alteration will take place in the underlying conditions that govern
the general course of international exchange itself. The volume of
purchasing power in circulation in the creditorcountrywill be built up,
in consequence of the increase in the banks' holdings of bills. In the
other country it will be reduced, through the decline there in bill
holdings. These changes, in turn, will operate upon the corresponding
general price levels. The latter effect is often, though not always,
strengthened by alterations in the discount rates. The movements in
prices will then influence the commodity balance oftrade. . . and will
continue to do so until the change in the commodity trade has become
great enough to offset and correct the original disturbance in the
balance of international payments. (P. 413)
Appendix D Interwar Critics
With the outbreakofwar in 1914 and Britain's suspension ofconvertibil-
ity, the classical gold standard expired. The gold-exchange standard
existed briefly from 1925 to 1931, after which the problem of interna-
tional monetary reform and the creation of a more viable international
monetary system took center stage.
The traditional approach to the gold standard was subjected to exten-
sive reinterpretation and criticism, much ofit derived from concern over
the monetary instability of the interwar period. The reinterpretation of
the gold standard began with the Cunliffe report ([1918] 1979) which
succinctly restated the stylized facts ofthe operationofthepre-1914gold
standard and appealed for a return to the old order. Another view
(Brown, Smit) ofthe prewar gold standard stressed that it was successful
because it was a managed standard-managed by London. Followers of
th~s institutional approach then documented all the many respects in
which the structure ofthe British money, gold and commoditymarkets-
"pax Britannica"-and the astute management of the Bank of England
made the system work. The key implication of the approach was that a
successful gold standard could be restored ifa similar institutional milieu
could be re-created. A related approach (Cassel) argued that the gold
standard worked well for England, and possibly for several other major
countries, but not for the rest of the world. Moreover, the fact that it
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A recurrent theme in the interwar literature was the inherent policy
conflict between internal and external stability under the gold standard
fixed-exchange-rate system. According to this view (Keynes), theprewar
gold standard worked because nations were willing to subsume domestic
economic objectives to the maintenance ofgold convertibility; but in the
postwar period, a return to the harsh discipline of the prewar gold
standard would be disastrous. This approach proposed the creation of a
supernational monetary agency or similar means to ensure international
harmonization of economic policy.
The final theme in the literature was the expression ofdoubt about the
stylized facts ofhow the gold standard worked. Returning to the anoma-
lies between fact and theory discussed by the Harvard school, the critics
(Whale) argued that perhaps the traditional approach itself was incor-
rect.
The views of writers identified with each of the foregoing themes are
summarized below.
The Stylized Facts
In the interwar period, a persistent thread in the literature was a view
of the prewar gold standard as the ideal monetary standard. A classic
statementofthisview appearedin theCunliffe report, butitwas repeated
by others including R. G. Hawtrey, T. E. Gregory, and the Interim
Reportofthe Gold Delegation ofthe Financial Committee ofthe League
of Nations ([1931] 1979).
The Cunliffe report ([1918] 1979) to Parliament succinctly presented
whatseemedto be thesalientfeatures ofthe operationoftheprewargold
standard in Great Britain and a series ofproposals for a quick return to
gold.
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As the report documented, the money-supply process before the war
was based on the Bank CharterAct of1844. Apartfrom a fixed fiduciary
issue, hand-to-hand currency consisted entirely of gold and subsidiary
coins or of gold certificates. Gold was freely coined and there were no
restrictions on the import or export ofgold, so changes in the monetary
base, aside from movements of gold to and from the arts, were deter-
minedby inflowsfrom abroadandoutflows. Inaddition, uponthis base of
a fixed fiduciary issue and gold and gold-backed currency rested an
extensive system ofcheckable bank deposits, so that the pre-WorldWar
I British money supply consisted mainly of deposits.
Second, the reportdescribed theoperationofthe balance-of-payments
adjustment mechanism. A disturbance to the balance ofpayments led to
a gold flow and a corresponding change in the money supply. Thus, e.g.,
when the balance oftrade was unfavorable and the exchanges adverse, it
became profitable to export gold, and the would-be exporter bought the
gold from the Bank of England. The Banking Department in turn69 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
obtained gold from the Issue Department in exchange for notes from its
reserve, with the result that liabilities to depositors and the reserve were
reduced by an equal amount, and the ratio of reserves to liabilities
declined.
50 The next step was a rise in the discount rate:
If the process was repeated sufficiently often to reduce the ratio in a
degree considered dangerous, the Bankraised its rate ofdiscount. The
raising of the discount rate had the immediate effect of retaining
money here which would otherwise have been remitted abroad and of
attracting remittances from abroad to take advantage of the higher
rate, thus checking the outflow ofgold and even reversing the stream.
(Cunliffe report [1918] 1979, par. 4)
Thusraising Bankrate by inducing ashort-termcapitalinflow would be
sufficient to stem a temporary balance-of-payments deficit. However, in
the case of a permanent disturbance, the discount-rate rise would addi-
tionally reduce domestic credit.
This description of the operation of Bank rate to facilitate the adjust-
ment mechanism has often been referred to as the rules of the game.
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According to Nurkse:
Whenever gold flowed in, the central bank was expected to increase
thenationalcurrencysupply notonly through thepurchaseofthatgold
but also through the acquisition of additional domestic assets; and,
similarly, when gold flowed out, the central bank was supposed to
contract its domestic assets also.... The chiefmethods to be used for
changing the volume of domestic central bank assets in accordance
with this principle were changes in the discount rate, designed to make
borrowing from the central bank either more or less attractive, and
purchasesorsalesofsecuritiesin theopenmarketonthecentralbank's
own initiative. (Nurkse [1944] 1978, pp. 66-67)
Moreover, the gold standard also provided an automaticmechanismto
offset an internal disturbance:
When. . .creditathomethreatenedto becomeduly expanded, theold
currency system tended to restrain the expansion and to prevent the
consequent rise in domestic prices which ultimately causes such a
drain. The expansion of credit, by forcing up prices, involves an
increased demand for legal tender currency both from the banks in
order to maintain their normal proportion of cash to liabilities and
from thegeneralpublicfor thepaymentofwages andfor retail transac-
tions. In this case also the demand for such currency fell upon the
reserve ofthe Bank ofEngland, and the Bank was thereupon obliged
to raise its rate ofdiscount in orderto preventthefall in the proportion
of that reserve to its liabilities. The same chain of consequences ...
described [above] followed and speculative trade activity was similarly
restrained. (Cunliffe report [1918] 1979, par. 6)70 Michael D. Bordo
Thus,
there was therefore an automatic machinery by which the volume of
purchasing power in this country was continuously adjusted to world
prices of commodities in general. ... Under these arrangements...
[the] country was provided with a complete and effective gold stan-
dard. The essence ofsuch a standard is that notes must always stand at
absolute parity with gold coins ofequivalent face value, and that both
notes and gold coins stand at absolute parity with gold bullion. When
these conditions are fulfilled, the foreign exchange rates with all coun-
tries possessing an effective gold standard are maintained at or within
the gold specie points. (Pars. 6-7)
Thecommittee recommendeda restorationofthe gold standard"with-
out delay" (par. 15), to be achieved by the cessation of government
borrowings andthe reduction ofBankofEngland noteissue. Inaddition,
the committee recommended allowing the free external movement of
gold and the use of Bank rate to check outflows and inflows. However,
following Ricardo's "Proposal for a Secure Currency," it recommended
against the use ofgold coins for domesticcirculation andin favor ofuse of
all the nation's gold to be held by the BankofEngland as backing for the
nation's monetary base-a gold-bullion standard. Most ofthe proposals
were adopted when Britain returned to gold in 1925.
Hawtrey (1935) summarized and expanded upon the stylized facts of
the Cunliffe report. He documented the domestic aspects of a gold
standard. A gold-coin standard with free coinage and free export and
import serves as a device to provide a limit on the supply of money, but
the authorities must maintain the quality of the coin. Thus,
the essence of the gold standard is that the price of gold, the value of
gold in monetary units, is fixed by law and this determines the wealth
value of the monetary unit itself. The use of gold coin ... provides a
fairly close approximation to this ideal. (Hawtrey 1935, p. 20)
A central bank acting as a bankers' bank by holding a pool of gold
reserves can reduce the foregone interest cost on commercial banks'
holdings of gold coins to maintain convertibility of their liabilities.
However, since commercial banks keep their reserves with a central
bank, it must accept the responsibility ofacting as a lender-of-Iast-resort.
For the banks and the public do not trouble themselves about the
interchangeability of gold and credit. That is the affair of the Central
Bankalone. Anyone can sell the CentralBankas much gold as he likes
and can procure from it as much gold as he chooses to pay for. The
CentralBankis in the gold marketas bothbuyerandsellerin unlimited
quantities at a fixed price. (P. 24)
The central bank has the power to control the domestic money supply
by using its principal tool-its discount rate. By raising the rate, the71 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
central bank can check lending by "improvident banks" and by lowering
the rate it can stimulate lending.
Hawtreythen described the mechanism by which a changein Bankrate
operates.
The power of the central bank over the wealth value of the monetary
unit ultimately depends on the deterrent effect of a high Bank rate
upon the borrowing operations of the customers of the banks. Bank
rateis essentially ashortterm rateofinterest....Itis the borrowingof
money for the purchase of goods that is likely to respond most
promptly to a restriction or relaxation ofcredit, because a trader who
wishes to reduce his indebtedness in respect ofgoods held in stock can
readily do so by postponing or reducing his purchases. When traders
are tending generally to do this, the effect is immediately felt by the
producers of the goods in decreased orders....
. . . The installation of capital is usually financed by the raising of
funds from the long-term investment market, but short-term borrow-
ing is often resorted to in anticipation ofthe raising offunds from that
source or for the purchase and holding of securities. If Bank rate is
raised, the holding ofcapital assets with money temporarily borrowed
is discouraged. But the effect on productive activity will be relatively
slow, for the installation ofcapital is a prolongedprocess, and any such
projectis likelyto beprecededby alongpreliminaryperiodofprepara-
tion. (Pp. 25-26)
Thus, changes in Bank rate have their primary impact on the holding of
inventories.
Hawtrey also discussed international aspects of a gold standard. The
commitment by a number ofcountries to fix the prices oftheircurrencies
in terms of gold establishes a fixed-exchange-rate system. The prices in
anyone currency of gold in different places cannot differ by more than
the cost of transporting gold between the different places-arbitrage in
the gold market will ensure that outcome. To maintain convertibility of
the currency-the primary responsibility ofa centralbank-an adequate
gold reserve is essential. The threatofa loss ofgold is more serious than a
possible gain, since in the former case the country may be forced to leave
the gold standard before the necessary adjustment can take place; in the
lattercase, although the central bank may temporarily lose control ofthe
market, the stimulus to lending will eventuallylead to a reversal ofa gold
inflow.
Finally, Hawtrey, like Keynes (see below, p. 79) saw an analogy
between the operation of a clearing system between banks within one
country and a clearing system ofcentral banks under the gold standard.
In his analysis ofthe balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism fol-
lowing a monetary disturbance, Hawtrey incorporated elements ofboth
the classical adjustment mechanism and the role ofincome changes. An
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ultimately lead to an increase in production and real income, assuming
less thanfull employment, butwill initiallyleadto an increasein sales and
reduction in inventories. Merchants and dealers will therefore seek to
replenish their stocks. Those dealing in home-produced goods will do so
partly by ordering fresh supplies from producers and partly by diverting
to the home market goods that might have beensold abroad, while those
dealing in foreign-produced goods will orderfresh supplies from abroad.
The diversion ofproductionfrom exports and the increase in imports will
create an adverse balance of payments and a gold outflow. The process
continues until a new higher equilibrium level ofincome is reachedwith a
lower than initial balance-of-payments deficit.
Once full employment is reached, the increased spending will affect
prices. However, the prices of traded goods cannot be fully raised.
These, which may conveniently be called "foreign trade products"
comprise not only actual imports and exports but all importable and
exportablegoods. Thepricesofforeign tradeproducts aregoverned by
prices in world markets andare fixed in gold. The demandfor themwill
expand as theconsumers' income expands, and as thedemandexpands
the loss of gold grows greater and greater. (Hawtrey 1935, p. 41)
Inaddition, someoftheincreasedincomewill bedivertedto thepurchase
offoreign securities which will worsen the current-account balance. The
process can be arrested and the deficit reduced by an increase in the
discount rate-quickly offsetting the capital inflow and ultimately reduc-
ing the rise in income. However, "the contraction of the consumers'
income is the only substantial corrective" to the balance-of-payments
deficit (p. 43).
For Gregory ([1932] 1979), like Hawtrey, the essence of the gold
standard is convertibility ofnational currency into a fixed weight ofgold.
One of the great advantages of the gold standard therefore is
that . . . it eliminates fluctuating rates ofexchange . . . [that] interna-
tional trade and investment can be conductedwithout any fear that the
sums risked in a particular trade or investment transaction will not be
recovered . . . owing to changes in the relative exchange values of
different moneys at the date ofpayment. (Gregory [1932] 1979, p. 9)52
In addition, he related the development of the international gold stan-
dard in the second half of the nineteenth century to the growth of
international trade and investment in that period, and stressed the role
played by gold movements in the establishment of the conditions
necessary to secure equilibrium in the international balance of pay-
ments of the various countries upon the gold standard....
What the international gold standarddoes. . . is to force prices and
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balance of payments can be adjusted without gold flows in either
direction.... The international gold standard creates, nota common
pricelevelbutan integratedprice-and-incomestructure. (Pp. 11, 14-15)
The gold standard can operate successfully in the context of modern
banking systems and central banks (provided sterilization activity is not
undertaken) and of tariffs, capital flows, and transfers.
The Role of London
An important theme in the literature of the gold standard, developed
in the interwar period, was that the gold standard was successful primar-
ily because it was a sterling standard.
53 Perhaps the most succinct state-
ment of the position is in Smit (1934), although a similar viewpoint is
expressed in Brown (1940).
According to Smit, by 1914,
all the leading money and trade centers in the world were intercon-
nected in a triangular fashion through London, although smaller pat-
terns, directly centered around Paris, Berlin and New York, were
woven into the main pattern of the picture. (Smit 1934, p. 53)
In the prewar world, sterling balances instead ofgold were increasingly
used by foreign financial institutions to settle international payments:
The most importantkey to the world'sforeign exchange marketslay in
the sterling balances offoreign bankers kept in London.... London
acted as one bank for a customer-neighborhood of bankers that com-
prised not only the small British island but the whole world. . . . The
pound, which was internationally wanted for settling commercial and
capitalindebtednesswith theBritishIsles, becamemore andmore, as a
consequence ofthe world-wide demand that it commanded, a conven-
tional credit counter for settling indebtedness among all countries.
(P. 54)
The primary financial interconnection between countries centered on
the London discount market because much of the world's foreign trade
was financed by sterling bills. 54
The Bank ofEngland by its discount rate and open-market operations
was able to exercise considerable influence over this market. Thus
the extraordinary effectiveness of the English official bank rate in
influencing foreign exchange rates and international gold movements
before the war cannot be explained unless one sees the integration that
had taken place in the world credit structure (P. 55)
In addition, the spread of the gold standard and integration of the
internationalcredit system were closely intertwined as "thelegal guaran-
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fluctuations andinspiredconfidence" and"Londonpossessedtheworld's
central gold market.... The possession of sterling balances was the
surest means of getting gold when wanted" (p. 56).
Finally, Smit argued that at the same time as the world moved towards
a sterling standard, there was growing internationalization ofcommodity
prices centered in British commodity exchanges. A key consequence of
internationalintegrationofbothcommodityandmoneymarketswas that
the traditional explanation of how the prewar gold standard operated
placed too much emphasis on "the existence ofdifferent national mone-
tarysystems, andthequantitativerelationsbetweentheseparate national
money and credit systems and domestic price levels" (p. 55).
Even before World War I, Keynes ([1913] 1971) had noted the unique
role of London in the operation of the gold standard. By World War I,
England had developed a sound currency and, aided by the effective use
ofBankrate, requiredonlya small gold reserveto maintainconvertibility
in the face ofexternalshocks. However, according to Keynes, mostother
countries were not as successful in staying on the gold standard. One key
difference between Britain and other countries was that she was a net
creditorin theinternationalshort-loanmarket, whereasmost othercoun-
tries were debtors.
In the former case, which is that of Great Britain, it is a question of
reducing the amount lent; in the latter case, it is a question ofincreas-
ing the amount borrowed. A machinery which is adapted for action of
the first kind may be ill-suited for action of the second. Partly as a
consequence ofthis, partly as a consequence ofthe peculiar organiza-
tion ofthe London money market, the "bankrate" policy for regulat-
ing the outflow of gold has been admirably successful in this country,
and yet cannot stand elsewhere unaided by other devices. (Keynes
[1913] 1971, p. 13)
Most other countries in adopting the gold standard used gold as a
medium of exchange but were unable to use the discount rate as an
effective method to preserve the standard because, in addition to not
being net international lenders, they had not established the elaborate
financial network of the London money market.
Consequently other countries used other mechanisms to supplement
their inadequacies: they held large gold reserves "so that a substantial
drain ... may be faced with equanimity"; they partially suspended
payment in gold; and they kept "foreign credits and bills ... which can
be drawn upon when necessary"(p. 14).
Most countries (especially less-developed ones) tended to rely on the
last method because it economized on the foregone interest cost of
holding gold reserves.
55 Thus the gold-exchange standard evolved
out of the discovery that, so long as gold is available for payments of
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of the national currency, it is a matter of comparative indifference
whetherit actuallyforms the nationalcurrency. . . .Thegold exchange
standard may be said to exist when gold does not circulate in a country
to an appreciable extent, when the local currency is not necessarily
redeemable in gold, but when the government or central bank makes
arrangements for the provision offoreign remittances in gold at a fixed
maximum rate in terms ofthe local currency, the reserves necessary to
provide those remittances being kept to a considerable extent abroad.
(P. 21)
Cassel (1935) went even further than Keynes, arguing that the gold
standard was an international standard neither in the pre- nor the post-
World War I periods. It was only a British standard. He argued that the
automatic balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism of price levels
adjusting to gold flows never in fact worked thatway-thatcentral banks
for the sake ofsecurity maintained larger reserves than legally required,
and therefore exports and imports of gold did not necessarily influence
the domestic money supply or the price level.
The gold supply of a country exercised such an influence only via the
policy ofthe central bank and its regulation ofthe market by means of
its rate ofdiscount and its open market operations. Thus the currency
necessarily became a "managed currency" whose value depended
entirely on the policy of the central bank. (Cassel 1935, p. 3)
In addition, capital flows hindered the automatic functioning of the
international gold standard:
A country normally exporting capital could compensate for a loss of
gold simply by a reduction of its lending; and a country normally
importing capital could compensate for a loss of gold by borrowing
more. Thus it was possible to prevent gold imports or exports from
having any influence on the price level of the country. (Pp. 3-4)
Finally, the international gold standard did not guarantee a natural
distribution of gold:
Creditorcountrieswere in a position to accumulate, ifthey chose to do
so, disproportionate gold stocks without using them for any other
purpose than for exercisingpolitical influence ormerelyfor satisfying a
national pride in the possession of gold. Debtor countries could pro-
vide gold reserves by increasing their foreign indebtedness.... The
size of these reserves had very little to do with the balance oftrade of
the country. Nor did gold imports and exports have any distinct rela-
tion to changes in the balance of trade. (P. 4)
That the international gold standard functioned so well before World
War I
can only be explained by the basic position thatthe pound sterling held
in this system. Indeed, the pre-war gold standard system may not76 Michael D. Bordo
inadequately be described as a sterling bloc held together by London's
positionas theworld'sfinancial clearingcenterandbytheserviceofthe
pound sterling as a generally recognized means for international pay-
ments. (Pp. 4-5).
Next, in Cassell's view, the international gold standard was fun-
damentally defective because it was based on the tacit assumption that
the purchasing power of gold would be stable and hence that mainte-
nance ofa fixed gold parity guaranteed stability in the purchasing power
of a country's currency. According to Cassel,
the gold standard . . . [suffered] from an inherent and irreparable
instability. This instability results partly from the instability of the
value ofgold itself, and partlyfrom the insecurity ofthe redemption in
gold of gold-standard currencies. (P. 6)
On the first score, he presented evidence ofconsiderable variability in
the value of gold for the period 1850 to 1910, based on the Sauerbeck
wholesale price index. This evidence he explained by "deviations ofthe
actual gold supply from the normal gold supply"56 and "variations in the
monetary demand for gold."57
On the second score, he alleged that only Britain had a completely
convertible currency in the prewar period; other countries usually put
barriers in the way of the large gold exports and "eagerly watched their
gold reserves." Indeed, he argued that by the end of the period most
countries kept large gold reserves as a matter of national pride and
consequently the key aim ofpolicy was to protect the gold reserve rather
than use the gold reserve to protectconvertibility. Thuswhen WorldWar
I broke out, the redeemability ofcurrencywas immediatelysuspended in
order to safeguard the gold reserve.
Like Cassel, Viner (1932) argued that the prewar gold standard
would. . . have beenfound impracticable andwould have been gener-
ally abandoned ... [if not for] the development of a deliberate and
centralized mechanism of control of gold movements, using central
bank discount policy and credit control as its chiefinstruments. (Viner
1932, p. 9)
Moreover, the Bank of England pioneered in the development of the
technique of central-bank control. England became the manager of the
international gold standard.
However, the evolution of the Bank of England's effective manage-
mentofthe gold standardemergedas a by-productoftheBank'slearning
by a process oftrial and errorto protect its slim gold reserves. The Bank
of England in the nineteenth century was primarily a profit-seeking
institution and hence tried to minimize its non-interest-bearing gold
holdings. However, bytheclose ofthecentury, theBankgraduallybegan
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TheBankofEngland, at first as the sole issuer ofpapermoney andthe
most important deposit bank, later under pressure of public opinion
and in self-defense against the irresponsibility of the other English
banks, partiallyacceptedtherole ofacentralbankwith somedegree of
special responsibility for the mode of operation of the English gold
standard and especially for the protection of the convertibility of the
English paper currency. (Pp. 12-13)
As a consequence, the Bank learned to makes its discount rate effec-
tive to protect its gold reserve in the face ofan external drain and to hold
adequate reserves to meet the exigencies of both external and internal
drains. 59
Moreover, accordingtoViner, in the nineteenthcenturyfluctuations in
the exchange rates within the gold points and short-term capital flows
aided the adjustment mechanism and reduced the size of gold flows
necessary to offset a disturbance to the balance of payments. Finally,
Viner made a case for the continuation ofthe gold standard, despite the
fact that it did not produce a stable price level, because a system of
inconvertiblepapercurrencies linked by flexible exchange rateswould be
far worse. 60
We know too little . . . of the possibilities of stabilization to take
immediately any major steps in that direction. The hostility ofcentral
bankers and the menace ofpolitical control are genuine andimportant
factors in thesituation. Thegold standardis a wretchedstandard, butit
may conceivably be the best available to us. Its past record, badas it is,
is not necessarily conclusive in this respect, as the only alternatives
which have actually been tried have, on the whole, had an incompara-
bly worse record. (P. 37)
The Conflict between Internal and External Goals
A major theme of the interwar period was the potential conflict be-
tween internal price stability and a fixed exchange rate under the gold
standard. By fixing the price of gold in terms of domestic currency,
movements in internal price levels (and real income) would be deter-
mined by external-price-Ievel (andreal-income) movements. Theprewar
gold standard period, characterized by both price stability (in a long-run
sense) and fixed exchange rates, was an accident ofhistory, never to be
repeated. At the same time, flexible exchange rates and abandonment of
the gold standard rule were not embraced because ofthe risk ofunstable
exchange rates and the fear ofthe consequences ofdiscretionary policy.
Thattheme is echoedin the works ofKeynes, Cassel, Viner, Nurkse, and
others. To remedy the conflict between external and internal goals,
various schemes were proposed to promote international harmonization
of price-level movements under a managed gold standard. The views of
major writers of the interwar period are surveyed briefly below.78 Michael D. Bordo
ForKeynes ([1923] 1971) the policy optionsfacing GreatBritain in the
immediate postwar period were to go back to the gold standard at the
prewar parity, which would involve deflation, or else to fix parity after
devaluing the pound. The choice between devaluation and deflation was
part of a more general dilemma-the choice between price stability and
exchange-rate stability. Keynes then asked, "In the light ofour answers
tothefirst two questions, is agold standard,howeverimperfectin theory,
the best available method for attaining our ends in practice?" ([1923]
1971, p. 117).
Because ofits adverse affects on income distribution, Keynes rejected
deflation. When internal and external price stability were incompatible,
he chose internal price stability. Under the prewar gold standard, the
choice was made in favor offixed exchange rates and the subservience of
the internal price level to external considerations. "Wesubmitted, partly
because we did not dare trust ourselves to a less automatic . . . policy,
andpartly because the price fluctuations experiencedwere in fact moder-
ate" (p. 126). But the circumstances of the pre-1914 era were partly
accidental, and it should not be presumed they would ever be repeated
again.
The special conditions Keynes cited for the past good performance of
the gold standard were first,
that progress in the discovery of gold mines roughly kept pace with
progress in other directions-a correspondence which was not
altogether a matter of chance, because the progress of that period,
since itwascharacterizedby thegradualopeningup andexploitationof
the world's surface, not unnaturally brought to light pari passu the
remoter deposits of gold. But this stage of history is now almost at an
end. A quarter of a century has passed by since the discovery of an
important deposit. Material progress is more dependent now on the
growth ofscientific and technical knowledge, ofwhich the application
to gold mining may be intermittent. (P. 133)
Second, the independent influences coming from the demand for gold in
the arts and for hoarding purposes in Asia had a steadying influence.
Third, central banks allowed their gold reserves to vary slightly, absorb-
ing much of the additional gold produced after major discoveries and
reducing some of their accumulated gold when it was relatively scarce.
They thus minimized the effects on price levels.
Given the special circumstancesthatmadethe gold standardsuccessful
before World War I, Keynes argued that the standard would be unlikely
to work as well in the postwar period. Even if all countries adopted the
gold standard-an important condition for it to be successful-the pre-
war system of balance-of-payments adjustment was "too slow and in-
sensitive in its mode of operation" to handle the "large [and] sudden79 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
divergences between the price levels of different countries as have oc-
curredlately" (pp. 128-29). Moreover, thoughshort-termcapitalflows in
response to interest-rate differentials helped speed up the adjustment
mechanism in the prewar period, especially when the' disturbance was
temporary, in thecaseofpermanentdisturbances, theadjustment "might
obscure the real seriousness ofthe situation, and enable a countryto live
beyond its resources for a considerable time at the risk of ultimate
default" (p. 130). This problem would be more serious in the postwar
period.
The case for flexible exchange rates andmanaged fiduciary moneywas
that balance-of-payments adjustment to external shocks would be much
more rapid under flexible than under fixed rates despite the risk of
instability.61 Thus Keynes came out strongly against restoration of the
classical gold standard by the United Kingdom.
In truth, the gold standard is already a barbarous relic. All ofus, from
the Governor of the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily
interested in preserving the stability of business, prices, and employ-
ment, and are not likely, when the choice is forced on us, deliberately
to sacrifice these to outworn dogma, which had its value once, of £3
17s. 10V2d. per ounce. Advocates of the ancient standard do not
observe how remote it now is from the spirit and the requirements of
the age. A regulated nonmetallic standard has slipped in unnoticed. It
exists. (P. 138)
Incontrasttohis earlierfocus onthepolicydilemmafacing onecountry
alone, Keynes ([1930] 1971) concentratedon the international monetary
system as a whole. The interrelationship between central banks in an
international fixed-exchange-rate system such as the gold standard was
':lnalogous, he noted, to the relationship between commercial banks and
the central bank within a national economy.62
Under the pre-World War I gold standard, commercial banks oper-
ated in step within one country and central banks operated in step
internationally except that reserve ratios did adapt somewhat to relative
scarcity or abundance of gold. Behavior of the long-run price level
depended on whether new gold available for reserves was increasing
faster or slower than trade of the gold standard countries, which in turn
depended on the rate of discoveries and technological improvements in
gold mines, the use ofgold as currency, the number ofcountries joining
the gold standard, and the growth of real per capita income.
Some important differences in the relationship between central banks
underthegoldstandardandbetweenmemberbanksandthecentralbank
in a national economy, however, Keynes observed, were that central
banks tended to have more variable reserve ratios;63 that more ofits own
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that there is a higher degree of competition for short-term capital be-
tween central banks through varying discount rates than is the case
between commercial banks.64
Thusin aninternationalsystem, a centralbankcanpursue an indepen-
dent policy-oriented primarily to domesticconsiderations-onlywithin
narrow limits and for short periods, with the degree of independence
determined by its relative size. Thus, under a fully operative gold stan-
dard, "credit cycles have an international character" because member
central banks must follow the average behavior. This implies a "real
divergence ofinterest; and we must not expect ofcentral banks a degree
of international disinterestedness far in advance of national sentiment
and of the behaviour of other organs of national government" ([1930],
1971, p. 257).
The dilemma between internal-balance and external-balance consid-
erations for one country on the gold standard is thus apparent.
65 Keynes
argued that in a world of perfect capital mobility, the domestic interest
rate must correspond to world interest rates:
Ifany country tried to maintain a higher rate than its neighbours, gold
would flow towards it until either it gave way or the international
system broke down by its having absorbed all the gold in the world.
And ifit tried to maintain a lower rate, gold wouldflow outuntil either
it gave wayorhadto leave theinternationalsystemthrough having lost
all its gold. Thus the degree ofits power ofindependent action would
have no relation to its local needs. (P. 271)
The problem arises for a country
ifits foreign balance is inelastic, and if, at the same time, it is unable to
absorb the whole of its savings in new investment at the world rate of
interest. It will also tend to happen even where the foreign balance is
elastic, ifits moneycostsofproductionaresticky....This, then, is the
dilemma ofan international monetarysystem-to preserve the advan-
tages ofthe stability ofthe local currencies ofthe various members of
thesystemintermsoftheinternationalstandard, andtopreserveatthe
same time an adequate local autonomy for each member over its
domestic rate of interest and its volume of foreign lending. (Pp. 271-
72)66
Asa solutiontotheproblem, Keynesadvocateda numberofpolicies to
increase the discretion of national monetary authorities while still re-
maining on a gold standard. One set of policies to protect a country's
domestic stability in the face of "inconvenient fluctuations in the rate of
foreign lending" is to maintain a large enough level ofreserves: either in
gold reserves at home or by holding "liquid balances in foreign centers,"
by arranging overdraft facilities with other central banks or by "borrow-
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bank" (p. 278). A second policy is to manipulate the gold points-to
create an artificial spread between the official buying and selling price of
gold. This can be done by direct authorityorbythe central bankmanipu-
latingtheforward rateofexchange.
67 Finally, hesuggesteddirectcontrols
over capital movements. Keynes's ideal solution to the problem ofcom-
bininganidealinternationalstandardandinternalequilibriumwas a gold
standard managed by a supernational bank.
68
The objectives ofa supernational monetary agency would be to ensure
long-run stability and to smooth short-run cycles around the long-run
trend. One way to achieve long-run price stability would be to adopt a
commodity standard based on an international aggregate of commod-
ities. "Thelong-periodtrendin the valueofgoldshouldbeso managedas
to conformto a somewhatcrudeinternationaltabularstandard" (p. 351).
To solve the problem of short-run disturbances within individual coun-
tries, Keynes advocated giving individual central banks more discretion
within the fixed-exchange-rate system.
The supernational bankwould be established by all the world's central
banks and would act as a lender-of-Iast-resort to them alone. It would
hold as assets gold, securities, and advances to central banks, and its
liabilities would be deposits by the central banks. These deposits, called
supernationalbankmoney(S.B.M.), would befully convertibleintogold
and would serve along with gold as reserves for the member banks. The
supernational central bank would then use the normal tools ofmonetary
policy-bank rate and open-market operations-to "maintain . . . the
stability of the value of gold (or S.B.M.) in terms of a tabular standard
based on the principal articles of international commerce" and to avoid
"general profit inflations and deflations of an international character"
(p. 360).
The interwar criticism ofthe traditional approach to the gold standard
culminated in a provocative and path-breaking article by Whale (1937).
He challenged boththe price-specie-flow adjustment mechanism and the
operation of the rules of the game.
Whale referred to four pieces of puzzling evidence: (1) Taussig's
finding that the adjustment of national price levels to disturbances oc-
curredmuch more rapidly thanthe theorypostulated; (2) Beach'sfinding
that gold flows to Great Britain moved procyclically contrary to the
classical prediction, and that they were more closely related to interest-
rate differentials than to price-level differences; (3) the finding that many
prewar central banks did not follow the rules of the game, e.g., the
central banks ofFrance and Belgium rarely changed their discount rates
yet remained on the gold standard; (4) the finding that price levels
between regions with varying levels ofeconomic activity moved synchro-
nously, suggesting a linkage through arbitrage rather than adjustment
with a lag to specie flows, as in the traditional theory.69 "Might not the82 Michael D. Bordo
national price level be similarly determined by the world system of
prices?" (Whale 1937, p. 22).
On the basis ofthis evidence, Whale suggested an alternative hypoth-
esis to the classical mechanism: Rather than the demandfor money in an
open economy with a fixed exchange rate adjusting to the supply of
money (andspecie flows) as theclassical theorypredicts, specieflows and
the money supply are determined by the demand for money, which in
turn is determined by real income and the price level.
Thus, according to Whale, an increase in real economic activity, for a
given price level (determined by the world price level), would increase
the demandfor money, causing a balance-of-paymentssurplus anda gold
inflow. Similarly an increase in the domestic money supplywould lead to
a balance-of-payments deficit, a gold outflow, and a decline in the re-
serves of the banking system. If the markets of the country are closely
linked with foreign markets, the decline ofbank reserves should lead to
"an almost immediate correction" of the money supply (p. 27).
Interestrates also playadifferent yet still importantrole in the alterna-
tive mechanism:
What is contended is that. . . the raising ofinterest rates did not have
the effect of producing a relative reduction of prices in certain coun-
tries. High rates in London led rather to a world fall in prices, partly
because of the sympathetic movement of rates elsewhere, partly be-
cause of the effect on British entrepot trade and British long-term
foreign investment. (P. 27)
Two important implications follow. First, the classical transfer
mechanism of Mill and Taussig must be reinterpreted. According to
Whale, a transfer ofcapital involves a redistribution ofspending power.
However, rather than this process involving a change in the direction of
demand and in the terms oftrade, "the redistribution ofspending power
itself, ... apart from any change in the direction of demand and the
terms of trade, may require a redistribution of money... effected by a
movementofgold" (pp. 28-29). Second, "sincegold movements...and
discount rate adjustments are displaced from their central position in the
process ofinternational price adjustment, the question of 'observing the
rules of the game' ... loses much of its importance" (p. 31).
Appendix E Post-World War II Reinterpreters ofthe
Gold Standard
In the period since World War II, economists have reexamined and
reinterpreted the operation ofthe classical gold standard on the basis of
new evidence and new theoretical and statistical tools. The principal83 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
areasofresearch are the adjustmentmechanism, the role ofcapitalflows,
the managed gold standard, and the rules of the game.
In the reconsideration of the international adjustment mechanism,
several approaches can be distinguished. The Keynesian open-economy-
multiplier approach (Ford) explains most ofthe adjustment to the trans-
fer ofcapital before World WarI in terms ofchanges in economic activity
rather than relative price levels. Extension of the classical price-specie-
flow mechanism (Friedman and Schwartz) focuses onrelative price levels
and interest rates in the adjustment process. The monetary approach to
the balance of payments (Triffin, Williamson, and McCloskey and
Zecher) integrates elements ofboth Keynesian and classical mechanisms
and views gold flows by themselves, rather than the effects they have on
price levels, incomes, and interest rates, as the equilibrating mechanism
in the adjustment of the balance of payments.
A major reexamination ofthe role ofcapital flows in the transmission
mechanism (Morgenstern) raised serious doubts about the classical
theory, though the analysis in turn was criticized (Borts). Evidence
favorable.to the traditional approach was also presented (Bloomfield).
Evidence on the managed gold standard amplified the view that Lon-
don managed the prewar gold standard (Lindert, Sayers, Goodhart).
Other studies showed that the rules of the game were largely violated
before 1914 (Bloomfield) and that they were inconsequential (McClos-
key and Zecher).
The Adjustment Mechanism
Ford(1962) downplayedthe role ofprice-level andmonetarychange in
the explanation of the adjustment of the balance of payments under the
prewar gold standard. He stressed three themes: (1) the key element in
the adjustment mechanism for Great Britain was the change in real
income, working through an open-economy-multiplier process; (2) the
important link between Great Britain and periphery nations via lending
and exports worked primarily through changes in income; (3) there was
an asymmetry betweenthe gold standardexperienceofGreatBritain and
Argentina (an example of a periphery country). For Great Britain the
gold standard mitigated the adjustment to external disturbances, for
Argentina the gold standard aggravated it. These divergent experiences
reflected the operationoffundamentally different gold standardfinancial
institutions and the presence and absence of "other favorable circum-
stances." Ford was highly critical of the stylized facts of the traditional
approachsummarizedin the Cunliffe report. His objectionswere thatthe
report omitted the crucial role ofincome effects; placed weight on a link
between changes in interest rates and economic activity that he believed
to be tenuous; treated relative prices as the primary mechanism of
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elastic demands for imports and exports; inappropriately ignored the
feedback effectsofchangesin income ofthe majortradingnation-Great
Britain-onother countries; and made no mention ofthe important role
of foreign lending.
Instead, Ford emphasized the key role of changes in income in the
balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism.
70 A disturbance to the bal-
ance ofpayments such as the exogenous decline in exports would reduce
much of the initial balance-of-payments deficit by a decline in real in-
come, working via the multiplier, and would reduce the demand for
imports without any change in price levels.
71 The extent to which the
balance of payments was equilibrated, without requiring a gold outflow
and changes in the money supply, depended on the relative sizes of the
marginal propensities to import and to save.
72 In addition, feedback
effects of changes in other countries' income due to the fall in British
demand for their products would (depending on the size of the other
country) also facilitate the adjustment.
The second adjustment mechanism was change in the money supply.
To the extent the balance of payments was not equilibrated by income
change, the resultant gold outflow would reduce the domestic money
supply, which would raise interest rates and lower domestic economic
activity, imports, andthe balance-of-paymentsdeficit. Therise in interest
rates would also induce a short-term capital inflow, providing a tempo-
rary cushion for the balance of payments. A rise in the central bank's
discount rate would further stimulate the reduction in domestic activity
and encourage a short-termcapital inflow. However, Forddid not regard
theBankofEngland'splaying by the rules ofthegame as the key element
in the process, and he downplayed the accommodating role of central-
bank policy in other countries.
73
Finally, Ford presented evidence he regarded as consistent with the
key role ofincome in the adjustment process for Great Britain. Compar-
ing deviations from a nine-year moving average ofexports, imports, and
income from 1870 to 1914, he found that
the parallelism between movements ofdeviations from nine year mov-
ing averages ofexports, imports and national income is marked, with
some slight tendency for imports to lag behind exports, ... these
movements provide powerful evidence both for the exports-income-
import automatic adjustment mechanism and for the view that in most
British booms and slumps variations in export values were a vital
factor. (Ford 1962, p. 61)74
According to Ford, British loans to developing nations such as Argen-
tina, Australia, and Canada were primarily transferred through changes
in real income, in contrast to the classical approach which emphasized
changes in sectoral prices. A British loan to a country like Argentina85 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
would lead to an increase in imports from Britain and an increase in debt
service. When the investmentprojectsin theborrowingcountry matured,
production of exportables would increase, some of which would be
imported by Britain. The resultant rise in Argentine incomes would then
generate the revenues necessary to service the foreign debt as well as
increase demand for British goods.
The arrangement worked well in the long run, but in the short run
problems could arise for the borrowing country. If the amount lent
abroad temporarily exceeded Britain's current-account surplus, a gold
outflow from Britain would occur, and the Bank ofEngland would raise
Bank rate. As a result, the borrowing country would experience a gold
outflow. Important investment projects might be halted before comple-
tion leading to a balance-of-payments crisis if the borrower were unable
to meet the debt-service obligations.
Ford examined in detail the cyclical adjustment mechanism in Argen-
tina underthe goldstandard(and underinconvertible paper). Thetypical
cycle can be described as follows: A rise in the price of Argentina's
primary staple exports, generated by an increase in foreign demand,
would produce a current-account surplus, a rise in economic activity, and
a gold inflow. The gold inflow would lead to a rise in the domestic money
supply. Some ofthe increased expenditure would go to the production of
additional exports, some to the purchase of imports, and some into the
nontraded sector-primarily for the purchase of land. A land boom
would develop, followed by further foreign investment and further ex-
pansion. Ultimately, the boom would be choked off, either by a reduc-
tion in foreign economic activity that reduced the demand for Argentin-
ian exports, or by a rise in the discount rate by the Bank of England to
offset a gold outflow. Furthermore, were speculation in land to get outof
hand, there would ultimately be a collapse in land prices and a domestic
liquidity crisis associated with bank failures. Foreign lending would be
discouraged. Iftheinternaldrainwere accompaniedby an externaldrain,
then domestic gold reserves would be insufficient to withstand the
onslaught and the country would suspend convertibility. This was the
sequence of events in 1885 and 1913.
Ford argued that the gold standard experience of periphery countries
such as Argentina was considerably less favorable than that of center
countries such as Britain. For two reasons the cycle in British economic
activity was dampened by the gold standard whereas the cycle in Argen-
tina was aggravated. First, Britain's position as the center ofthe world's
money market meant that in the face ofan external drain, a rise in Bank
rate would draw on short-term capital and sterling balances in London
without loss of gold, while Argentina lacked the cushioning financial
institutions.
75 Second, itwas easierfor a creditornationto obtainimmedi-
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. . . in a period of stringency it was difficult or even impossible for a
debtorcountry (with a pasthistory ofdepreciation) to offset gold exports
by increasing its borrowing abroad" (p. 182).
In their monumental study of U.S. monetary history, Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) treated the gold standard in a traditional way in their
analysis of the role of monetary forces and of the price-specie-flow
mechanism to explain balance-of-payments adjustment under the gold
standard; in their application of the commodity theory of money to
explain secular price movements; and finally, in their discussion of the
role of central-bank management under the gold standard.
They described the role of the money supply under an international
specie standard that the United States adhered to from 1879 to 1933, as
follows:
The amount of money in anyone country must be whatever is neces-
saryto maintaininternationalbalancewith othercountriesonthesame
standard, and the amount of high-powered money will alter through
imports and exports of specie in order to produce this result . . . the
amountofhigh-poweredmoneyis a dependentratherthananindepen-
dent variable, and is not subject to governmental determination.
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 51-52)
Moreover,
for a country which is an economically minor part ofthe gold standard
... the majorchannel ofinfluence is from fixed rates ofexchange with
other currencies through the balance of payments to the stock of
money, thence to the level of internal prices that is consistent with
theseexchange rates.... [However] the links havemuchplayin them,
so that domestic policies can produce sizable short-term deviations
in the stock of money from the level dictated by external influences.
(Pp. 89-90)
Under a flexible-exchange-rate regime, by contrast, such as the green-
back period from 1862 to 1879, "the amount of high-powered money is
determined by governmental action" (p. 51).
Adjustment to both external and internal disturbances was facilitated
by the classical relative-price-Ievel adjustment mechanism and capital
flows. The events of the period 1879-82 are analyzed in these terms.
Good harvests in 188Q-81 led to an increase in U.S. exports. The result-
ing increase in demand for dollars implied a relatively higher U.S. price
level consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium.
76 Pending the rise
in prices, a gold inflow ensuedthatled to a rise in themoneystock and the
price level. At the same time, a gold outflow from Great Britain led to a
monetary contraction and a decline in the price level. As a consequence
the Bank of England raised Bank rate, reversing the gold flow to the
United States.87 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
The gold inflow was a passive reaction which temporarilyfilled the gap
in payments. Inits absence, therewouldhavehadtobeanappreciation
of the dollar relative to other currencies-a solution ruled out by the
fixed exchange rate under the specie standard-or a more rapid rise in
internal U.S. prices. At the same time, the gold inflow provided the
basis andstimulusfor anexpansionin thestockofmoney and therebya
rise in internal prices at home and downward pressure on the stock of
money and prices abroad sufficient to bring an end to the necessity for
large gold inflows. It would be hard to find a much neater example in
history ofthe classical gold standard mechanism in operation. (P. 99)
Otherepisodes are treatedsimilarly: prices andincomes, aided by capital
flows, adjust to maintain external balance.
77 The bruntofthe adjustment
was sustained in some cases by changes in the money stock, in others by
changes in velocity or real output.
Economically, these were the channels whereby a necessary adjust-
ment was worked out. They were not the forces determining what
adjustment was necessary.... The discipline of the balance of pay-
ments under the gold standard enforced that adjustment and deter-
mined its size. (P. 101)78
Friedman and Schwartz applied the classical commodity theory of
money to explain secular price-level movements:
Under a specie standard confined to a single country, or for the world
as a whole under an international standard, the existing amount of
specie is determined by the available physical stock plus the relative
demand for monetary and other uses; and changes in the amount of
specie, by relative costs of production of specie and other goods and
services. (P. 52)
They explained the secular deflationary episode of 1879-96 by
[a] combination ofevents, including a slowing ofthe rateofincreaseof
the world's stock of gold, the adoption of the gold standard by a
widening circle of countries, and a rapid increase in aggregate eco-
nomic output,... despite the rapid extension ofcommercial banking
and of other devices for erecting an ever larger stock of money on a
given gold base. (P. 91)
The subsequent turnaround in prices and secular-inflation episode is
explained by
fresh discoveries of gold in South Africa, Alaska, and Colorado com-
bined with the development of improved methods of mining and
refining, especially the introduction of the cyanide process. These
occurred during a period when there were few further important
extensionsofthegold standardyet a continueddevelopmentofdevices
for "economizing" gold. (P. 91)88 Michael D. Bordo
Moreover, the period ofsecular deflation "was an important factor in
stimulating the searchfor gold and for economical techniques for extract-
ing gold from low-grade ore" (p. 188).
Finally, in their discussion of the sterilization of gold inflows in the
1920s by the Federal Reserve system, Friedman and Schwartz explain
how violations of the rules of the game weakened the adjustment
mechanism of the gold standard.
The sterilization of gold could be justified as a means of insulating
internal monetary conditions from external changes. Its international
effect, however, was to render the maintenance of the international
gold standard more difficult. Suppose all countries linked by a gold
standard were to sterilize gold flows. Goldflows would then setin train
noforces tendingto bringthemto a haltorto reverse them. Thesystem
could last only as long as the flows resulted from purely temporary
imbalances of sufficiently small magnitude to right themselves before
draining thecountrieslosing gold oftheirreserves. Theeffectwould be
to insulate the countries from minor adjustments at the cost ofletting
them accumulate into major ones. (P. 283)
FriedmanandSchwartzattributedtheFederalReservesystem'sfailure
to stem the banking crisis of 1931 to its failure to follow the classical
medicine prescribedby Bagehotfor central-bankoperationsin theface of
both an external and an internal drain-to lend freely but at a high
discount rate (p. 395).
Emphasis on the "stylized facts" of the gold standard on intercountry
adjustment via specie flows that produced relative price-level adjust-
ments, aided by capital flows and by central banks following the rules of
the game, failed, according to Triffin (1964), "to bring out the broader
forces influencing the overall pace of monetary expansion on which
individual countries were forced to align themselves" (p. 2).
Evidence damaging to the traditional story included: "enormous de-
gree ofparallelism-rather than divergent movements-between export
and import fluctuations for anyone country, and in the general trend of
foreign-trade movementsfor the various trading countries. . . from 1880
to 1960" (p. 3); and "overall parallelism-rather than divergence-of
price movements, expressed in the same unit ofmeasurement, between
the various trading countries maintaining a minimum degree offreedom
of trade and exchange in their international transactions" (p. 4); down-
ward wage rigidity among countries that maintained exchange stability;
Bloomfield's (1959) evidence ofthe failure ofmost central banks to play
by the rules ofthe game; the ineffectiveness ofchanges in discount rates
in many countries to stem capital flows orchange relative prices; and the
important role of long-term capital flows in maintaining enduring bal-
ance-of-payments disequilibrium without relative price adjustment.89 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
Triffin accordingly painted a different picture of how the gold standard
worked.
The most important aspect of the gold standard was exchange-rate
stability maintained by "pressures for international harmonization ofthe
pace of monetary and credit expansion [between central banks] similar
. . . to those which. . . limit divergent rates ofexpansion among private
banks within each national monetary area" (p. 11), enforced by the
constraint of convertibility into gold of fiduciary money.79 Given stable
exchange rates, then
national export prices remained strongly bound together among all
competing countries, by the mere existence ofan international market
not brokendown by any large orfrequent changes in tradeorexchange
restrictions. . . . National price and wage levels also remained closely
together internationally, even in the face of divergent rates of mone-
tary and credit expansion, as import and export competition consti-
tuted a powerful brake on the emergence of any large disparity be-
tween internal and external price and cost levels. (P. 10)
As a consequence, monetary expansion generating
inflationary pressures could not be contained within the domestic
market, but spilled out directly . .. into balance of payments deficits
rather than into uncontrolled rises of internal prices, costs, and wage
levels. These deficits led, in turn, to corresponding monetary transfers
from the domestic banking system to foreign banks, weakening the
cash position ofdomestic banks and their ability to pursue expansion-
ary credit policies. (Pp. 10-11)
Central banks could only temporarily slow down the adjustment pro-
cess by engagingin offsettingopen-marketoperationsorusingothertools
ofmonetary policy, because ultimately their international reserve ratios
would decline. Thus, in the gold standard world offixed exchange rates,
price levels were closely linked together and the balance-of-payments
deficit (surplus) reflected both money-market disequilibrium and the
method by which it was eliminated.
In an approach similar to that of Triffin, Williamson (1961, 1963)
reinterpreted U.S. experience under the gold standard. He urged analy-
sis ofthe balance ofpayments in a general-equilibrium context, with the
long-swing cycle in the growth of real output determining specie and
capital flows.
80 Increased real growth would lead to both an excess de-
mand for goods (a balance-of-trade deficit), an excess supply ofbonds (a
capital inflow), and an excess demand for real balances. The excess
demandfor moneywould besatisfied by aspecieinflow, withlittlechange
in the price level, accompanied by a long swing in capital inflows (Wil-
liamson 1961, p. 379). The external balance was both a cause as well as a90 Michael D. Bordo
reflection ofthe long swing, since in the 1830s it was British demand for
U.S. cotton that was the key source ofthe long swing in output, which in
turn induced British investment in railroads and canals.
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In an important article applying the recently developed monetary
approach to the balance ofpaymentsto the operationofthe classical gold
standard from 1880 to 1914, McCloskey and Zecher (1976) extended the
challenge to the traditional approach intimated by Marshall in the 1880s,
endorsedbyWhalein the 1930s, andrepeatedby Triffin andWilliamson.
The monetary approach states that for an open economy with fixed
exchange rates, the national stock of money, rather than prices, adjusts
to changes in the public's demand for money (see Frenkel 1971; Johnson
1976; Mundell 1971). Contrary to the Hume price-specie-flow mechan-
ism-which postulates significant lags in the adjustment of price-be-
cause ofinstant arbitrage, according to the monetary theory, no lags are
observed in the adjustment ofworld prices. In the most rigid version of
the theory, an increase in the demand for money ca~not reduce prices
because prices of internationally traded goods are determined in world
markets and kept comparable in different countries by international
arbitrage, and prices ofdomestic goods and services are kept in line with
prices ofinternationally traded goods by domestic arbitrage. The reduc-
tion in the public's demand for goods and securities leads to reduced
imports and expanded exports on the goods side and to higher interest
rates and capital imports on the securities side. The current account or
the capital account orbothmove into surplus. Toprevent appreciation of
the currency, the monetary authority buys foreign exchange from its
nationals, paying out newly created high-powered money. The increase
in high-powered money leads to a multiple expansion of the domestic
quantity ofmoney which continues until thepublic's demand is satisfied.
In open economies on a fixed exchange rate, a once-for-all increase in
the quantity of money in one country and a decrease in another would
produce a balance-of-payments deficit in the first and surplus in the
second and lead to a flow of money to the second until equilibrium was
reestablished. If a monetary authority in one country alone increased
high-powered money, that would be equivalent to an increase in the
world money supply. That country would experience a temporary bal-
ance-of-payments deficit until the world money supply was redistributed
in proportion to the size ofthe country ofissue, and the world price level
would rise accordingly. In the long run, domestic monetary policy in a
small country has a negligible influence on international prices, although
in the short run the monetary authority can affect its price and income
level by open-market sales (purchases) equal to its balance-of-payments
surplus (deficit) that will maintain the national money stock below
(above) its equilibriumvalue. Thecloserthe Ijnks amongworld commod-
ity markets, the higher the degree ofcapital mobility, the less scope for91 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
independent monetary policy in the short run. The greater the elasticity
of substitution between traded and nontraded goods, the less successful
will such policy be. In the long run, however, independent monetary
policy is inconsistent with fixed exchange rates.
McCloskey and Zecher tested the key assumptions of commodity
arbitrage by examining correlations among price changes between coun-
tries and between regions within countries. For traded goods such as
wheat, they found synchronous correlations equally high between re-
gions as between nations, unlike the case of nontraded goods such as
labor services and bricks. For overall price indexes, they found a signifi-
cantcorrelation betweenthe U.S. and U.K. wholesale price indexes, less
so for GNP deflators, and even less for consumer price indexes. The
higher correlation for the wholesale price than for the other index un-
doubtedly reflects the larger share of traded goods in the former. 82
They conclude:
What has been established here is that there is a reasonable case . . .
for the postulateofintegratedcommoditymarkets betweenthe British
and American economies in the late nineteenth century, vindicating
the monetary theory. There appears to be little reason to treat these
two countries on the gold standard differently in their monetary trans-
actions from any two regions within each country. (McCloskey and
Zecher 1976, pp. 379-80)
They also cite less conclusive evidence in favor of capital-market arbi-
trage. They tested their model by comparing gold flows-predicted by a
simple demand for money function less the money supply produced by
domestic credit expansion-with actual gold flows and found a close
relationship. In their view,
we have established at least a prima facie case for viewing the world of
the nineteenth century gold standard as a world ofunified markets, in
which flows ofgold represented the routine satisfactionofdemandsfor
money. (P. 385)
Capital Movements
Both short-term and long-term capital movements play an important
role in the traditional approach to the gold standard. Short-term capital
flows were to act as an equilibrating mechanism, to economize on gold
flows and to reduce the burden ofadjustment by changes in relative price
levels. Private short-term capital movements, assumed to be highly re-
sponsive to interest-rate differentials (induced by changesin the discount
rate), would act to equate interest rates (adjusted for exchange risk) in
differentmoneymarkets. Morgensternexaminedtheevidenceinfavorof
the "solidarity hypothesis," that arbitrage would ensure uniformity of
interest-rate differentials to exchange risk (measured by the difference of92 Michael D. Bordo
the exchange rate from the gold points), and found it to beinconsistent
with the principles of the gold standard. Borts, in criticizing both his
methodology and data, put Morgenstern's conclusions into serious
doubt. Bloomfield found evidence that private short-term capital flows
responded to interest differentials and expected exchange-rate changes
as predicted.
Long-term capital flows, a key disturbing force in the traditional
approach, were believed to have been well accommodated by the gold
standard balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism. They allowed
both developing debtor nations and mature creditor nations to run per-
sistent balance-of-payments disequilibria without requiring adjustment
in the balance oftrade. Bloomfield's study supported the integral role of
long-term capital flows in the development of the "Atlantic economy."
Morgenstern (1959) examined short-term-interest-rate data of differ-
ent maturities, exchange rates, and the gold points for four key gold
standard countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United
Statesin the periods 187~1914and 1925-38, subjecting the "assumption
of international solidarity of money markets" to three tests.
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The first test compared derived exchange rates, basedoncross rates in
third markets, with the actual exchange-rate series. If arbitrage were
effective, differentials between the series would vanish. Morgenstern
found evidence of differentials persisting in both periods, but more so
after World War I, with the greatest deviations occurring in periods of
crisis or disturbance such as the 1890 Baring crisis.
The second test identified deviations of exchange rates beyond the
median gold import and export points. Violations persisted for long
periods, with greater frequency of deviations beyond the gold export
point than beyond the gold import point.
The·third test compared market-interest-rate differentials with the
"absolute maximumpermissible" differential determinedbythe distance
between the gold points. Violation of the principle occurred in both
prewar and postwar periods.
Morgenstern concluded that we ought to view
the period of the classical gold standard as inadequately described by
the typical mechanism at least in one respect: the interaction between
two and more money markets via exchange rates and interest rates is
notnearlyas preciseandrigid as postulated(Morgenstern1959, p. 569)
He explained these results by "friction" and central-bank intervention,
suggesting the replacementofthe interpretationofthe gold standard as a
mechanism by the notion that central banks and other market partici-
pants engage in game strategy in a struggle for gold. Borts (1964) criti-
cized bothMorgenstern'smethodology and his data. Bortsattributedthe
results of the first test comparing cross with own exchange rates to the93 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
methodsofmaking exchange quotations. Morgenstern's datawere either
exchange quotations in the form ofsingle prices atwhich brokers cleared
the market or the average of bid-ask spreads. For Borts the bid-ask
spreads were likely measures of transactions cost; hence "what appears
to be an opportunity for arbitrage profit could be the difference between
the clearing price and the prevailing practice ofgiving quotations" (Borts
1964, p. 225).
Bortsfound the results ofthe second test comparing the spot exchange
rate with the gold points ambiguous. In deriving the gold points, Mor-
genstern assumed circumstances favoring his results since he took into
account neitherdifferent methods ofcoveringexchange risk norfrequent
operations by the monetary authorities on the gold points. These ambi-
guities could be sorted out, according to Borts, by directly examining
gold movements "in an effort to confirm the position of the exchanges
with regard to the gold points" (p. 227).84
Finally, Morgenstern'sthird testcomparing interestdifferentials tothe
maximum exchange risk on uncovered funds was faulty, in Borts's view,
because (1) "[he converted] the percent movement in the exchange rate
into a percent difference on one-year paper. The exchange risk. . . has
no time dimension and exists no matter what the maturity of the paper
held" (p. 227); (2) he did not account for possible forward cover. 85
Bloomfield examined the role ofbothshort-term (1963) and long-term
(1968) capital flows under the pre-1914 gold standard. Hesuggested that
privateshort-termcapital movementsservedtoequilibratethebalanceof
payments in the short run by tending to reduce the size of gold flows or
acting as substitutesfor changesin official exchange holdings (Bloomfield
1963, p. 44). To test the latter hypothesis, he compared the signs of the
first differences of annual changes in the stock of net foreign short-term
assets of commercial banks with annual changes in the stock of central-
bank gold and foreign-exchange reserves of the Scandinavian countries
and found the postulated negative relationship (p. 58).86
Long-term capital flows in the classical gold standard period in the
form of portfolio investment came mainly from Britain and France,
followed by Germany; the bulk of the funds went to the developing
countries of the new world to finance the development of infrastructure
and production andexportationofprimaryproducts. Followingthework
ofWilliamson (1964), Cairncross (1953), O'Leary and Lewis (1955), and
Thomas (1973), Bloomfield (1968, pp. 18-34) found evidence of a long-
swing cycle in long-term capital movements. Consistent with their theo-
ries, he found for debtor countries positive correlations between capital
imports and indicators ofdomesticinvestmentsuch as domestic building,
andbetweencapitalimportsandnetimmigration; for creditorcountries a
negative correlation between capital exports and domestic investment,
and a positive one between capital exports and net emigration.87 These94 Michael D. Bordo
results, plus the evidence that similar long-swing movements in the
United States and Canada in turning points were inversely related to
swings in British building and economic activity in general, gave support
to Thomas's (1973) thesis of an Atlantic economy. Finally, contrary to
theory, interest rates did notexplain movements in annual dataofBritish
capital exports and U.S. capital imports. In the multiple regressions that
Bloomfield estimated, domestic and foreign investment activity were the
significant regressors.
The Managed Gold Standard
The mainstream view ofthe classical gold standard that emerged from
the interwar period (appendix D) was that it evolved into a sterling
standard. The concentration ofworld capital, commodity, and gold mar-
kets in London made the pound sterling an attractive reserve asset in
addition to gold and made it easierfor the BankofEngland to control its
gold-reserve ratio by altering Bank rate, in the process affecting the
policies ofothercentral banks and influencing economic conditions both
at home and abroad.
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In the post-World War II period, the degree of management of the
prewarstandardwas further explored. Key currencies otherthan sterling
were shown to have been important in the pre-World War I period,
though sterling's role was still predominant, and the Bank of England's
use of the Bank-rate weapon was deemed to be less effective than
traditionally believed (Lindert 1969). The ways in which the Bank of
England managed the gold standard were described (Sayers 1936, 1957;
Goodhart 1972).
Following Bloomfield (1963), Lindert (1969, pp. 13-27) found that
holdings of several major currencies~thepound, the franc, and the
mark-represented an important and growing fraction of the interna-
tional reserves held by many countries in the period 1900-1913.
89 As
expected, Londonwas theprimaryreserve centerfor theworld butfrancs
and marks were popular on the Continent.
According to Lindert, key currencies were held for theinterestincome
they earned; they involved lower transaction and transportation costs
than gold, and maintenance of balances in a foreign currency such as
sterling often gave easier access to credit in the London money market.
Perhaps the key reason these currencies were held was that their good
brand name guaranteed with certainty that they could be converted into
gold on demand. In the case ofthe pound, the location in London ofthe
international money market and the world's gold marketlikely enhanced
its brand name.
Because their currencies were widely held, the central-reserve coun-
tries could run larger balance-of-payments deficits than otherwise and95 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
could maintain them longer. However each central bank was sensitive to
its gold-reserve ratio andwhenit declinedthebankwould reactbyraising
its discount rate.
90 Lindert found that when Great Britain raised Bank
rate, other central banks on the Continent would respond, but London
had stronger "pulling" power and could always attract short-term funds
from the Continent.
91 A flow of short-term funds proceeded from
peripheral European nations, running balance-of-payments surpluses to
Paris and Berlin, and then to London. The asymmetry in discount-rate
drawing powermaybe explained by the fact thatfor the centercountries,
short-term foreign assets tended to be less liquid than short-term liabili-
ties; "sincetightermonetarypolicy tendstostimulateshifts towardliquid
assets, bankswould react byseekinggreaterkey-currency balancesatthe
expense of bills on lesser centers" (Lindert 1969, p. 78).
Thus, the indisputable position of London as the dominant financial
center during the prewar years meant that "other countries, had, there-
fore, to adjust their conditions to hers."92
After the publication of Lombard Street (Bagehot [1873]1969), the
Bank of England began to take seriously its responsibilities for both
maintaining convertibility and preventing domestic monetaryinstability,
doing so not by increasing its gold reserves, as Bagehotsuggested, but by
altering its discount rate whenever its gold reserves were threatened
(Sayers 1951, pp. 109-10).
SayersdescribedtheprewartechniquesusedtomakeBankrate "effec-
tive" in the sense of linking it tightly to short-term market rates. The
methods included open-market operations, eligibility requirements, and
the switch to a penalty rate in 1878.
93 In addition, under special circum-
stances, when it feared the internal repercussions of raising Bank rate,
the Bank would protect its gold reserve by using "gold devices"-direct
operations in the gold market. It is generally agreed however that the
Bank achieved full control over its reserves after 1890 (Presnell 1968).
According to the traditional approach, a rise in Bank rate would
equilibrate the balance ofpaymentsvia two principal channels: by induc-
ing a short-term capital inflow (reducing an outflow) and by checking
domestic economic activity, the domestic price level, and the price of
imports. Lindert (1969, pp. 43-44), Bloomfield (1959, p. 42), and
Goodhart (1972, chap. 15) evaluated the evidence for the domestic
channel as indicating at best a weak and protracted adjustment with the
case for the link via capital flows sacrosanct. The case made against the
domestic channel was twofold: the limited response of the domestic
money supply to changes in the Bank ofEngland's gold reserve, and the
limited response ofdomestic economic activity to changes in the interest
rate.
With respect to the moneysupply, Goodhart (1972, p. 208) was unable96 Michael D. Bordo
to detect any close, positive association betweenthe cash base (reserves)
of the commercialbanks, represented by bankers' balances at the Bank
of England, and the Bank's gold reserves.
According to him, the direction of causation was the reverse of the
traditional one. An increase in economic activity would lead to an in-
creasein commercial-banklending anddeposits, andtheincreasein bank
reserves required to maintain stable reserve ratios would be supplied by
theBankofEnglandatthe expenseofits otherdiscounts, thus producing
both a lower gold-reserve ratio at the Bank ofEngland (the proportion)
and a higher discount rate. The rise in the discount rate would then lead
to a gold inflow restoring the Bank's proportion.
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Goodhart concluded (1972, p. 219):
Indeed, on this view, the great years ofthe gold standard (189~1914)
were remarkable, notbecause the system enforced discipline and fun-
damental international equilibrium on this country by causing varia-
tions in the money supply, but because the system allowed for the
development of such large-scale, stabilising and equilibrating, short-
term, internationalcapital flows, that autonomous domesticexpansion
was rarelydisruptedbymonetaryorbalanceofpaymentsdisturbances.
With respect to domestic economic activity, Tinbergen (1950, p. 133)
found that
the influence of interest rates on the course of investment activity-
which is the chief influence interest rates exert, according to our
results-isonlymoderate. A rise in interestratesdepresses investment
activity, but only to a modest extent.
and Pesmazoglu (1951, p. 61) that
variations ... in the long-term rate ofinterest did not have an impor-
tantinfluence onfluctuations ofBritishhomeinvestmentbetween 1870
and 1913.
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The Rules of the Game
According to the traditional approach, the key objective ofmonetary
policy was to maintain convertibility into gold and to use monetary
policy, specifically the discount rate, to facilitate internal adjustment to
externaldisequilibria. However, Bloomfield (1959, pp. 25-26)found that
while central banks were primarily concernedwith maintaining converti-
bility, their policy actions were discretionary, not automatic:
Not only did central banking authorities ... not consistently follow
any simple or single rule or criterion ofpolicy, or focus exclusively on
considerations of convertibility, but they were constantly called upon
to exercise, and did exercise, their judgment on such matters as
whether or not to act in any given situation and, ifso, at what point of97 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
time to act, the kind andextentofaction to take, and the instrumentor
instruments of policy to use. . . . It does indicate that discretionary
judgment and action were an integral part of central banking before
1914, even if monetary management was not oriented toward stability
of economic activity and prices in the broader modern sense.
In a test of the extent to which central banks under the pre-1914 gold
standard played by the rules of the game, Bloomfield interpreted the
rules as meaning''thatcentralbanksweresupposedtoreinforce the effect
of these flows [gold flows] on commercial bank reserves, not merely not
to neutralize them. This implied... thatcentral bankswere supposed to
lower theirdiscount ratesin the face ofpersisting gains ofgold. . . and to
raise them when there were persisting losses." Such a policy would have
the effect of"increasing central bank holdings ofdomestic earning assets
when holdings ofexternal reserves rose, and ofreducing domestic assets
when reserves fell" (Bloomfield 1959, p. 47).
Following Nurkse's approach in his examination of central-bank be-
havior in the 1929-38 period, Bloomfield comparedyear-to-yearchanges
in international and domestic assets for twelve central banks in the
1880-1914 period and found that, in the case ofevery central bank, the
changes in the two classes of assets were more often than not in the
opposite direction (wit!1 the Bank of England coming close to being the
exception to the rule).
Thus,
Farfrom respondinginvariablyin a mechanicalway, andin accordwith
some simple or unique rule, to movements ofgold... , central banks
were constantly called upon to exercise, and did exercise, discretion
and judgment in a wide variety of ways. Clearly the pre-1914 gold
standard system was a managed and not a quasi-automatic one from
the viewpoint of the leading individual countries. (Bloomfield 1959,
p.60)
Basedontheir reinterpretation ofthe classical gold standardaccording
to the monetary approach to the balance of payments, McCloskey and
Zecher (1976) denied that the Bank of England could have "acted as
conductor of the international orchestra" as in Keynes's ([1930] 1971)
description, but "was no more than the second violinist, not to say the
triangle player, in the world's orchestra" (McCloskey and Zecher 1976,
pp. 358-59).
The monetary theory holds that the world's economy is unified by
arbitrage and that the world's price level is determined by the world's
money supply. Then the Bank of England's
potential influence on prices (and perhaps through prices on interest
rates) depended simply on its power to accumulate or disburse gold
and other reserves available to support the world's supply of money.98 Michael D. Bordo
. . . Only by decreasing the securities and increasing the gold it held
. . . could the Bank exert a net effect on the world reserves . . . Had
the Bank in 1913 sold off all the securities held in its banking depart-
mentit would have decreasedworld reserves by only0.6percent; hadit
sold off all the gold in its issue department, it would have increased
world reserves by only 0.5 percent. (McCloskey and Zecher 1976, p.
359)
Finally, according to McCloskey and Zecher, the central banks ofthe
world ignored the rules of the game-stipulating that a deficit in the
balance ofpayments be accompanied by contractionarymonetarypolicy,
a surplus by expansionary policy-becausethe rules were "inconsequen-
tial." According to the monetarytheory "neithergold flows nordomestic
deflation have effects on prevailing prices, interest rates, and incomes"
(p. 361) since the central bank ofa country adhering to the gold standard
could only control the composition of the monetary base as between
international reserves and domestic credit, not its total amount.
Notes
1. Some of the material covered is drawn from, and may overlap, earlier surveys by
Viner (1937), Fetter (1965), and McCloskey and Zecher (1976).
2. The meaning ofthe price ofgold is its relative orreal price orthe purchasing powerof
gold. This meaning is not explicitly stated by all writers but presumably it is what they
intended. It is the fixed mint price of gold in terms of national currency divided by some
commodity price index.
3. For some writers changes in incomes rather than changes in relative price levels
produced the adjustments.
4. Some would argue that Adam Smith ([1776] 1976) should be included in this list.
Smith subscribed to most of the views expressed by the other classical economists. He
viewed the world specie stock and its exchange value in the long run as determined by the
richness ofgold and silver mines. Healso stressedthe social saving ofusing papermoneyfor
specie up to the point of convertibility. However, he did not discuss the price-specie-ftow
mechanism and his belief in the real-bills doctrine (see Mints 1945) has resulted in the
downgrading of his contribution to the traditional view. Recently, however, Girton and
Roper (1978) and Laidler (1981) have argued that Smith may have been correct after all, if
interpreted according to therecentmonetaryapproachto the balanceofpayments. Accord-
ing to these authors, Smithviewed a countrysuch as contemporaryScotland as a small open
economy on a fixed exchange rate with an exogenously determined price level. Undersuch
circumstances, the quantity of money would adjust to the demand for money-a result
consistent with both the real-bills approach and the absence of any change in the terms of
trade.
5. This discussion draws heavily on Bordo 1983.
6. Cantillon [1931] 1964, bk. 2, chap. 16. Indeed the intrinsic value of the precious
metals and hence long-run supply is determined by the cost of production of the least
productive mine (p. 101), Le., by marginal cost. Temporary variations of the exchange99 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
value ofmoney from its intrinsic value can be caused by changes in the demandfor precious
metals (for nonmonetary uses), butin the long run exchange value will equalintrinsic value
(p. 97).
7. Other aspects ofthe traditional view mentioned in Cantillon's Essai include a discus-
sion on capital mobility (pp. 191-93), the gold points (pp. 253,255,257,261), the use ofbills
of exchange to settle international balances (pp. 229,245,247), and the operation of the
forward exchange market (p. 259).
8. Viner (1937, pp. 316,319) argued that the distinction between the law ofone price as
pertaining to the equality ofprices stated in a common currency ofidentical traded goods,
allowance being made for transport costs, and the price-specie-flow mechanism, which
involved changes in the relative prices ofimport and export goods (the terms oftrade), was
held by all the classical writers. Samuelson (1971) viewed the "inconsistency" as an errorof
interpretation by Viner and others. According to him, when prices in each country are
measured relative to wages, the equality of identical-traded-goods prices will hold after a
gold discovery initially affects the money supply and prices in one country.
9. Also paper has the advantage that it is flexible and can be supplied quickly in periods
of crisis (Ricardo [1816] 1951, p. 58).
10. In addition the issue of bank notes will produce the same effect as a gold discovery
(Ricardo [1811] 1951, p. 55).
11. Ricardo also described the force ofarbitrage in maintaining equality between prices
(the value of money) in the country and in London ([1811] 1951, p. 87).
12. Because it was legal to export bullion, but illegal to export coin, the price ofbullion
would initially rise above the mint price. Eventually, however, people would evade the
prohibition and melt coin into bullion (Ricardo [1811] 1951, p. 64n).
13. According to Sayers (1953), Ricardo perceived that the essential condition ofa gold
standard is not gold coinage, but convertibility into gold for international transactions.
14. Chronologically, ThorntonprecededRicardo by severalyears, butitis convenientto
present his views following those of Ricardo.
15. The size of the gold reserve should be determined by the degree of confidence
"between independent countries" and the "largeness ofthe balance between the indepen-
dent places" (Thornton [1802] 1978, pp. 155-56).
16. There may, however, be distribution effects between gold mining and other coun-
tries since the reduction in the use of gold as money will reduce the price levels ofmining
countries relative to those of the rest of the world. In addition, there will be first-round
effects depending on how the money is issued-by private bankers or the government.
Money issued by bankers would lead to a fall in the interest rate, a capital outflow, and a
gold outflow, with no effect on the price level. If issued by government or by private
manufacturers, the initial effect would be on domestic prices, leading to a current-account
deficit and a gold outflow.
17. HereMill ([1865] 1961, p. 625) cited Ricardo (Principles, 3rded., p. 143). "Goldand
silver having been chosen for the general medium ofcirculation, they are, by the competi-
tion of commerce, distributed in such proportions amongst the different countries of the
world as to accommodate themselves to the natural traffic which would take place ifno such
metals existed, and the trade between countries were purely a trade of barter."
18. This section is based on Bordo 1975. Note that Jevons ([1884] 1964) considered the
same issue as Cairnes and in the course of his investigation constructed a price index to
measure the extent of depreciation of the value of gold caused by the discoveries.
19. Cairnes also tested Ricardo's theory ofcomparative advantage in predicting Austra-
lia's switch from being a net exporter to a net importer of agricultural products, andthe
Cantillon transmission mechanism to predict the dispersion of price changes between
different commodity groupings.
20. Cairnes argued that England and the United States, because of their efficient
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since theywould require less gold to finance the necessary price rise. Thegold flowing outof
England into France would serve to displace silver, since France was on a silver standard.
Thedisplacementofsilverwould for atime act as aparachutepreventingFrenchprices from
rising until gold completely replaced silver; at the same time the released silver would flow
eastward and into the silver currencies ofAsia, augmenting gold flowing there directly. At
this pointin an argumentsimilartothatofJevons ([1884] 1964), Cairnespointedoutthatthe
"parachuteeffect" would not be as important as Chevalier (1859) maintainedin preventing
a rise in French prices, since gold and silver were substitutes, so that as gold currency
substituted for silver, the price of silver would tend to fall along with the price of gold.
21. See Viner 1937 and Fetter 1965 for a complete history of the debates.
22. That was the recommendation of the currency school which argued that a mixed
currency--oneconsistingofbothspecie andnotes-shouldbe made to operateas ifit were a
pure specie standard. See Fetter 1965, p. 130.
23. This was the banking school's position. For them convertibility into gold and free
competition in banking were sufficient to maintain an adequate money supply consistent
with both internal and external balance. See Viner 1937, pp. 222-24.
24. See Viner 1937, pp. 264-70, and White (1981) who has reformulated the currency-
banking schools debate as turning on the question whether to centralize the right of note
issue in a single institution or to allow competition ("free banking").
25. In addition, Bagehot was in favor of publication of the accounts of the Banking
Departmentofthe BankofEngland and employing more professionals and fewer amateurs
in the government of the Bank ([1873]) 1969, pp. 302, 72).
26. Also Marshallstatedthat "apersonwho hadto bringhome the returnsofany salesin
a country had to elect what commodity he would bring, and the question whether he should
bring lead or tin was governed ... by exactly the same conditions as whether he should
bring lead orgold. Ifafter allowing for expensesofcarriage you get a little more by bringing
home the lead and selling it than by bringing home the tin, he would choose the lead; if he
would get a little more by bringing home gold and selling it, he would bring home the gold"
(1926, p. 121).
27. However this is only a temporary effect; in the long run changes in gold have no
effect onthe rateofinterest, which is determinedby "theaverage profitablenessofdifferent
business" (Marshall 1926, p. 130).
28. The views on the gold standard of Fisher's contemporary, J. Laurence Laughlin
(1903), according to Girton and Roper (1978), anticipated the monetary approach to the
balance of payments. A critic of the traditional approach, Laughlin disagreed with the
Hume price-specie-flow mechanism which postulated lengthy lags until relative-price-Ievel
differences led to corrective gold flows. He argued (in a manner similar to Angell, see p.
66) that commodity arbitrage tended to keep price levels ofgold standard countries always
in line. In addition, in the tradition ofAdamSmith, he reversed the causation ofmoney and
prices of the classical quantity theory. According to Laughlin, for an open economy, the
supply of money adjusted through the balance of payments to the demand for money,
determinedin turnby the "needsoftrade."Thusgold did notflow toequilibratepricelevels
but to satisfy an excess demand for (supply of) money.
29. Fisher cites a number ofreasons why prices may not be equal. "Distance, ignorance
as to where the best markets are to be found, tariffs, and costs oftransport help to maintain
price differences.... Practically, a commodity will not be exported at a price which would
not at least be equal to the price in the country of origin, plus the freight" ([1922] 1965,
p.92).
30. Fisher also considered the case ofbimetallism and rejected it on grounds similar to
those notedbyotherclassicalwriters-ittends to degenerateinto monometallism whenever
the market ratio ofgold to silver diverges from the official ratio ([1922] 1965, pp. 123,325).
He also argued against an irredeemable paperstandard because ofthe inevitable tendency
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bases the standard on too narrow a base of commodities (p. 328), and against a tabular
standard: how to express money to conform to that standard was a problem (p. 335).
31. On the basis of a statistical investigation in 1933 of price-level movements of
twenty-seven countries, Fisherfound thatthe price levels ofgold standardcountries tended
to move together, those ofsilver standard countries moved together, and the average price
level ofeach group varied with changes in the relative prices ofgold and silver. Moreover,
he found evidencefor a short-runtradeoffbetweenprice-levelchanges andchangesin trade
andemploymentwithin countries. Finally, evidence thatcountries not on the gold standard
during the Great Depression, e.g., Spain and China, avoided the deflation suffered by gold
standard countries and the concomitant contraction in output and employment, convinced
him that "depressions travel internationally ... the infection is carried chiefly via the
monetary standard" (1935, pp. 15-16).
32. See lonung 1979 for a discussion of Wicksell's theory of price-level movements.
Basically Wicksell argued that price levels will rise cumulatively if the market rate of
interest, determined in the loan market, diverged from the natural rate ofinterest, deter-
minedby theforces ofthrift andproductivity. Ifthe marketratewere belowthe naturalrate,
prices would rise cumulatively, the price rise only being arrested by a gold outflow that
would reduce the banking system's reserves, causing banks to raise their loan rate. When
the market rate ofinterest was above the natural rate, a cumulative deflation would occur.
Wicksell explained periods ofsecular inflation and deflation in the nineteenthcentury using
this approach. In contrast to Wicksell, the Swedish economist Cassel applied classical
doctrine, explaining episodes ofworld inflation and deflation by the growth of the world's
goldsupply relative to thegrowthin demandfor gold, the formerinfluencedprimarilybythe
production of new gold, the latter by the growth of real income.
33. Several years later A. G. Silverman (1931) tested the classical theory that capital
exports, ceteris paribus, would lead to a rise in the price ofimports relative to the price of
exports. Using British data over the period 188~1913,he compared "yearto year percent-
age changes ... for the ratio of import to export prices with year to year absolute
differences for Hobson's indirect estimates ofcapital exports expressed in terms ofits
average deviation" and found thatoverthe whole period "anannual increaseordecrease in
capital exports is more often than not accompanied by an opposite change in the ratio of
import to export prices." Thus he concluded that"theorthodox analysis... does notseem
to be borne out. For most of the period under consideration 'net barter terms of trade' in
their yearly variations become more favorable with an increase in capital exports, and vice
versa" (p. 124). His explanation for this result was that "an increase in British demand for
foreign securities was apparently offset by an increased foreign demand for English goods"
(p. 124).
34. In Canada, the primary recipient of the new capital, the opposite took place after
190{}-animprovement in the terms oftrade and rising moneywages. See the discussion on
Viner, pp. 6~61.
35. Accordingto the theory, ifthe proceedsofthe loanwerespentin the lending country
then the price-specie-flow mechanism would not operate (Taussig [1927] 1966, p. 230).
36. "Still another equalizing factor is the movement of securities that have an interna-
tional market. They are sold between the great financial centers in a way that replaces or
lessens the transmission ofgold....In any given financial center, a tight moneymarketand
a high discount rate tend to lower the prices of . . . international securities among
them.... An inflow ofgold, which might be expected to take place toward the country of
tight money, is replaced by an outward movement ofsecurities" (Taussig [1927] 1966, pp.
218-19).
37. In a description ofthe monetarysystem ofGreatBritain, the UnitedStates, Canada,
and France, Taussig demonstrated how different the response mechanism to gold flows can
be, ranging from the sluggish response ofthe Frenchsystemwithits high specie-moneyratio
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loaned-up banking system. The Canadian system, with gold reserves held abroad in New
York and London, gave the impression that deposits and notes increased before the gold
inflow (Taussig [1927] 1966, pp. 201-7). Thus "in all countries using deposits and checks
freely, the looseness ofthe connection between bank reserves and bank deposits leads...
to a chronological orderdifferent from that assumed in the Ricardian reasoning. An inflow
ofspecie may follow, not precede, an enlargement of the circulating medium and a rise in
prices. So it may be, at least, for a short time, even for a period ofmany months. Indeed, if
there be furtherforces atworkthanthose merelymonetary, it mayremainso foryears" (pp.
207-8).
38. In his analysis ofthe massive capital inflows to Canada, Taussigstated, "Ifthe world
level of prices had remained unchanged, we should have expected in Canada a fall in the
prices ofimported goods, and a rise in the prices ofdomestic goods. Exported goods in the
long runwould have shown a movement similar to thatofthe domestic, butwith a lag which
would for some time keep their prices either on the same low level as the imported, or in a
positionintermediate betweenthatofthe importedand the domestic articles" ([1927] 1966,
p. 228).
39. Beach 1935, p. 180. In an appendix, he presented evidence for the United States,
supportive of this explanation, that agrees with an earlier study by A. P. Andrew (1907).
40. Viner's contribution is summarized in Taussig [1927] 1966, chap. 19. For the litera-
ture critical of Viner, see Meier 1953 and Dick 1981.
41. Until 1935, althoughthe largestcommercial bank, theBankofMontreal, performed
many of the functions of a central bank. See Rich 1978.
42. Viner disputed Laughlin's view that all price levels are tied together via arbitrage,
citing large differences in the price of gold among countries (Viner 1924, p. 206). He
distinguished between traded goods, whose prices are closely linked internationally, and
domestic goods, whose prices are only affected indirectly.
43. However, prices ofmost Canadian exports were determined internationally, hence
the rise in the price of international goods produced in Canada by the increased price of
domestic goods and services would cause a decrease in exports.
44. Also anindexofthe price ofservices rose relative to theoverallprice index, as did an
index of money wages relative to those in the United States and Great Britain, confirming
the relative price adjustment mechanism (Viner 1924, pp. 241, 248).
45. Much of the reduced exports came from the diversion of raw materials to domestic
use, while a large shareofthe increased imports consisted ofcapitalgoods, largelyfrom the
United States-both forces conducive to economic development. The fact that most ofthe
proceedsofthe loan were notspentin the lendingcountry, GreatBritain, is given as further
verification of the classical mechanism, which otherwise would not come into play. See
Taussig [1927] 1966, pp. 230 and 259, where he states, "Itwas to be expected that Canada,
getting a growing excess of imports over exports in terms of money, should also get more
imported commodities in proportion to her commodities exported. But for the verification
oftheory it is particularly significant that the net barter terms also become more favorable.
The Canadiansnotonlygot more ofphysical goods in proportionto the goods theysentout,
but they got, on better terms, those imported goods which may be regarded as coming in
payment for their own exported goods, and which had no relation to the borrowings."
46. White 1933, p. 303. Nevertheless, he concludedthat "theinfluenceofsectional price
changes as a force in the adjustment does not in the case ofFrance appear to have played so
prominent a role as is presupposed by the neo-classical doctrine.... Shifts in demand
schedules were doubtless a more effective medium. No substantiation ofthis view could be
found in the French trade statistics, but actual substantiation would in any case be impossi-
ble because fluctuations in prices as a causal factor in merchandise movements could not be
excluded; it would beimpossible todeterminewhatproportionofthechangesin thevolume
of merchandise imports and exports was due to changes in demand schedules and what
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47. See Kindahl 1961 and Friedman and Schwartz 1963 for further discussion.
48. According to Graham, in the first period, exporters to the United States will obtain
for a time practically the same paper prices as before the lending, and these translated into
gold will be higher than before. At the same time import prices in Great Britain will rise
because the gold obtainedby Americansellersfor theirproductswhen translatedintopaper
yields less than before the depreciation ofgold. Unless the British buyers can import from
some othercountry, the U.S. sellers will gradually be able to raise theirprices. The ultimate
effect will be a rise in the British price level which will appear as a relative increase in the
price ofdomestic goods. The opposite forces will occurin the secondperiod (Graham 1922,
pp. 259-60).
49. According to Nurkse ([1944] 1978), the general picture of the adjustment process
and the role ofcentral-bank policy presented in the Cunliffe report "was one which during
much of that [interwar] period dominated men's ideas both as to the actual working ofthe
gold standard before 1914 and as to the way the gold standardshould be made to work after
its restoration" (p. 67). Thus the prewar gold standard was portrayed in similar terms in
both the Interim Report ofthe Gold Delegation ofthe Financial Committee (League of
Nations [1931] 1979) and the Macmillan report (1931).
50. The reportignored the role offluctuations in the exchange ratewithin thegoldpoints
and the temporary sterilization of gold flows.
51. The rules were never formally spelled out. According to the Macmillan report
(1931), "themanagementofan internationalstandardis an artandnotascience, andnoone
would suggest that it is possible to draw up a formal code of action admitting of no
exceptions andqualifications, and adherence to which is obligatory, onperilofwrecking the
whole structure" (par. 47).
52. Moreover Gregory doubted the ability of forward exchange markets to cover ex-
change risk because he felt that "just when the relative values of currencies are most
uncertain and when, therefore, the advantages to be derived from the organization of a
forward exchange marketwould be greatest, the difficulties oforganizingit... are greatest
also" ([1932] 1979, p. 10).
53. This theme also appeared in the prewar literature in Keynes [1913] 1971. See the
discussion below. It has played an important role in the postwarexplanationofthe classical
gold standard's success. See, e.g., Triffin 1964, Lindert 1969, D. Williams 1968, and Palyi
1972.
54. Behind this elaborate network offinancial flows was the real process ofthe transfer
ofcapital to developing countries from the developed countries and the real flow ofgoods
through the current account. According to Williams (1947, p. 155), "England's creditor
position in the nineteenth century had developed gradually, along with the development of
aworld economyinvolving the division ofproductiveeffortbetweenthe olderindustrialized
areas and the younger agricultural areas and the flow of accumulated savings from the
former to the latter. The same circumstances which assigned to England the leading role in
capital export made London the international money market and the Bank ofEngland the
administrator of the gold standard."
55. Important pre-1914 European examples were Austria-Hungary and Russia. In
Asia, India and the Philippines represented the classic successful examples ofthe operation
of the gold-exchange standard.
56. Calculated on the basis of the underlying trend growth rate of real income. See
Cassell in the Interim Report . .. ofthe Financial Committee (League of Nations [1931]
1979).
57. Among the key sources ofvariation in monetary demandin the pre-WorldWarI era
were "the large accumulation ofgold in the United States in preparation for the introduc-
tion ofthe goldstandard" in 1879 (Cassell 1935, p. 11), andthecompetitionby centralbanks
to strengthen their gold reserves: "the orthodox use of gold reserves for ironing out
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importance in comparison with the gold movements caused by competition for gold and
ultimately traceable to the artificial position given to gold in the world's monetary system"
(p. 13).
58. Viner (1937) described how the conflict between private and public interests of the
Bankwas resolved in the period 1844 to 1870. Also see the discussion above onBagehot (p.
46).
59. Not however without courting disaster on numerous occasions (Viner 1932, p. 16);
also, Viner 1937, pp. 259-74.
60. Viner's (1937) chronicle of the history of nineteenth-century debates over the
monetarystandardcenteredonthe role ofdiscretionarymanagementundera goldstandard
rule. "Although most present day writers seem to believe either that the non-automatic
characterofthe moderngold standardis a discoveryofthepostwarperiodorthatit was only
in the postwar period that the gold standard lost its automatic character, currency contro-
versy during the entire nineteenth century concerned itself largely with the problems
resulting from the discretionary or management elements in the prevailing currency sys-
tems. Thebullion controversy...turnedlargelyonthe difference in the modeofoperation
in theinternationalmechanismofa managedpaperstandardcurrency,ontheonehand, and
of a convertible paper currency, on the other, with the latter treated generally, but not
universally, as if it were automatic. Later, the adherents of both the currency and the
banking schools distinguished carefully between the way in which a supposedly automatic
'purelymetallic' currency (which, in addition tospecie, included bankdeposits butnotbank
notes) would operate and the way in which the Bank ofEngland was actually operating a
'mixed' currency (which, in addition to specie and bank deposits, included bank notes)"
(pp. 388-89).
61. "This means that relative prices can be knocked about by the most fleeting influence
of politics and of sentiment, and by the periodic pressure of seasonal trades. But it also
means that the postwar method [of flexible exchange rates] is a most rapid and powerful
corrective of real disequilibria in the balance of international payments arising from
whatever causes, and a wonderful preventive in the way ofcountries which are inclined to
spend abroad beyond their resources" (Keynes [1923] 1971, p. 130).
62. The analogy holds perfectly if we assume that each central bank has a rigid gold-
reserve ratio so that the aggregate quantity of central-bank money is determined by the
aggregate gold reserves ofthecentralbanks; thatnogoldis used as currency; andhencethat
variations in the world monetary gold stock are determined by the difference between the
amount of new gold mined and the amount consumed in the arts (Keynes [1930] 1971,
p. 250).
63. This reflects two factors: a central bank cannot turn to a "lenderoflast resort" ifits
reserves are deficient; a central bank does not maximize profits and thus may keep higher
reserves than otherwise (Keynes [1930] 1971, p. 252).
64. In the British banking system there is little interest-rate competition (Keynes [1930]
1971, p. 254).
65. J. H. Williams, "MonetaryStabilityandthe GoldStandard" (1932) in Williams 1947
covered much the same ground.
66. Keynes argued that this dilemma did not present itself to Great Britain before 1914
because "the influence of London on credit conditions throughout the world was so
predominantthat the BankofEnglandcouldalmost haveclaimedtobe theconductorofthe
internationalorchestra. Bymodifyingthetermsonwhichshewas preparedto lend, aidedby
her own readiness to vary the volume of her gold reserves and the unreadiness of other
central banks to vary the volume oftheirs, she could to a large extent determine the credit
conditionsprevailingelsewhere" (Keynes [1930] 1971, p. 274). Howeversince WorldWarI,
the decline ofGreatBritain'sinfluence onworld creditconditions meantthatshe now faced
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67. See Sayers 1936 and p. 95 for a discussion ofhow this was frequently done on a de
facto basis by the Bank of England in the 1890-1914 period.
68. As in the Tract, Keynes considered the case for a managed money standard with
flexible rates but ultimately rejected it because the uncertainty associated with exchange-
rate fluctuations would impede long-term capital mobility. "If we ... desire that there
should be a high degree of mobility for international lending, both for long and for short
periods, then this is, admittedly, a strong argument for a fixed rate ofexchange and a rigid
international standard" ([1930] 1971, p. 299). Also, see Williams (1947), who recom-
mended maintenance of the gold standard as a restraint, setting the "limits to which
monetary variation can be carried" but widening the role ofdiscretionary monetary policy
(pp. 187-88). Ultimately "the logical end of the evolution ofcredit management, and the
only real hope ofsolution of the conflict between external and internal stability, would be
closer cooperation ofcentral banks looking toward some form or degree ofsupernational
management" (p. 190).
69. Whale cited evidence ofrapid price adjustment between Lancashire and the rest of
England, and between England and Scotland.
70. Ford argued that accounting for real-income changes would also explain Taussig's
puzzle, "that periods ofactive lending have been characterized by rising prices rather than
falling prices and that the export of goods apparently has taken place, not in conjunction
with a cheapeningofgoods in the lending country, butin spite ofthe fact thatits goods have
seemed dearer at times of great capital export" (Taussig [1927] 1966, p. 219).
71. Ford does not entirely dismiss the role of price changes, but doubts that the
elasticities are high enough or prices flexible enough to carry the full burden (1962, p. 12;
1977, p. 17).
72. Ford estimated the marginal propensity to import at about 0.3 and the marginal
propensitytosave at0.1 to 0.2. This produces an open-economymultiplierof2to 2.5 which
is not sufficient to equilibrate the balance of payments (1962, p. 54).
73. Following Keynes ([1923] 1971) andBloomfield (1959), Fordarguedthatthe rules of
the gamewerefollowed only by creditorcountries, and noteven by all ofthem (1962, p. 16).
Britain's playing by the rules was facilitated by the location in London of the world's
principal capital and gold markets (pp. 11-12).
74. This evidence is contrasted to Ford's finding, unfavorable to the classical relative-
price mechanism, that "thecyclical behavior ofthe net barterterms oftrade shows no such
consistent pattern" (1962, p. 76).
75. Favorable circumstances for Britain other than the institutional environment
stressed by Fordwere: confidence in the convertibilityofsterling, the alternating patternof
trends in home and foreign investment, and the sensitivity of British exports to British
overseas lending (1962, p. 190).
76. "The price level in the U.S. relative to that in Britain rose from 89.1 to 91.1"
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 98).
77. Howeverone conspicuous example, discussed by Friedman and Schwartz, when the
classical approach could not fully explain the adjustment mechanism, was the period
1896-1901.
78. A study by Macesich (1960), using a similar approach, demonstrated that the
monetary instability in the period 1834-45 was not caused primarily by the Bank war and
Jacksonian policy, as traditionally believed, but rather was produced by external events.
Given that the United States was part of the international specie standard, the author
argued, internal prices had to adjust to external prices, and how they did so did not matter.
Macesich isolated the different determinants ofmonetary change and found that changes in
the ratio ofthe public's holdings ofdeposits-plus-notes to specie and the ratio ofthe bank's
liabilities to specie explained most ofthe change in the money supply reflecting uncertainty
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sources, was similar to Macesich's, but attached greater importance to changes in high-
powered money, and less to the ratios, in explaining monetary movements.
79. Following Keynes ([1923] 1971, [1930] 1971) and Cassel (1935), -Triffin doubted the
strengthofthe long-termequilibratingforces ofthecommoditytheoryofmoneyandtermed
the gold discoveries of the nineteenth century favorable accidents temporarily reversing a
tendency to secular deflation. Instead, "the reconciliation ofhigh rates ofeconomic growth
with exchange-rate and gold-price stability was made possible by the rapid growth and
propermanagementofbankmoney, andcould hardlyhave beenachievedunderthepurely,
or predominantly, metallic systems ofmoney creation characteristic ofthe previous centu-
ries" (Triffin 1964, p. 15). Triffin (1960) foresaw thatagold-exchangestandardbasedonkey
currencies, such as that which dominated the interwar and the post-World War II periods,
would ultimately fail because ofa growing threat to the convertibility ofthe key currencies
as their use as international reserves increased.
80. See similar approaches by Abramovitz (1973) and Thomas (1973).
81. In the postbellumperioditwas theforeign demandfor wheatthatwas the key source
of the long swing. Williamson's interpretation of the 1830s differs markedly from that of
Macesich andTemin (n. 78 above) who eachstressedthe role ofexternalmonetaryforces as
the key disturbing factor.
82. However, the evidence to date on commodity arbitrage, based on more recent
evidence, is far from conclusive, with the majority ofstudies casting doubt on its effective-
ness for other than internationally traded commodities (see Kravis and Lipsey 1978).
83. "When two (or more) countries are on the gold standard then there exist definite
limits for the absolute differences between their short-term interest rates. The actual
differences at a given moment depend on the absolute stand of the exchange rates at the
same moment, which in turn can vary only between the gold points of the currencies....
When the interest rates oftwo countries conform, then we say that their money markets are
in a state ofsolidarity; when the differentials do not conform with the respective absolute
positions ofthe exchange rates, i.e., when they exceed the respective "permissible limits,"
then we say that they violate that solidarity ... the principles of the gold standard"
(Morgenstern 1959, pp. 166-68).
84. Morgenstern explicitly rejected the available data on gold movements because his
study (1955) found them to be unreliable. In that study, using official data ofimports and
exports ofgold coin andbullionfor the UnitedStates, GreatBritain, Germany, France, and
Canada and a sample offour years, 1900, 1907, 1928, and 1935, official gold exports from
one country did not square with gold imports for another.
85. "Withoutexamining the future exchange prices, the author cannot make a case that
the maximum permissible interest rate differentials were in fact violated. For the market
will respond to the best opportunity. If New York interest went to a 1% premium over
London, Morgenstern would say the market was not operating perfectly. Yet with a
premium on spot exchange, it would be perfectly consistent with the operations of a
competitive market. The question of interest differentials which exceed the maximum
exchange risk theninvolves theinterestparitiesofforward exchange rates. Morgensterndid
not examine this at all" (Borts 1964, p. 227).
86. However, asimilartestfor Canadarevealedno correlation (Bloomfield 1963, p. 65).
87. ForCanadaandSweden, merchandise exportsin real terms also showedlong swings
that tended to lead those in other variables.
88. Scammel (1965) echoed this view by stating "itis, in the writer's view, arguable that
the gold standard was in fact quasi-organizational, being operated by a team of central
bankers cooperating under the leadership of the Bankof England on behalf of the world
business community" (p. 34).
89. Foreign-exchange reserves accounted for 19 percent oftotal world reserves in 1913.
Japan, Russia, and India held the largest fraction of their reserves in sterling.107 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
90. Offour effects ofa rise in discount rate to correct the balance ofpayments, Lindert
ruled out the effect on aggregate demand as involving too lengthy a lag to account "for the
remarkable smoothness and rapidity with which exchange rates, international gold flows,
and gold reserves ofcentral banks seem to have been altered." Moreover he found the lag
between changes in Bank rate and import prices also to be too long to be relevant, and the
evidence on the effect on new issues of long-term foreign securities to be unclear. Hence
only the effect on short-term funds operated as the key channel of influence of Bank rate
(1969, pp. 43-47).
91. Asa testofthe relative "pulling" powerofthe differentcurrencies, Lindert(1969, p.
50) regressed each exchange rate on the othertwo exchange rates, on its own discount rate,
and the second center's rate. He found a hierarchy ofdominance running from London to
Paris to Berlin.
92. Quotation from the Macmillan report (1931, p. 125) in Lindert 1969, p. 49. The fact
that London and the othercenterscould maintain "deficits without tears" in the pre-World
War I period ultimately led to a weakening ofthe balance-of-payments adjustment mecha-
nism because the longer the process continued, the more difficult it became "to undertake
the contractionary measures that would have been required to restore payments 'equilib-
rium' " (Lindert 1969, p. 79). Also see Triffin 1960.
93. Additional methods used were the outright sale or purchase of securities, selling
consols spot and buying for the account, borrowing in the market, borrowing from clearing
banks, borrowing from special depositors, and moral suasion.
After 1878, the Banklent to its own customers at the marketrate ofinterest, while at the
same time it chargeddiscount houses a penalty rate above the marketrate. "Thepositionof
the penal rate was ordinarily a matter of daily concern and therefore influential over the
market rate itself" (Sayers 1951, p. 115).
94. Goodhart's analysis follows closely that of Whale (1937). Both Goodhart's and
Whale's results can be reinterpreted as consistent with the monetary approach to the
balance of payments. According to that approach, a rise in economic activity in an open
economy such as Great Britain would generate an excess demand for money that would be
satisfied in partby a gold inflow. IndeedMills and Wood (1978), applying the Granger-Sims
causality test to the pre-World War I U.K. money supply and national-income data, found
that income caused money, evidence that they considered sympathetic to the monetary
approach.
95. Also see A. G. Ford (1977, p. 42), who cites similarevidence oninvestment activity.
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Comment C. Knick Harley
Michael Bordo has certainly presented an extensive review ofsome two
centuries of thought on the workings of a currency either consisting of
specie or based on notes freely convertible into specie. I have learned a
great deal about the evolution of ideas from the 160 pages and 446
footnotes in the version ofthe paper I have worked with. Certainly I do
not have the qualifications, the time, nor the inclination to discus indi-
vidual economists or even individual schools of thought in comparable
detail. Rather I would like to highlight some major themes that run
through the literature. In particular, I would like to try to shift the
emphasis of the discussion toward the last fifty or a hundred years and
stress what Viner called "the international mechanism" partially in its
theoretical context but especially within the context of the process of
foreign lending in the late nineteenth century.
Twoissues havealways dominateddiscussion ofthegold standard. The
first considers the determinants of the value of the standard in terms of
other commodities and the stability of that value over time. The second
considers the nature of international equilibrium and the relationships
amongtheprices ofvariouscommoditiesin variouslocationsorcountries
that equilibrium requires. Central to this discussion is the comparison of
equilibria under differing underlying conditions and also investigation of
dynamics ofadjustmentwhenunderlyingconditions alter. I intendto add
nothing to the discussion of the value of the standard, but will state the
obvious: The fluctuations of the value of the standard over the last
two-thirds of a century make the concerns ofMarshall, Fisher, and their
contemporaries seem rather trivial.
Tomy mindthe mostinterestingliteraturerelating tothegoldstandard
deals with what can broadly be called, after Viner, "the international
mechanism." Unfortunately, I am disappointed by Michael Bordo's
treatmentoftheliteraturethathas grown upoverthepasthalfcentury. In
particular I am surprised that so little attention has been paid to Viner's
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Studiesin the TheoryofInternational Trade (sixfootnote references, most
apparently as an afterthought) which has always seemed to me to have
been the most thorough and considered statement of the traditional
position as it emerged between the wars. Along the same lines I miss any
discussion of the theoretical literature on transfers and reparations
(Keynes [1929] 1949; Ohlin [1929] 1949; Samuelson 1952,1954). Finally,
more should be said about the literature onthe "Atlanticeconomy" that
has appearedsince the SecondWorld War. I would, therefore, like to use
the few minutes at my disposal to present what I see to have been the
issues raised by these strands of literature and thus highlight what I
believe to be major issues that should remain in our research agenda.
The literature on the "international mechanism" contained two
strands to which I have already referred. First, there is the real theory of
comparative-static comparison ofinternational equilibria. Second, there
is discussion of what we would now call macroeconomic processes in-
volved in moving between equilibria. Now these two issues were often
notclearlyseparatedin theliterature andOhlin ([1929] 1949, p. 179, n. 3)
was moved to remark (and was echoed by Samuelson), "ProfessorTaus-
sig seems to me to present two different and incompatible theories: (1)
the barter theory of Mill; (2) a theory of the monetary and price mech-
anism." Ohlin, ofcourse, proceededto explain the real (barter) theoryin
a manner that was quickly recognized to be correct. At the same time he
left the "theory of the monetary and price mechanism" to "Professor
Viner, with whom I am in substantial agreement." Ohlin demonstrated
that the older supposition, which underlay much ofthe work by Taussig
and his followers, that the real transfer implied a shift in terms of trade
against the paying country, was incorrect. The comparative statics ofthe
transfer problem under a considerable range ofconditions is now firmly
understood and is presentedwith his characteristiclucidity by Samuelson
(1952, 1954).
Even if errors in identifying the conditions of new equilibrium are
avoided, issues of the (macroeconomic) adjustment to the new equilib-
rium in a complex monetary economy remain. First, the transfer mecha-
nism involves a reduction of"totalbuying power" in the sending country
and an increase in the receiving country. In addition new equilibrium will
normally require relative price adjustments, although as Ohlin demon-
strated, the adjustment in the relative prices of traded goods is smaller
and less predictable than earlier writers imagined. Furthermore, in a
world where transportation costs result in a considerable portion of
national product being untraded, resources wil have to be redirected
toward (or away) from traded goods in the sending (receiving) economy,
presumably through the mechanism of relative price changes. The final
equilibriumwill require a lowermoney stockin the sendingcountryanda
higher stock in the receiver. Discussion of the monetary aspects of the115 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
adjustmentmechanism consists ofattempts to discoverthe processes that
are involved in these adjustments. Furthermore, most investigatorsseem
to believe that alteration of relative prices is not frictionless and can be
expected to affect both employment and the general price level during a
period of adjustment. Thus Keynes ([1929] 1949, p. 167) characterized
those who see no such adjustment prlblems as "applying the theory of
liquids to what is, if not a solid, at least a sticky mass with strong internal
resistance." Discussion ofthe operation ofthe gold standard in the short
run must now proceed among the otherbattles in the arenaofshort-term
macroeconomic adjustment where heroes of flexibility confront glad-
iators of rigidity.
Historical fact-as well perhaps as historical myth-maintains schol-
ars' interest in the late-nineteenth-century gold standard. The interna-
tional economy seems to have experienced less short-run instability than
eithertheoretical models ortwentieth-centuryexperiencewouldsuggest.
Britain, in particular, seems to have succeeded in maintaining enviable
short-run stability despite recurring real shocks in the form of large
periodic fluctuations in foreign investments that reflected the cycles in
expansion in areas of recent settlement. For example, in 1903 foreign
investment was about 2.5 percent of British GNP, but by 1913 it had
grown to some 7 percent. Now the remarkable feature ofthese cycles to
Taussig and his students when they discovered them and to subsequent
investigators who believe in "sticky mass" theories ofshort-term adjust-
ment was both the near absence of fluctuations in unemployment and
inflation and the absence of monetary crises despite Britain's fractional
reserve banking system.
What happened factually is clear enough. First, the balance of pay-
ments adjusted rapidly, primarily through fluctuations in exports, so that
an increase in foreign lending from about£50 million in 1903 to well over
£200 million in 1913 was transferred abroadwithout significant gold flows
and thus without placing any noticeable strain on the Bank ofEngland's
gold holdings that were always well under £40 million. Thus loans were
transferred without monetary strain. Second, as Cairncross (1953) dem-
onstrated, fluctuations in employment and the domestic price level were
largely avoided because domestic investment, particularly building, de-
clined as exports rose in response to foreign investment and then dis-
placed exports as the latter declined when foreign investment declined.
Now it is obvious to anyone who examines the evidence that the
international system could not have worked in the manner postulated by
the simplest version ofthe gold standard adjustment mechanism. That is
to say, the increase in lending could not possibly have been initially
transferred in gold and the real transfer then been effected by gradual
price adjustments. In the first place there was insufficient gold in Britain,
and in the second the adjustment seems too rapid.116 Michael D. Bordo
The historical literature, it seems to me, is best seen as trying to
understand this adjustment. One strand has paid attention to short-run
capital flows and the use ofBritish balances as a substitute for gold as the
mechanism that allowed fluctuating capital flows in the face of very
moderate gold movements. Thatexplanation, however, does not seemto
offer any strong mechanism acting in Britain to effect the real transfer,
nor does it help to explain how sterling in its role as a reserve currency
avoided the problems of sterling since the First World War or of the
dollar since 1960.
A second majorstrand in the literature has maintained that the capital
movements were not exogenous shocks but part of a wider process of
growth in the Atlantic economy as a whole. The working out of that
process ofgrowth involved simultaneouslychanges in the composition of
production in the borrowing and lending country necessary to effect the
real transfer and the capital flow in financial terms. In this tradition I
would obviously include Brinley Thomas's and Jeffrey Williamson's
work. I would also draw attention to a very interesting theoretical article
by George Borts (1964).
Others like A. G. Ford argue thatwhile long-run forces in the expand-
ing international economy aided adjustment, it is probably somewhat
misleading to focus exclusively on Britain's stability. Their argument
would run that there were inflationary periods alternating with financial
crises and deflation, but the international market for short-term funds
insulated Britain and forced the instability onto the periphery.
I remain agnostic about the mechanism that smoothly allocated re-
sources alternately between building houses in Oldham and Oklahoma
over at least a half century. Until we understand that mechanism, we
must take care in drawing conclusions about the classical gold standard.
Perhaps, as H. J. Habakkuk (1962) has argued, there was not a mecha-
nism but rather chance. It seems more likely to me that there were
elements of the systematic relationships suggested in the literature, but
these may well have been peculiar to their own historical situation. It
certainly seems that the international transfer of capital within the late
nineteenth century has been and should remain central to our study and
understanding of the workings of the gold standard. More central, I
would argue, than Michael Bordo's summary allows.
Finally, I cannot concur with Bordo's vision of McCloskey and
Zecher's (1976) article as a Copernican revolution in our thinking about
the gold standard. Certainly they have made some useful arguments
about what sorts of disequilibria are possible. But they have not consid-
ered what is to my mind the major issue ofthe adjustment mechanism in
the late-nineteenth-century gold standard that I have just discussed at
length. Finally, I have been unable to resist reading a few sentences of
Viner (1937, pp. 316--17) to them:117 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
Theclassical school and its importantfollowers all held thesameviews
on this point: after allowance for transportation costs, the market
prices of identical transportable commodities must everywhere be
equalortendto be equalwhen expressedinorconvertedto a common
currency. When, therefore, critics ofthe classical theory have taken it
to taskonthegrounds thatit explainedthe adjustmentofinternational
.balances by the influence on the course of trade of divergent market
prices in different markets ofidentical transportable commodities. . .
they have misinterpreted the classical doctrine.
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General Discussion
ABRAMOVITZ emphasized and endorsed the view that a central mystery
concerningthe adjustment mechanism underthe internationalgold stan-
dard lies in reconciling the relative freedom enjoyed by Great Britain
from the long swings in·aggregate economic activity that characterized118 Michael D. Bordo
the UnitedStateswith the magnitude ofinternational capital movements
in the nineteenth century.
FRIEDMAN elaboratedupontheissue raised byAbramovitzby referring
to the findings ofa study that Anna Schwartz and he recently completed
onmonetarytrendsin theUnitedStates andtheUnitedKingdom. Oneof
their most surprising findings was the independence of phase-cycle-to-
phase-cycle movementsin realincomein GreatBritainfrom eventsin the
United States. Friedman and Schwartz had been unable to find any
systematic factors explaining real-income fluctuations in Britain. Fried-
man suggested that this phenomenon was precisely the one cited by
Abramovitz.
MCCLOSKEY respondedto a pointraised by Harley. He notedin several
ofthe papers at the conference a definition ofequilibrium in the interna-
tional affairs of nations that is both artificial and a potential source of
confusion. According to that definition, a country's international affairs
arein equilibriumonlywhenthe balanceofpaymentsis zeroor, in a more
extreme version, when the current-account balance is zero. In fact,
countries can maintain surpluses or deficits in their balance ofpayments
for periods ofdecades or longer. This is evident in the recent experience
of Japan, for example. Similarly, countries sometimes go for centuries
with surpluses or deficits in their trade balances. Thus, a zero trade
balance orzero current-account balance may not be a useful definition of
equilibrium.
ZECHER, commentingonDavidHume'smethodology, pointedoutthat
though Hume may have believed in the law of one price as always in
effect, yet he might still ask what would happen if prices did differ
between countries or regions. For exan:tple, he used this method in
explaining the law ofgravity by starting with a situation where water did
not find its own level.
KOCHIN noted Bordo's exclusion of a notable authority on the gold
standard, Adam Smith. He noted also another issue omitted from Bor-
do's paper, namely, Hume's recognition that one of the purposes of the
gold standard is to possess a treasure against the contingency of war.
FRENKEL, commenting on Harley's remarks, was skeptical that one
should require a discussion ofthe gold standard to bring to the forefront
the terms of the trade adjustment consequent on the transfer. Frenkel
suggestedthatas far as the gold standardis concerned, the terms-of-trade
effect is probably not a central issue, since much of the adjustment
mechanism operates through the income-expenditure mechanism a la
Ohlin.
Frenkel also asked discussants to define precisely what they meant
when referring to the law ofone price. Inhis own discussion ofthe law of
one price, Humehad statedmerely that any manwho traveled in Europe
in his day observedthatdifferences in the prices ofcommodities between119 The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach
one kingdom and another are no greater than such differences between
provinces in the same kingdom.
DORNBUSCH expressed surprise at Frenkel'sstatementthatthe transfer
issue is not central to the analysis of the gold standard. It is central, he
suggested, if we think that relative price changes are part of the gold
standard adjustment mechanism.
WHITE offered a supplement to Bordo's discussion of the classical
period in which Bordo considers Ricardo and Mill but omits the cur-
rency-banking school controversy. White suggested that Bordo's ac-
count of the Act of 1844 relies too heavily on the arguments of its
advocates. It may be misleading to say that the currency school wished to
combine the automaticity ofthe gold standard with the capital savings of
a fiduciary currency, since in fact the Act of 1844 was not required in
order to accomplish that goal. Simply permitting the existence of an
unregulated financial system with fractional reserve banking would have
been sufficient to achieve that goal. White argued that the currency
school's principal complaint was that the gold standardwas insufficiently
automatic; they sought to eliminate what they saw as a slippage between
exports of gold and reductions of the quantity of money.
White went on to argue that the so-called banking school was made up
oftwo distinct sets ofopponents ofthe Act of1844. Bordo indicates that
the opponents of the act favored free competition, but in fact certain
members of the banking school, such as Thomas Tooke, were quite
hostile to free competition in banking and sympathetic with the Bank of
England's monopoly. At the same time, there were other opponents of
the BankAct, best referred to as the free bankingschool, who advocated
free competition in banking. The free banking school had a monetary
theory of the trade cycle and blamed the Bank of England for the
economy'scyclical instability. Tooke, ontheotherhand, hada nonmone-
tary theory and placed little of the blame on the Bank of England.
BORDO concurredwith Frenkel'sviewthatthetransferproblemwas not
central to the gold standard story. He accepted White's interpretation of
the existence of divisions within the banking school.